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Abstract  
This thesis evaluates the impact of minimum wages on labour market outcomes, 
exploiting variation in its "bite" across areas and years. 
In the UK, a National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced in 1999 and has been 
up-rated each year since.  This rather extended length of time since implementation 
constitutes an opportunity to take a retrospective look at the impact of this policy. 
Identification is based on variation in the "bite" of the NMW across local labour 
markets and the different sized year on year up-ratings. An "Incremental Difference-in-
Differences" (IDiD) model is used in which each year's change in the NMW is 
considered as a separate interaction effect. This IDiD procedure allows one to evaluate 
the year-on-year impact of the up-rating of the NMW on different labour market 
outcomes. 
The effect of the NMW on UK wage inequality is also assessed. In order to identify the 
effect of this policy on the distribution of earnings, the strategy applied in the US by 
Lee (1999) and more recently by Autor et al (2010) is used. Variation in the relative 
level of the NMW across local areas is exploited in order to disentangle the NMW effect 
from movements in latent wage dispersion. 
Finally, new estimates of the employment effects of the Minimum Wage (MW) are 
produced focusing on a panel of 33 OECD and European countries for the period 1971-
2009. Cross-national variation in the level and timing of the MW up-rating is exploited. 
The panel allows one to take into account the institutional and other policy related 
differences that might have an impact on employment other than the MW. It also allows 
one to differentiate the effect of the MW on employment in periods of economic 
downturn as well as in periods of economic growth, exploiting the exact timing of the 
recessionary experiences in different countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The labour market effects on a minimum wage, particularly its effect on employment, 
are perhaps one of the most contentious issues in labour economics. Contrasting 
theories (Stigler (1946), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Manning (2003)) suggest that a 
minimum wage can have either positive, negative or neutral effects on employment 
depending on one’s priors and so ultimately the effects  must be a matter for empirical 
verification. Despite more than 30 years of empirical work in this area, the effects are 
still disputed and vary across space and time generating room for continued work in this 
area. This thesis in applied labour economics consists of four research chapters that are 
devoted to the empirical analysis of the impact of the Minimum Wage (MW) on various 
labour market outcomes, exploiting variation of its "bite"
1
 across areas and years in 
order to try and identify its effects. The decade since the advent of the MW in the UK, 
in particular, provide new grounds on which to undertake further empirical 
investigation. Most existing UK studies focus on the short-term effects of the 
introduction of the MW in the UK and few look at the effects over a longer time horizon 
when there may be more scope for factor adjustment. We also take advantage of a long 
cross-country panel in order to extend the analysis to research questions that UK data 
cannot answer. First of all, using cross-country data we focus on young people, who are 
more likely to be affected by MW legislation because they are at the margins of 
employment. Secondly, we use cross-country data to look at whether the effects of the 
MW change across the business cycle. 
All four chapters aim at deepening our understanding of whether the MW has an effect 
on employment (chapter 2 and chapter 4), on hours of work and unemployment (chapter 
3) and on wage inequality (chapter 5). Most of the analysis will make use of UK data at 
local area level (chapter 2, 3 and 5). Chapter 4 will exploit international variation in the 
"bite" of the MW. 
 
                                                          
1
 By "bite" of the MW we mean a variable which captures the impact of the MW and  varies across areas 
and years. Such a measure is especially necessary when looking at the UK, where the MW is national and 
the units of analysis are geographical areas. One of the most widely used variables in the literature is the 
Kaitz index, defined as the ratio of the MW to some measure of the average wage. The closer the Kaitz 
index to unity the "tougher" the "bite" of MW legislation in any area. In this thesis we will use the Kaitz 
index as a measure of the "bite" of the MW, but we will also look at other  measures to test the robustness 
of our results. Detailed definitions of these measures will be found in the main chapters of the thesis 
(Chapter 2, section 2.2.1 and Chapter 4, section 4.3 and  Appendix 4.C). 
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Chapters 2 and 3 focus on assessing the impact of the UK National Minimum Wage 
(NMW) on inequality, employment, unemployment and hours of work over a decade 
since the introduction of the policy (1999-2007).  
The main reason for looking at inequality is that one of the motivations of the 
introduction of the NMW was to help reduce the trend of rising wage inequality which 
characterised the British labour market in the 80s and 90s (Low Pay Commission 1998). 
Since, labour adjustments due to the NMW may take place either at the extensive 
margins or at the intensive margin looking at how changes in the local area minimum 
wage incidence are related to changes in the employment rate, the unemployment rate 
and average working hours in the locality makes sense. 
Identification of the NMW impact is based on two sources of variation. The first is to 
exploit a natural variation in how the NMW "bites" in different geographical locations. 
In the UK case the NMW is set nationally and so there is no decision to be made at the 
local level. This means that the natural variation in the way the NMW impacts can be 
different at each geographical area. The second source of variation is to examine the 
effect of changes in the up-rating of the NMW over the years since it was introduced. 
The effects of the NMW are evaluated in each year, using an "Incremental Difference-
in-Differences" (IDiD) estimator. Instead of using a simple policy-on/policy-off 
Difference-in-Differences model, we examine a model  in which each year's change in 
the NMW is considered as a separate effect.  
We find that an increased "bite" is associated with a significant fall in wage inequality 
in the bottom half of the distribution. This suggests that geographical areas where the 
NMW "bites" more have experienced larger decline in wage inequality than elsewhere. 
While the overall effect of the NMW on employment rates averaged over its existence is 
neutral, we do find small positive employment effects from 2003 onwards. Likewise, 
the association of the NMW with unemployment has been negative in recent years. 
NMW effects on hours have been mixed, but overall there is no compelling evidence to 
indicate that the NMW up-ratings have had an adverse effect on full-time total hours of 
work. Our conclusions are all the more credible in the sense that we got substantially 
the same results even though we reanalysed the data using different definitions of the 
geographical unit of analysis and different measures of the "bite" of the NMW. 
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Chapter 4 is devoted to obtaining new estimates of the employment effect of the MW by 
focussing on the recessionary experiences across countries over 1971-2009 and on 
young people. 
Results in chapter 2 suggest that overall the impact of the UK NMW on employment is 
neutral for the period 1999-2007. These results are in line with theories where firms 
have some degree of monopsonistic power or with the existence of other labour market 
frictions. They are also consistent with the idea that there may be adjustments along 
margins other than employment, notably prices, profits, productivity and hours. 
However, one should bear in mind that the period of analysis is characterised  by an 
economic boom and macroeconomic stability and that the effects of an upgrade of the 
MW could change across the economic cycle. Economic recessions clearly impose 
aggregate shocks to employment conditions which may affect the working of the MW.  
This motivates chapter 4, which exploits variation of recessionary experiences across 33 
countries and 40 years. Moreover, analysis in chapter 2 is mainly conducted for adult 
workers. Chapter 4 also focuses on young people, who are at the margins of 
employment, and therefore more likely to be affected by the employment legislation.  
Using international data different sources of variation are exploited: cross-national 
variation in the timing and up-rating of the MW and the exact timing of recessionary 
experiences in different countries with a panel dataset comprising 33 OECD and 
European countries for the period 1971-2009. Institutional and other policy-related 
differences that might have an impact on employment other than the MW will be also 
accounted for. 
The study advances in many ways the earlier cross-country study of the impact of the 
MW on employment (Neumark and Wascher, 2004). The first advance relates to 
extending the dataset of Neumark and Wascher (2004), by including more countries and 
by extending the time period under scrutiny. The second contribution of this study is to 
generalise the controlling environment to allow for the fact that countries are 
introducing new employment policies, or changing them very frequently. In the 
literature to date this has not been adequately modelled. Another area of advance relates 
to one of the starting point and guiding motivation of this research which is to examine 
the effects of the interaction between the depth of the recession and the MW. Another 
contribution is to use different measures of the "bite" of the MW, checking the 
robustness of the results. As in Neumark and Wascher (2004) and in most of the MW 
literature, the Kaitz index as the ratio of the MW to an average wage is used. However, 
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the percentile at which the MW "bites" the wage distribution and the MW relative to 
GDP per head are also looked at. The final area of our robust investigation is that we 
attempt to explore the difficult problem of the possible endogeneity of the MW or Kaitz 
variable. The core problem with any MW regression, however formulated, is that 
arguably the measurement errors of the determination of employment are not 
independent of the "bite" of the MW. This is true to the extent that any country's 
government which invokes a MW (or has favourable policies relating to its up-rating in 
real terms) will also have unmeasured, unobserved attributes which separately affect the 
employment level. In this sense – one cannot reasonably assume that the variable which 
measures the MW is a valid exogenous variable to be included on the right hand side of 
such an equation. For this reason a ‘political complexion of the government’ 
instrumental variable (the Schmidt Index) is used.  
The main finding of this chapter is that there are significant negative employment 
effects of MW rises for young people – but that there are basically no significant 
negative employment effects for adults – which are only found when one uses one 
alternative measure of the "bite" of the MW. It would also appear that there are 
important additional interaction effects of these policies for young people in times of 
recession. In policy terms, the findings suggest that there is a potential price to be paid 
by those who are at the margins of employment, such as young people, especially 
during recessionary periods. Countries that have not already adopted a separate MW 
rate for young people should consider doing so. Also our results would suggest that in 
times of recession it might be prudent not to raise the MW for young people. 
 
Chapter 5 aims at deepening the understanding of whether the NMW contributed to the 
decrease of lower tail wage inequality in the UK, looking at the period from the 
introduction of the policy in 1999 up to 2010.  
One of the motivations for the introduction of the NMW was to help to "make work 
pay" and address in-work poverty, against a background of rising wage inequality which 
characterised the British labour market in the 1980s and early 1990s. At the outset, the 
Low Pay Commission (1998) hoped that the NMW might take "greater inroads into pay 
equality" without putting jobs at risk. That is why the chapter aims at having a deep 
insight of the impact of the NMW on wage inequality. 
In order to estimate the effect of the NMW in the recent trend towards lower tail wage 
inequality in the UK, the methodology exploited by Lee (1999) for the US is used. We 
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assume that the level of wages would have been similar across areas (or would have 
changed similarly), if it were not for the effect of the NMW. Differences in average 
wage levels across areas, that are assumed to be exogenous, therefore induce useful 
variation in the real "bite" of the NMW across areas that allows the identification of its 
effect net of other confounding forces. 
Three issues that appear to bias Lee’s (1999) work are addressed. Namely, the omitted 
variable bias due to the absence of area fixed effects (Autor et al, 2010), measurement 
error in the variables (Bosh and Manacorda, 2010) and simultaneity bias. We address 
the measurement error in the wage data by instrumenting our measure of the NMW 
computed with the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data with a new 
NMW measure computed using the Annual Population Survey (APS). To the extent that 
measurement error in the ASHE data is not correlated with measurement error in the 
APS data, this procedure will purge the estimates of potential correlation between the 
included regressors and the error term due to measurement error. We also attempt to 
solve the simultaneity bias problem in our data using alternative measures of wage 
inequality in our regression, such as the Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini.  
By looking at wage differentials of different percentiles q relative to the median wage 
(w
q
it – w
50
it), we find an effect of the NMW on the wage distribution. Using 2SLS 
estimation, the point estimates tend to become smaller at higher deciles and are 
statistically significant only up to the first decile, suggesting a negative impact of the 
NMW on lower tail wage inequality and perhaps some small spill-over effects. By 
looking also at different measures of wage inequality, such as the Atkinson index and 
the Generalised Gini, we find again a significant contribution of the NMW in reducing 
wage inequality. In conclusion, the findings suggest that the NMW has an impact on the 
UK wage distribution, contributing significantly to the decrease of lower tail wage 
inequality in past years. In policy terms, the NMW helped to “make work pay” and 
address in-work poverty, against a background of rising wage inequality which 
characterised the British labour market in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The following chapters now expand on these issues in more detail. 
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2. Employment,  Inequality and the UK National Minimum 
Wage over the Medium-Term 
2.1  Introduction 
It is now more than ten years since the National Minimum Wage (NWM) was 
introduced in the UK in April 1999. This rather extended length of time since 
implementation affords us an opportunity to take a retrospective look at the impact of 
the NMW. Most existing UK studies, (Stewart, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) have focused on 
the impact of the introduction of the NMW, finding, broadly, that the employment 
effects of the introduction were negligible. Aside from adjustment along other 
dimensions such as productivity, profits, hours or prices, or simply that the initial rate 
was too low in the wage distribution, another possible reasons for this, arguably 
counter-intuitive employment effect is that any longer-run effects have not been 
captured by previous studies. Since in the short-run the costs of adjusting inputs tend to 
be high, the response of employment to NMW increases might not be immediate. As 
recently pointed out by Neumark and Wascher (2007): “Most of the existing research on 
the United Kingdom has been limited to estimating short-run effects, and in our view, 
the question of the longer-run influences of the NMW on UK employment has yet to be 
adequately addressed”. In this chapter we take a medium to long run look at the impact 
of the NMW in the UK and its up-ratings and try to assess whether this has had a 
differential impact across heterogeneous geographical areas.  
Since inception, the UK NMW has been administered on a national basis, with both 
adult and youth rates applying to all parts of the country. However, the issue of whether 
a national minimum adequately reflects putative regional variation in productivity has 
recently been mooted in government and in the media.
2
 The longstanding geographic 
variation in wage rates across the UK does indeed have consequences for the "bite" of 
the NMW in different areas. As Stewart (2002) points out, the NMW reaches further up 
the wage distribution in certain parts of the country than in others.  We therefore make 
use of both this geographical variation and the variation in the real level that the NMW 
has been set at over time in order to see how changes in the local area NMW incidence 
over several years of the minimum wage’s existence are correlated with changes in local 
area performance. Since the level of the NMW is typically announced 6 months in 
                                                          
2
Daily Telegraph 23 July 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1558174/Gordon-Brown-to-
vary-minimum-wage-over-UK.html 
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advance of any up-rating, we also explore issues of advance implementation of 
employment changes in the dynamic specifications that follow. 
While there are a large number of studies on the labour market impact of the NMW, 
especially on the impact on employment, (see Brown et al (1982) and Card and Krueger 
(1995) for extensive reviews of the literature), only a few studies evaluate the impact of 
the NMW by exploiting geographical variation in local or regional labour markets, (See 
Card (1992) or Neumark and Wascher (1992) for the United States, Stewart (2002) for 
the UK). This chapter builds on that small literature by examining the impact of the 
NMW in the UK over the period 1997-2007, comparing the period two years before its 
introduction with the subsequent history of the NMW and its up-ratings. This enables us 
to provide an additional insight by distinguishing effects between those in a NMW 
policy-off period compared to each incremental up-rating of the NMW in subsequent 
years.  Hence instead of using a simply policy-on/policy-off, Difference-in-Differences 
(DiD) model, we examine a model in which each year's change in the NMW is 
considered as a separate interaction effect. This 'Incremental Difference-in-Differences' 
(IDiD) estimator is a logical corollary of the econometric model suggested by 
Wooldridge (2007) and Bertrand et al (2004) in that it introduces a yearly interaction for 
each up-rating of the NMW so that we may gauge the impact of each change in the 
NMW. We use this IDiD procedure to evaluate the year on year impact of the up-rating 
of the NMW on both employment and inequality. 
Secondly, we seek to assess whether the definition of the variable used to capture the 
impact of the NMW makes a notable difference to the analysis. In the empirical 
literature there is some debate over the exact definition of which variable to use to 
measure (or instrument for) the NMW. In our work, three different minimum wage 
variables are used and compared. Two measures focus on the proportion of workers 
directly affected by increases in the minimum wage: the minimum wage “share” (the 
proportion paid at or below the minimum wage) and the “spike” (the proportion paid at 
the minimum). The third measure is the Kaitz index, the ratio of the minimum wage to 
average wages in the local area.   
Thirdly, we examine whether the definition of the geographical unit used for the 
analysis matters. Since the definition of what constitutes a 'local labour market' in Great 
Britain is still open to discussion, the analysis is undertaken at three different levels of 
geographical aggregation. As in Stewart (2002), the data can be divided into 140 areas 
comprising unitary authorities and counties. However, the same analysis can be done 
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using 406 unitary authorities and districts. We also look at how the results change if we 
use the definition of 67% of people living and working in the same geography to 
capture a local labour market, as now used by the UK national statistics office to define 
a “travel to work area”  (TTWA). We remain agnostic as to what the correct definition 
of a 'local labour market' is and let the data tell us whether such definitional difficulties 
matter.   
Finally, the chapter examines the robustness of our results with regard to the issues 
associated with: dynamic specification to incorporate the lagged effects of the impact 
of the NMW, fixed effects for geographical areas, time and interaction effects, and we 
also assess whether the estimates differ if we include young people (those aged 16-25) 
or just use adults separately in the analysis.  In this testing we suggest that much of the 
previous literature is sometimes presented as if the results are in stark contrast to each 
other. Our take on this literature is that it often estimates fundamentally different 
parameters and that this explains a large degree of the differences in results.  
Previous research in the UK focused mainly on the employment effects of the 
NMW and for the most part found mainly no impact. However since, one of the 
motivations of the introduction of the minimum wage was to help reduce the trend of 
rising wage inequality which characterised the British labour market in the 80s and 90s 
(Low Pay Commission 1998), we show how changes in the local area minimum wage 
incidence are related to the extent of wage inequality in the locality along with our 
employment estimates. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the datasets used and the 
characteristics of the data and contains a description of the maps of the incidence of the 
minimum wage and the measures of local area performance in each local area. Section 
2.3 outlines the methodology for the analysis. The main results of the analysis are 
presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 focuses on robustness checks. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 Data 
The central idea of this chapter is to see whether geographic variation in the "bite" of 
the minimum wage is associated with geographic variation in employment and wage 
inequality. Geographical variation in wages in the UK is exploited in order to evaluate 
the impact of the NMW on employment and inequality. The data used in this study are 
drawn primarily from three sources. Data on earnings and a restricted number of 
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covariates all disaggregated by geography is provided by the Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (ASHE) from 1997 to 2007. The survey, conducted in April of each year, 
employers are asked to provide information on hours and earnings of the selected 
employees. The geographic information collected for the full sample period used in the 
chapter is based on workplace rather than residence. This is the only dataset that has 
hourly wage information from 1997 to 2007 at the various levels of geographical 
disaggregation used in this chapter. Alongside the hourly wage, the ASHE data enable 
us to compute different measures of wage inequality at the same geographic level, (we 
use the 50
th
/5
th
, 50
th
/10
th 
percentiles of the wage distribution. See appendix 2.B for a 
detailed description of the limitations affecting ASHE dataset).  
The geographic variation in wages will reflect the demographic and industrial 
composition of each local labour market. The changing industrial composition of an 
area and the extent to which industries are low and high paying will affect the changing 
incidence of the minimum wage working in a locality. Likewise the skill, age and 
gender composition of the local workforce. To a certain extent we can control for 
variation in these factors with a set of time varying local labour market control 
variables, drawn from either ASHE or matched in from complementary Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data. However, the choice of what constitutes a local labour market is 
open to discussion, therefore the analysis is conducted at three different levels of 
aggregation. First, the analysis is conducted at unitary authority and district level 
which includes 32 London boroughs, 238 districts
3
, 36 metropolitan districts and the 
46 unitary authorities in England. This geography also includes the 22 unitary 
authorities in Wales and the 32 unitary councils in Scotland, resulting in 406 local 
areas in Great Britain.  The median ASHE sample cell size is 311 and the smallest cell 
is 37. The second level of analysis is conducted at unitary authority and county level 
including 34 English counties, 6 English metropolitan counties, 46 English unitary 
authorities, inner and outer London and finally 52 unitary authorities in Scotland and 
Wales.
 4
 This results in 140 local areas in Great Britain.  Here the median sample cell 
size is 575 and the smallest cell is 42.  The final level of our analysis is to use a general 
definition of a TTWA, by aggregating up from district level to create areas in which 
                                                          
3
The London borough City of London and the district Isles of Scilly are excluded from the analysis due to 
small sample sizes. 
4
The Orkney Islands, Shetland Isles and Western Isles are aggregated together. The 36 English 
metropolitan districts are combined into 6 English metropolitan counties. London Boroughs are 
aggregated into inner and outer London. This allows to have matched geographies in the LFS and in the 
ASHE, using the definition of the variable “uacnty” in the LFS. 
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67% of people living and working in the same geography. Since TTWAs are not 
available for the entire period considered in this study the only option was to attempt to 
replicate our results for the most 'reasonable' definition of a TTWA that we could 
manually reconstruct from the data available. This gave us 138 new geographical areas 
for which we repeated all our analysis. The mechanics of how to do this and the 
estimated effects using TTWA instead of the formal geographical administrative areas 
are given in the robustness checks section of the chapter. 
We then match local area employment data from the LFS with the minimum wage 
covariates generated from the ASHE. There is an important feature of the timing of data 
collection which we exploit in order to try and make sure that our employment variable 
is measured after the up-rating of the NMW.  The ASHE estimates for hourly earnings 
and therefore the minimum wage variables used in this chapter are recorded in April of 
each year. Since the minimum wage was first introduced in April 1999 but then up-rated 
in October of each following year, the NMW variables are therefore generally recorded 
6 months after each NMW up-rating. There are however two exceptions: April 1999 
which is contemporaneous to the introduction of the minimum and April 2000 which is 
1 year from the introduction of the minimum. To reduce simultaneity concerns, the 
wage data in April of year t is regarded as having absorbed any effect of the NMW 
upgrade in October of year t-1. This is in turn matched to employment data taken from 
June to August of year t
5
. This means that the estimated impact effect we identify is a 
mixture of the impact of the up-rating in year t-1 and any changes from the already 
announced anticipation of the effect of the new NMW level in year t
6
.  
Data on employment at these levels of aggregation derived from the LFS are 
available via NOMIS for yearly data for 1997 and 1998.  For the period 1999-2005 we 
use employment rates calculated from the quarterly LFS local area data. For the years 
2006 and 2007 we use the quarterly LFS Special License data to calculate the 
employment rate. Data availability means that we can do our analysis separately for 
three age groups: All workers from 16 years old to retirement age (65 years for men and 
                                                          
5
 For 1997 and 1998, data on employment rates are collected from March 1997 to February 1998 and 
from March 1998 to February 1999. Quarterly data is not available for these two calendar years. Since 
LFS Local Area data is only available in seasonal quarters, it is only possible to use the June-August 
quarter and not a longer period (eg. from May to September). 
6
Swaffield (2008) shows that there is little early upward adjustment in wages in the six months prior to 
October over several years of data.  
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60 for women); Adults workers, from 25 years old to retirement age
7
. A detailed 
definition of the key variables in the analysis is reported in appendix 2.A 
2.2.1 Measures of the NMW 
One of the most widely used variables in the literature is the Kaitz index, defined as the 
ratio of the minimum wage to some measure of the average wage. We use the median 
wage in our study. The closer the Kaitz index to unity the "tougher" the "bite" of 
minimum wage legislation in any area. However, the denominator can be influenced by 
factors other than the level of the NMW and so the median wage is arguably more 
endogenous in an employment regression. For example, a positive correlation between 
the employment rate and the median wage might be generated by an exogenous labour 
demand shift. This will create a negative correlation between the Kaitz index and the 
employment rate. In view of these problems with the Kaitz index, two other minimum 
wage variables are used in this study. These two measures focus on the proportion of 
workers directly affected by increases in the minimum wage: the minimum wage 
“share” proportion paid at or below the minimum wage, and the “spike” (proportion 
paid at the minimum). The larger the spike or the shares, the more likely the impact of 
the minimum wage on the local wage. The “shares” and the “spike” should exclude the 
variation in real minimum wages that results from inflation or other aggregate factors 
(Neumark and Wascher, 2007).   
The logic of our identification strategy is evident in the descriptive statistics in 
figures 2-1 to 2-3. Figure 2-1 highlights the temporal variation in the NMW, comparing 
the nominal hourly wage level of the adult NMW over time with the notional level 
which would have been achieved if the NMW were indexed to average earnings. The 
figure shows how the NMW started off by being lower than the average rise in earnings 
and then rose more steeply than this series. Most marked is the rise in this level in both 
real and nominal terms since 2003. The largest rises in the NMW are in 2001, 2004 and 
2006. This is mirrored in the rising level of the Kaitz Index over the same years shown 
in figure 2-2.   
As well as temporal variation in the NMW, there are clear geographic differences in 
the "bite" of the NMW. The 95% range for the Kaitz index is around 20% points and the 
spread for the share estimate is around 5 points. This pattern does not change much over 
                                                          
7
Due to the presence of age bands in the area-level LFS, it is not possible to analyse the impact of the 
NMW on adults from 22 years up that the actual coverage of the adult rate of the NMW would require. 
Analysis is therefore restricted to persons from 25 years up. 
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the 1997-2007 period. While the average value of the Kaitz has risen, there is less 
evidence that these spreads have risen or fallen consistently over time. Figure 2-3 plots 
how these patterns of geographical low pay vary across the UK at the inception of the 
NMW in 1999 alongside the changes in the NMW share over the period 1999-2007.  
The "bite" of the minimum wage in London tends to be lower than in the rest of the 
country. Areas particularly affected are the rural periphery of the country and the 
formerly industrialised urban areas. Over time the map shows that the "bite" of the 
minimum wage has increased across more areas. The biggest changes in the "bite" occur 
in parts of the Midlands, Hampshire, Wiltshire and Dorset and parts of Lancashire and 
the North East.  As we show below, these changes are associated with changes in the 
local area levels of wage inequality. The tougher the NMW "bites", the bigger the effect 
on local measures of wage inequality.  
2.3 Methodology and identification  
To understand any of the estimation results relating to the impact of the NMW one must 
be clear about the exact form of the econometric specification and which parameters the 
model aims to identify in the model.   
Among the first to use panel data to address the question of the impact of the 
minimum wage were Neumark and Wascher (1992) who used US state data from 
1973-1989. They estimated the model: 
Ejt =   + γTt + Jj + βMWjt + δXjt + εjt        (2.1) 
Where Ejt is employment at time t in State j , MWjt  is the level of the MW (adjusted for 
coverage) at time t in State j, Xjt is a set of controlling regressors at time t in State j, Tt is 
a set of year effects and Jj is a set of State fixed effects. Fixed effect estimation 
identifies potential causal inferences based on changes in the regressor and regressand 
given the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity across areas remains constant 
over time periods.  Later Neumark and Wascher (2004) use the same specification to 
estimate the impact of the NMW laws across countries with the slight modification that 
now the MWjt  term is similar to the Kaitz index using the ratio of the NMW in country j 
at time t divided by the average wage in that year
8
. Neumark and Wascher in their 
various papers, whether at the US state level or at the level of countries, also find a 
negative employment effect of the NMW.   
                                                          
8
Usually the Kaitz index is also weighted by some measure of 'coverage' of the NMW in the sense of the 
fraction of the labour force that the NMW applies to. 
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The logical critique of this panel model is that it still suffers from potentially all the 
same sources of potential heterogeneity bias as the simple time series model. Indeed it 
could even be argued that using geographical states as the unit of observation could 
potentially have even more problems - if for example - one state legislature's decision to 
implement or change a minimum wage is heavily influenced by another neighbouring 
state's policy decision.  This concern is less of a problem in the UK context as there is a 
national NMW rather than a state minimum - in which case the actual level (and 
change) in the NMW is not under the control of the authorities in any particular 
location.   
A related methodological departure focused on identification is suggested by Card 
(1992) and Stewart (2002) in which a ‘structural’ econometric model consists of two 
equations.  The first is a form of labour demand equation which suggests that any 
change in the employment rate in area j is a movement along the labour demand curve 
which results from a change in the wage level in area j. 
ΔEj = γ0 + ηΔWj + u1j   (2.2) 
The second equation is a form of identity suggesting that the wage increase in area j is a 
function of the proportion in the area who are ‘low paid’, Pj. 
ΔWj =  1 + λPj + u2j   (2.3) 
Substituting equation (2.3) into equation (2.2) we get    
  
ΔEj = γ0 + βPj + εj   (2.4) 
Where β = ηλ, with λ assumed to be positive, implying that β has the same sign as η 
which basic economic theory would suggest is negative if the demand for labour falls as 
wages rise. According to Stewart (2002) the precondition for identification is that the 
proportion in the area that are ‘low paid’, Pj is a predetermined instrument for the 
endogenous wage change. 
The central idea of our chapter is also to see whether geographic variation in the 
"bite" of the minimum wage is associated with geographic variation in employment. 
However, we also allow the effect of any treatment to vary over time, given the 
differential pattern of up-ratings that we observe in the data. This can be done by 
pooling over the 11 year period and letting the treatment be the measure of the "bite" of 
the NMW in each area at time t, Pjt, so that the model estimated is: 
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(2.5)                                     
Where Ejt is a measure of area labour market performance in area j at time t, Jj are area 
effects, and Yt is a set of year effects. Area fixed effects are included to control for 
omitted variables that vary across local areas but not over time such as unmeasured 
economic conditions of local areas economies that give rise to persistently tight labour 
markets and high wages in particular areas independently of national labour market 
conditions. Time fixed effects control for omitted variables that are constant across local 
areas but evolve over time. 
The IDiD coefficients θt
IDiD
 on the interaction of the year dummies and the measure 
of the "bite", capture the average effect of the up-rating of the NMW in each year, 
starting from the introduction of the policy in 1999 all relative to the 'off period' of 1997 
and 1998, provided of course that the proportion in the area who are ‘low paid’, Pjt  is a 
valid instrument for the endogenous wage change. The advantage of using the IDiD 
estimation procedure is that it facilitates the estimation of year on year incremental 
effects of each year’s up-rating.  So even if the average effect over all years is 
insignificantly different from zero, this does not mean that the effect of any individual 
year's change in the NMW is also zero.  Note that one cannot deduce the longer run 
effect of all the changes in the NMW by simply summing all the year-on-year IDiD 
coefficients.
9
  The long run effect can only be measured in aggregate by using one DiD 
coefficient for the whole period.  We therefore present both short run IDiD and medium 
run DiD estimates in what follows. 
The literature is silent on how to untangle autocorrelation in panel data with very 
short time series like ours. An additional concern is the obvious one of spatially 
contiguous areas giving rise to heteroskedastic errors. With regard to the latter problem 
one approach is to model the form of these spatial relations.  As all our geographical 
areas have bordering areas then it may well be that there is a clear relationship between 
these contiguous areas. The complex nature by which these neighbouring areas have 
local labour markets which are inter-related and how to model these effects is left for 
future work. In the absence of an appropriate spatial model, we calculate standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of unknown form, Wooldridge (2002 
                                                          
9
This is because some additional (untestable) assumption relating to independence of effects over time 
would be necessary. In addition, since we use a dummy variable interaction term, rather than a normalised 
metric on how large each increment was then this also makes aggregation of the individual interaction 
term estimates difficult. 
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p.275), which gives consistent, if inefficient, estimates. Another alternative is to simply 
cluster the data by local area. 
10
  
2.3.1 Identification Issues 
One important question to ask is how long it should take the introduction (or changes) 
in the NMW to have its full effects on employment and other economic indicators 
(especially since some of the variables in the data are already measured with a lag).  
From an empirical point of view, this raises the specification issue about including a 
lagged effect of the minimum wage variable in the regression. The debate on this 
question is still ongoing. On the one hand, employers might react relatively quickly to 
increases in minimum wages. Employers might even adapt before the implementation of 
the minimum wage. Brown et al (1982), regarding employment, argue that:  ”One 
important consideration is the fact that plausible adjustment in employment of minimum 
wage workers can be accomplished simply by reducing the rate at which replacements 
for normal turnover are hired.”, (p.496). Clearly the size of any change to the existing 
wage bill generated by the NMW matters here. Another reason given by the authors is 
that minimum wages increases are announced months before they are implemented – 
typically 6 months in the UK - therefore firms may have begun to adapt before the 
increase of the minimum wage come effectively into force. On the other hand, it might 
take time for employers to adjust factors inputs to changes in factors prices. Hamermesh 
(1995) points out that in the short run capital inputs might be costly to adjust. If firms 
adjust capital slowly following an increase of the minimum wage, the adjustments of 
labour input might be slowed as well. The use of a lagged minimum wage measure as 
well as the inclusion of fixed effects in the regression also helps to decrease the possible 
endogeneity of the minimum wage variable which occurs from correlation of either the 
proportion paid at the minimum or, in case of the Kaitz index, the minimum wage and 
the median wage with labour market conditions or productivity.  
A further issue of identification arises from the 'common trends assumption' which, 
in our context, is that the effect of market conditions will be the same across all 
geographic units in the absence of the introduction of the NMW.  One way of 
examining this is to consider whether the employment rate has the same underlying 
trend across all our geographical units before the introduction of the NMW.  In our case 
we cannot do this because the small geography LFS data which we use to construct the 
                                                          
10
Clustering by local area rather than using the general robustness correction makes little or no qualitative 
difference to our conclusions. 
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employment rate does not go back before 1997.  However, it is possible to have a longer 
off-period starting from 1994 and using 95 areas, which correspond to the coding used 
on the NES (the National Earnings Survey which preceded the ASHE) up to 1996.
11
 
The results of the test give us some confidence about the internal validity of the model, 
being unable to reject the null of a common trend at 10% level for the two age groups 
considered in the study.
 12
 Whilst this is no proof of the presence of common trends in 
our data, this gives us some confidence about the internal validity of our model for the 
full set of more detailed geographies.  
The NMW was not the only labour market policy instrument in operation over the 
period that varied by area and time. It may be that identification of a NMW effect is also 
compromised by any correlation of these other interventions with changes in the local 
"bite" of the NMW. The set of area and time varying covariates in the control vector Xjt  
help net out some of the concerns over these issues. 
13
 
2.4  Results  
We begin with a summary of the association between the level of lower tail wage 
inequality and the "bite" of the NMW in the local area. If there appears to be an impact 
on the wage distribution then this might suggest there would be effects on other 
measures of local labour market performance. There is good reason to expect that 
imposition and then raising of the NMW will have positive effects in reducing wage 
inequality at the bottom end of the income distribution.  If one truncates the income 
distribution from the left by forcing employers to pay the lowest earners at a specified 
minimum then automatically one expects that (unless there are large spill-over effects) 
we would find that inequality would be reduced as the NMW rises, other things equal. 
Dickens and Manning (2004a) report evidence of these effects in the UK around the 
                                                          
11
The areas comprise all existent counties, the counties abolished with the 1996 local government reform 
and the London boroughs. The “City of London” was deleted from the dataset due to small sample size 
and the Scottish Islands were excluded from the analysis because they are not present in the data across 
all years. 
12
For adult workers (25 years to retirement) we cannot reject the null of a common trend at the 10% level 
(F (94, 285) =1.41). For all workers (16 years to retirement) we cannot reject the null of a common trend 
at the 10% level (F(91,  276)=1.45) if we omit three areas, all with small sample sizes, (Scottish Borders, 
Gwynedd and Shropshire). However, omitting these areas from our IDiD regressions does not change our 
main results. 
13
Employment rates for groups more or less likely to have been affected by the NMW within areas as a 
means to identification through a triple Difference-in-Differences, could, in principle be disaggregated by 
local area and industry or education from 2004 onward using the Annual Population Survey, though the 
level of area disaggregation would have to be larger than that used in the present study because of sample 
size limitations. Wages could be disaggregated by (macro) region and industry back to 1997.  
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introduction and other authors report similar findings from the US. (See DiNardo et al 
(1996), Lee (1999) and Autor et al (2010)).   
There are obvious endogeneity concerns here when regressing a measure of wage 
inequality on another variable linked to wages. For this reason we do not use the Kaitz 
index as an NMW toughness proxy and the remaining estimates should be seen as 
indicative only of correlations in the data. Table 2-1 presents our IDiD results using 
model (2.5) for the effects of the year on year up-ratings of the NMW on local area 
wage inequality as measured by the log 50-5 and the log 50-10 percentile ratio. The 
results are given for two different local labour market definitions for all adults aged 16 
and over. We have also performed our estimation for the  TTWA as defined above. Our 
results with their TTWA robust counterparts can be summarised in a graphical 
representation of the estimates coefficients from the underlying regression model. 
Figure 2-4 graphs the estimated NMW coefficients along with the 95% confidence 
interval for both the 406 and TTWA area levels of aggregation. The coefficients of our 
IDiD regression are all negatively significant and increasingly so over time, indicating 
that lower tail wage inequality fell more in areas where the NMW bit most.  It is also 
important to note that there is a clear overlap in all of the 95% confidence intervals for 
both these different geographies. 
There are also smaller effects moving up the wage distribution, again consistent with 
the idea that the NMW is driving the fall in inequality. The NMW coefficients for the 
50-10 wage ratio are smaller than the equivalent coefficients using the 50-5 ratio. This 
may also indicate limited spill-over effects of the NMW as the lower percentile used in 
the measure of inequality moves further away from the percentile at which the NMW 
"bites". When we repeat the same exercise at 140 areas level of aggregation the results 
are qualitatively similar. Here the regression coefficients tend to be even more negative 
than the coefficients for the 406 areas, suggesting there may be a greater degree of 
attenuation bias in the 406 level of disaggregation.
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There is little difference between the estimates when wage inequality rate for all age 
groups is used as the dependent variable or when only the adult (25 to retirement) rate is 
used. 
We next present estimates of the DiD model (2.1) using (the log of) employment as 
the labour market outcome of interest to summarise the NMW effect on employment 
over the medium term, namely the average over nine years since its introduction relative 
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If we use the 50-20 differential as the dependent variable, the NMW effects are smaller still. 
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to the base period of 1997/98. Table 2-2 outlines the estimated NMW coefficients . For 
each NMW toughness measure there are 4 columns. The first column is the estimate 
from a simple regression of the dependent variable on the NMW measure, effectively 
establishing the correlation between the two variables. The estimates confirm the long-
established fact that employment is lower in low wage areas.  The correlation is stronger 
when 140 areas are used rather than 406. In every regression the estimated coefficients 
based on the 406 areas are attenuated relative to the higher level of aggregation 
estimates. This again suggests the presence of a greater degree of measurement error 
among the more disaggregated data. There is little difference between the estimates 
when total employment is used as the dependent variable or when the adult (25 to 
retirement) rate is used. The addition of year specific time dummies makes little 
difference to the estimates, but the addition of area fixed effects removes the positive 
association between low wages and low employment. Since any effect is now identified 
through variations in the NMW "bite" over time across areas, this suggests no overall 
difference in employment growth rates between areas where the NMW "bites" most 
compared to areas where the NMW has less impact. The further addition of time and 
varying area-level covariates has little effect.  
Table 2-3 presents the results of the IDiD estimates for several samples based on the 
model (2.5), with a full set of controls along with time and area fixed effects.  The 
results suggest that the average estimate of no association between the NMW "bite" and 
employment obscures significant changes over the sample period. Indeed over time, the 
positive association between low pay and NMW toughness becomes negative, so that in 
the latter sample period, areas where the NMW bit most experienced higher 
employment growth. These positive estimates are larger and most significant for the 
sample of all individuals aged to 16 to retirement, but in 2004 and 2006 there are 
positive, significant estimates of the NMW "bite" on employment for two of the three 
NMW measures. These point estimates effects are small in magnitude,
15
 but it is clear 
that they are masked if the simple DiD policy-on/policy-off variable is used. If the 
standard assumptions of Difference-in-Differences relating to the Stable Unit Treatment 
are applicable (namely that no other systematic factors are varying across geography 
and over time) then we can interpret this as a causal impact of the up-ratings to the 
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For example the point estimate of 0.026 for 2004 implies that employment growth in that year was 
0.26% higher in an area where 10% of employees were paid at or below the NMW compared to areas 
where no-one was paid the NMW compared to the respective growth rates in 1997/98. 
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NMW. On this basis, if anything, employment rate appears to have risen more in areas 
where the NMW has more relevance.
16
 
Figure 2-5 plots the individual year employment estimates for the 16 to retirement 
group for both the 406 areas and the TTWA areas. The regression estimates are given in 
Table C 2-4. Here again we can see clearly that whichever geography is used there are 
grounds to believe that there were positive employment effects for 2004 and for 2006 
with a reasonable possibility that the positive effect also exists for 2003 and 2005.  
Figure 2-1 suggests that these are all the years in which the up-rating of the NMW kept 
it above the general rise in average earnings.
17
   
2.5 Robustness checks 
Table 2-4 offers a set of robustness checks for the employment estimates. To address 
concerns over measurement error in the construction of the minimum wage variables, 
we use instead the mandated minimum plus 5 or 10 pence to generate the share, spike 
and Kaitz variables. This makes very little difference to the estimates, nor does using 
the mean rather than the median as the denominator for the Kaitz index. A weighted 
least squares regression, based on the sample sizes of the local areas used to calculate 
wages, also makes little difference to the overall impression that while the full sample 
period there is little association between the "bite" of the minimum and employment, 
there are years toward the end of the sample period when there is a positive association 
between the "bite" of the NMW and employment.  
An alternative way to eliminate fixed unobserved area characteristics and obtain 
consistent estimates is to estimate the model in differences. Table C 2-1 compares 
within group estimates of the NMW effect estimated in Table 2-2, averaged over the 9 
years, with the estimates in differences. In both models time fixed effects are added to 
control for omitted variables that are constant across local areas but evolve over time. 
Both models suggest no overall difference in employment growth rates between areas 
where the NMW "bites" most compared to areas where the NMW has less impact. 
Similarly using different dynamic specifications, outlined in Table C 2-2, make little 
differences to the conclusions drawn from Table 2-2. 
The results of the IDiD estimates measured the additional incremental effect of the 
up-rating of the NMW in each year relative to the off-period of 1997/98. In Table C 2-3, 
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One concern with the timing of the effects we have found is that the post 2003 period coincides with the 
change in the sampling frame of ASHE.  However, it would seem to us that there is no way to test this.  
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we run separate Difference-in-Differences regressions year by year, measuring the 
effect of the up-ratings of the minimum wage in each year relative to the year before. 
The estimates for the years 1997-8 (before the NMW was introduced), effectively test 
how our Difference-in-Differences model performs on a 'placebo', fictitious law. The 
estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero, independently on the 
minimum wage measures used and the level of geographical aggregation, giving us 
confidence about the internal validity of our model. The results for the other year 
pairings are generally insignificant, excepting the negative and significant estimate of 
the introduction of the NMW in 1999 using the proportion paid at the NMW. In general 
then, it seems that the positive employment results we find above are driven mainly by 
comparisons with local area conditions in the run-up to the introduction to the NMW
18
. 
The definition of a local labour market is moot, however it is important to test the 
robustness of our findings to different definitions of a local labour market. We have 
therefore used a travel to work area approach alongside the other two local area 
classifications. Since TTWA data do not exist on any administrative data bases that we 
are aware of for the entire length of our panel, we have had to create an alternative set 
of local areas that are close to TTWA from the raw ASHE/LFS data that we do have 
access to as follows. The most recent criteria used by the ONS to define TTWA is that 
at least 67% of those who live in the area also work there and at least 67% of those who 
work on the area also live there. We therefore use ASHE data from 2002 where we have 
information about the local authorities where people work and local authorities where 
people live. We then compute commuting shares (given by the proportion of people 
who live in an area and work in another area and the proportion of people who work in 
an area and live in another one). We than keep all the district and unitary authorities 
where the ONS definition of travel to work areas holds (around 12% of areas). For the 
other local authorities, with the help of ArcGis software we overlap the map of ONS 
TTWA with the map of local authorities and combine Districts and Unitary Authorities 
into existing TTWA boundaries. With these new geographies we compute the 
commuting patterns to check the consistency with ONS definition of TTWAs. For the 
few areas (14%) where the ONS definition of TTWAs still does not hold we aggregate 
further. Doing this we end up with 138 areas. Some 90% of these are such that at least 
                                                          
18
Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2009) have also recently used an area based approach over the latter half 
of our sample period. They find statistically insignificant NMW effects on employment growth over this 
period.  This again seems to suggest that the base period is an important reference point underlying the 
results. 
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67% of working residents work in the area and at least 67% of workers are resident in 
the areas. Table C 2-4 shows how changing the definition of geography used in our 
analysis the main message of the chapter does not change. Similar small positive effects 
of the NMW are found when we use our TTWA definition. 
In Table C 2-5 we present our IDiD results using as a base year either 1997 only or 
1998 only. This is mainly because in 1998 there might be already an anticipation of the 
effect of the introduction of the NMW. The results using either 1997 or 1998 as a base 
year are similar to our main regressions results, suggesting that the anticipation effect of 
the introduction of the NMW in 1998 was limited. The coefficients of the interactions 
between the NMW measure and 1998 as well as 1997 are insignificant. 
The regression estimates of Table C 2-6 show our IDiD estimates using a longer off-
period from 1993 to 1998 and compares them with our previous estimates. Due to the 
changing in coding reflecting the local government reorganisation of the mid-1990s, the 
geography used in previous sections of the chapter cannot be used for a longer period 
estimation. Instead we use the same 95 areas used to test for common trends. The results 
in Table C 2-6 again show that the average estimate of no association between the 
NMW "bite" averaged over the entire sample period obscures significant changes at 
different points. Comparing the regression results of the 408 and 140 areas with the 
ones of the 95 areas, over time, the initial (insignificant) negative association between 
employment and NMW toughness is now statistically significant and then becomes 
positive and statistically significant. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Our starting point was that much of the US debate over the employment effects of the 
NMW has generated a 'lot of heat but not much light'. This conclusion is warranted to 
the extent that our examination of the empirical literature made it clear that much of the 
US controversy and debate over whether the effects on employment are negative or 
positive is actually arguing about different estimated parameters in the sense that they 
use different estimation strategies, with different types of data, on widely different 
samples of people of different ages. The truth is that most of the papers in this literature 
are estimating different marginal effects. 
Our identification strategy was to use two sources of variation to try and identify the 
effect of the NMW. The first is to exploit a natural variation in how the NMW "bites" in 
different geographical locations. In our UK case the minimum wage  is set nationally 
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and so there is no decision to be made at the local level (in sharp contrast to the US 
case). This means that the natural variation in the way the NMW works must be 
different at each geographical area. Our second source of variation was to examine the 
effect of changes in the up-rating of the NMW over the years since it was introduced. 
This estimation is based on an IDiD method which allows us to estimate the marginal 
(interaction) effect of each year change in the NMW. The combination of these two 
different methods of identification along with the rigorous use of different robustness 
checks means that we can be more confident about the estimated effect of the impact of 
the NMW. Our conclusions are all the more credible in the sense that we got 
substantially the same results even though we reanalyzed the data in three completely 
different ways using completely different definitions of the geographical units of 
analysis.   
The conclusion from our estimates is that overall there seems to be no significant 
association of the NMW on employment when we use a conventional Difference-in-
Differences estimation for the whole policy-on/policy-off effect.  However, when we 
use of IDiD estimation method we retrieve significant positive effects on employment 
in recent years.  Most specifically in the period 2004-6. These findings are interesting as 
they are firstly consistent with much of the recent literature focusing on the introduction 
of the NMW (i.e. since they also get zero or small positive effects) but also because they 
explain why it may be possible to get both zero and positive effects. What drives these 
results is open to interpretation and subject to our ability to identify a NMW effect. It 
may be a realisation that the effects of the NMW on the wage bill may not warrant 
widespread employment losses, particularly given the level of demand and the ability of 
UK firms to adjust to labour cost shocks through a combination of hours, prices, 
productivity and profits documented elsewhere (summarized in Metcalf (2008)). 
In relation to our findings on inequality it is  clear, as one might expect, that raising 
the NMW is associated with reduced lower tail wage inequality in a systematic way 
each year since its introduction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 2-1. Change in the Nominal Hourly Wage Level of the adult rate of the NMW 
 
Source: Low Pay Commission and ONS 
Figure 2-2. Change in Estimated NMW &  Kaitz Index Over Time, 1997-2007 
 
Source: ASHE and ONS.
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Figure 2-3. Geographical Variation in the Minimum Wage Share (persons of working age) 
  
   Level 1999-2001        Change 1999-2007 
Source: ASHE 
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Figure 2-4. Incremental Difference-in-Differences wage inequality estimates, age 16- 
retirement.  
  
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations. 
 
Figure 2-5. Incremental Difference-in-Differences employment estimates, age 16-
retirement.  
 
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations.
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Table 2-1. Incremental Difference-in-Differences Wage Inequality Estimates 
  Proportion paid at or below NMW Proportion Paid at NMW 
 
Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  
16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 16-ret. 
406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 
  50-5 50-10 50-5 50-10 
NMW  0.092*** 0.095*** 0.054** 0.060** -0.002 0.004** -0.001 0.003* 
Base Years (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
         NMW*1999 -0.035*** -0.052*** -0.009 -0.007 0.007 -0.006 0.014** 0.008* 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
NMW*2000 -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.027*** 0.028*** 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
NMW*2001 -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.031*** -0.043*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.011*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
NMW*2002 -0.067*** -0.079*** -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.011 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.009** 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
NMW*2003 -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.036*** -0.041*** 0.001 -0.011** 0.001 -0.014*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
NMW*2004 -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.005 -0.017*** (0.004) -0.011*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
NMW*2005 -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.015** -0.017** -0.009 0.009* 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
NMW*2006 -0.077*** -0.097*** -0.047*** -0.056*** -0.009 -0.025*** -0.007 -0.017*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
NMW*2007 -0.102*** -0.116*** -0.064*** -0.077*** -0.028*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.027*** 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Notes: All regressions contain year, area effects + controls (education, age, gender). HAC robust fixed effect 
estimates in brackets. The base year are 1997-1998. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-2. Employment Estimates of the NMW over the Medium Term, 1997-2007 
  Proportion paid at or below NMW Proportion paid at NMW Kaitz Index 
Total 16-ret. -0.021*** -0.020*** 0.001 0.001 -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.015 -0.021 -0.012 
406 areas (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) 
             
Total 16-ret. -0.039*** -0.043*** 0.009* 0.008* -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.001 0.002 -0.109*** -0.150*** 0.031 0.035 
140 areas (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.024) (0.048) (0.030) 
             
Adult 25-ret. -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.001 0.001 -0.013*** -0.016*** 0.001 0.001 -0.014 -0.026*** -0.008 -0.006 
406 areas (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.023) 
             
Adult 25-ret -0.038*** -0.042*** 0.003 0.002 -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.002 0.003 -0.102*** -0.151*** 0.066 0.047 
140 areas (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.020) (0.041) (0.042) 
             
Year Effects N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Area Effects N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Controls N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-3. Incremental Difference-in-Differences Employment Estimates 
  Proportion paid at or below NMW   Proportion Paid at NMW   Kaitz Index 
 
Total  Total  Adult  Adult  
  
Total  Total  Adult  Adult  
  
Total  Total  Adult  Adult  
16-ret. 16-ret. 25-ret 25-ret 16-ret. 16-ret. 25-ret 25-ret 16-ret. 16-ret. 25-ret 25-ret 
406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 
NMW  -0.006* -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 
 
0.009 -0.001 0.012* -0.001 
 
-0.041 -0.034 -0.032 -0.009 
Base year (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.026) (0.050) (0.025) (0.045) 
NMW*1999 
-0.009 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 
 
-0.025*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.013** 
 
-0.029 0.023 -0.009 0.023 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.040) (0.032) (0.036) 
NMW*2000 
-0.001 0.002 0.002 0.008 
 
-0.013** -0.007 -0.014* -0.006 
 
0.02  0.078** 0.022  0.090*** 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021) (0.038) (0.020) (0.034) 
NMW*2001 
0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 
-0.009 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.013** 
 
0.01 0.038 0.006 0.035 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.019) (0.042) (0.018) (0.037) 
NMW*2002 
0.008 0.002 0.007 0.001 
 
-0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004 
 
 0.048**  0.068*  0.048** 0.036 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.020) (0.035) (0.021) (0.034) 
NMW*2003 
 0.012** 0.01 0.007 0.013 
 
-0.008 0.004 -0.013* 0.005 
 
 0.074***  0.184***  0.054**  0.128*** 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.024) (0.044) (0.022) (0.039) 
NMW*2004 
0.021***  0.026*** 0.012**  0.021** 
 
-0.003 0.008 -0.011 0.003 
 
0.078*** 0.115*** 0.050** 0.079** 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.025) (0.044) (0.022) (0.037) 
NMW*2005 
0.013** 0.023** 0.006 0.017* 
 
-0.004  0.013*** -0.004 0.008 
 
 0.072***  0.132*** 0.031  0.067** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.028) (0.036) (0.023) (0.032) 
NMW*2006 
0.019** 0.033*** 0.013* 0.023** 
 
-0.001  0.011* -0.004 0.006 
 
 0.077**  0.177***  0.063**  0.142*** 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) 
NMW*2007 
0.012* 0.020* 0.005 0.012 
 
-0.003 0.011 -0.008 0.002 
 
 0.058**  0.143***  0.049**  0.116*** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.026) (0.048) (0.024) (0.042) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
 
  
 
 
4
0
 
 
Table 2-4. Employment Robustness Checks, 406 areas, total (16-ret.) 
  Proportion paid at or below NMW   Proportion paid at NMW   Kaitz Index 
 
Original 5p 10p Cell  size   Original 5p 10p Cell size   Original 5p 10p Cell size 
               
NMW  -0.006* -0.005 -0.006 -0.009** 
 
0.009 -0.002 -0.006** 0.004 
 
-0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.037 
Base year (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
               
NMW*1999 
-0.009 -0.011* -0.010 -0.011*  
 
-0.025*** -0.010** -0.007 -0.019** 
 
-0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.035* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
NMW*2000 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 
-0.013** -0.001 -0.001 -0.01 
 
0.02 0.021 0.021 0.027 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
NMW*2001 
0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.009 0.003 -0.002 -0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
NMW*2002 
0.008 0.006 0.007 0.010 
 
-0.01 0.006 0.005 -0.002 
 
 0.048**  0.048**  0.049**  0.058** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
NMW*2003 
 0.012*** 0.012** 0.015** 0.001 
 
-0.008 0.006  0.010** -0.013 
 
 0.074***  0.074***  0.074*** 0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) 
NMW*2004 
0.021*** 0.021*** 0.023***  0.021*** 
 
-0.003  0.013**  0.019*** -0.001 
 
0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.065** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) 
NMW*2005 
0.013** 0.012* 0.013* 0.021** 
 
-0.004 0.007  0.010*  0.004 
 
 0.072***  0.073***  0.073**  0.097* 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.050) 
NMW*2006 
0.019** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 
 
-0.001  0.018***  0.019***  0.008 
 
 0.077**  0.077**  0.078**  0.100*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) 
NMW*2007 
0.012* 0.012* 0.015** 0.012 
 
-0.003 0.010*  0.014**  -0.002 
 
 0.058**  0.058**  0.059** 0.077 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.050) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Appendix 2.A 
Definition of key variables 
Employment rate  
Total number of employees, self-employed, unpaid family workers and participants in 
government-supported training and employment programs in working age as a 
proportion of people in working age in each local area. 
This variable has been generated also for adult workers (25 to retirement age). 
Data on employment used in this chapter is taken from June to August of each year.  
Source: Labour Force Survey. Residence based analysis. 
Wage Inequality: 
In this study two different measures of wage inequality are used: 
- The median wage divided by the 5
th
 percentile of the wage distribution in each local 
 area 
- The median wage divided by the 10
th
 percentile of the wage distribution in each local 
 area. 
This variable has been computed also for adult workers (25 to retirement age). 
Source: ASHE, data recorded in April of each year. Workplace based analysis. 
Minimum wage shares 
Proportion of workers paid at or below the minimum wage in each local area. 
The shares are generated for two age bands in each local area: 
- 16 to retirement age 
Starting from 1999, the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of 
persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age. 
From 2004, with the introduction of the new development rate for young between 16 
and 17 years, the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of persons 
of persons of 16 and 17 years, of persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to 
retirement age. 
- 25 to retirement age 
Source: ASHE, data recorded in April of each year. Workplace based analysis. 
Spike of the minimum wage 
Proportion of workers paid at the minimum wage in each local area. 
The spikes are generated for two age bands in each local area: 
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- 16 to retirement age 
Starting from 1999, the spike is a weighted average of the spike of persons from 18 to 
21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age. 
From 2004, with the introduction of the new development rate for young between 16 
and 17 years, the spike is a weighted average of the spike of persons of 16 and 17 years, 
of persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age. 
- 25 to retirement age 
Source: ASHE, data recorded in April of each year. Workplace based analysis. 
Kaitz Index 
Kaitz Index, generated as the ratio of the NMW to the median hourly wage in each local 
area. 
The Kaitz index is generated for two age bands in each local area: 
- 16 to retirement age  
Starting from 1999, the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of 
persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to retirement age. 
From 2004, with the introduction of the new development rate for young between 16 
and 17 years, the shares are a weighted average of the minimum wage shares of persons 
of persons of 16 and 17 years, of persons from 18 to 21 years and of persons from 22 to 
retirement age. 
- 25 to retirement age 
Source: ASHE, data recorded in April of each year. Workplace based analysis. 
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Appendix 2.B 
ASHE Dataset 
Even if ASHE is considered to give reliable wage figures through payroll records and it 
has a relatively large sample size, there are some limitations of this dataset which affect 
this study. 
a) Possible measures of hourly earnings 
The Low Pay Commission recommended construction of the hourly pay variable on the 
ASHE data involves dividing gross pay (excluding overtime, shift and premium 
payments) by basic paid hours. This variable closely matches the definition of NMW. 
However, the variable is available in the panel only from 2000. It is therefore necessary 
to use another measure of hourly earnings in this study which covers the period 1997 to 
2007.  
The variable used is a “basic hourly wage rate”, defined as gross weekly earnings 
excluding overtime, and divided by normal basic hours. As a result this variable will be 
slightly larger than the true hourly wage and the measurement error will tend to be 
larger, the higher shift and premium payments are. This might therefore result in an 
under-statement of the number of low paid workers. 
b) Discontinuities in ASHE dataset across years 
Time series analysis has been complicated when the ASHE replaced the NES in 2004 
and also by several changes in the ASHE methodology from 2004 to 2007. 
First of all, the coverage of employees for the ASHE is greater than that of the NES. 
The NES surveys employees taken from HM Revenue & Customs PAYE record, 
excluding the majority of those whose weekly earnings fall below the PAYE deduction 
threshold. Moreover, this survey does not cover employees between sample selection 
for a particular year and the survey reference week in April. Thus, mobile workers who 
have changed or started new jobs between the drawing of the sample and the reference 
week are excluded. In conclusion, NES understate the proportion on NMW as it does 
not record the earnings of many low paid workers, especially part-time and mobile 
workers. In 2004, ASHE survey was introduced to improve on the representation of the 
low paid: it improved coverage of employees including mobile workers who have either 
changed or started new jobs between sample selection and the survey reference in April. 
Also, the sample was enlarged by including some of the employees outside the PAYE 
system. 
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In 2005 a new questionnaire was introduced. In particular, the definition of 
incentive/bonus pay changed to only include payments that were paid and earned in 
April. Also, a new question including “pay for other reasons” was introduced. This 
implies respondents might include earnings information which was not collected in the 
past. Even if results for 2004 have been reworked to exclude irregular bonus/incentive 
payments and to allow for this missing pay, results from 1997 to 2003 remain 
inconsistent with the ones from 2004 onwards. 
Given that the main source of  information on hourly pay in this study includes shift 
and premium payments and from 2004 “pay for other reasons”, estimations of measures 
of minimum wage and wage inequality might be affected by this discontinuity, with an 
increase of the average measurement error and the dispersion in the measurement error 
from 2004 onwards. 
Finally, in 2007 the sample size of ASHE was reduced by 20%. ASHE results for 
2007 are based on approximately 142,000 returns, down from 175,000 in 2006. The 
largest sample cuts occurred principally in industries where earnings are least variable, 
affecting the randomness of the sample.  
Consistent series which takes into account of the identified changes has been 
produced going back from 2006 to 2004 and from 2007 to 2006. For 2004 results are 
also available that exclude supplementary information, to be comparable with the back 
series generated by imputation and weighting of the 1997 to 2003 NES data. It is not 
possible to get consistent datasets for the entire period of this study (1997-2007). 
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Appendix 2.C 
Robustness checks 
Table C 2-1.Employment Estimates of the NMW over the Medium Term, 1997-2007. 
Comparison of results with area fixed effects and in first differences. 
  
Proportion paid at or below 
NMW 
Proportion paid at the NMW Kaitz Index 
  Fixed effects Differences Fixed effects  Differences Fixed effects Differences 
Total 16-ret 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.004 
406 areas (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.026) 
       
Total 16-ret 0.008* 0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.035 0.005 
140 areas (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030) (0.055) 
       
Adult 25-ret 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 
406 areas (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Adult 25-ret 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.047 0.011 
140 areas (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) (0.048) 
       
Years Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Areas Effects Y N Y N Y N 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Table C 2-2. Within Group Estimates of Dynamic Specifications of Minimum Wage Effects on Employment Rate  
(16 years to retirement age), 406 areas. 
  Proportion at or below the NMW Proportion at the NMW Kaitz Index 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion paid at or below the NMW t 
  
0.001 0.002 
        
   
(0.002) (0.002) 
        
Proportion paid at or below the NMW t-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
        
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Proportion paid at the NMW t 
      
0.001 0.001 
    
       
(0.002) (0.002) 
    
Proportion paid at the NMW t-1 
    
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
    
     
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Kaitz Index t 
          
-0.014 -0.003 
           
(0.027) (0.028) 
Kaitz Index t-1 
        
-0.015 -0.011 -0.011 ‘-0.010 
         
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Years Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Areas Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 4060 
R-squared 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.027 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Table C 2-3. Difference-in-Differences year by year, Employment Estimates. 
  
Proportion paid at or below 
NMW 
Proportion paid at  NMW Kaitz Index 
 
Total Total Total Total Total Total 
  16- ret, 406 16- ret, 140 16- ret, 406 16- ret, 140 16- ret, 406 16- ret, 140 
1997-1998 
      
NMW*1998 -0.002 0.001 0.012 0.004 -0.002 ‘-0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018) (0.035) 
1998-1999 
      
NMW*1999 -0.007 -0.015 -0.025** -0.014** -0.034 0.008 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.035) 
1999-2000 
      
NMW*2000 0.003 -0.003 0.010* 0.015** 0.051** 0.081* 
 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.042) 
2000-2001 
      
NMW*2001 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.049 
 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.023) (0.048) 
2001-2002 
      
NMW*2002 0.011 0.006 -0.002 0.016** 0.040* 0.038 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.040) 
2002-2003 
      
NMW*2003 0.011 0.021 0.005 0.011 0.029 0.115** 
 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.047) 
2003-2004 
      
NMW*2004 0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.077 
 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.026) (0.053) 
2004-2005 
      
NMW*2005 -0.006 0.009 0.001 0.007 -0.005 0.023 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.032) (0.045) 
2005-2006 
      
NMW*2006 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.030 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.041) (0.037) 
2006-2007 
      
NMW*2007 -0.009 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.027 -0.043 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.039) (0.038) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Table C 2-4. Incremental Difference-in-Differences, Employment Estimates: using TTWAs. 
  Proportion paid at or below NMW Proportion paid at the NMW Kaitz index 
 
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
 
16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 16 to rt. 
 
406 areas 140 areas TTWA 406 areas 140 areas TTWA 406 areas 140 areas TTWA 
NMW -0.006** -0.002 -0.014* 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.041 -0.034 -0.107** 
Base Year (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.026) (0.050) (0.050) 
NMW*1999 -0.009 -0.011 0.005 -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.029 0.023 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.040) (0.048) 
NMW*2000 -0.001 -0.002 0.020* -0.013** -0.007 -0.002 00:02 0.078** 0.037 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.038) (0.044) 
NMW*2001 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.009 -0.017*** -0.005 0.010 0.038 -0.017 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) (0.042) (0.036) 
NMW*2002 0.008 0.002 0.017* -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 0.048** 0.068* 0.030 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.035) (0.037) 
NMW*2003 0.012** 0.010 0.018 -0.008 0.004 0.010* 0.074*** 0.184*** 0.100** 
 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.044) (0.042) 
NMW*2004 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.044*** -0.003 0.008 0.014** 0.078*** 0.115*** 0.113** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.044) (0.049) 
NMW*2005 0.013** 0.023** 0.013 -0.004 0.013*** 0.017** 0.072*** 0.132*** 0.040 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.028) (0.036) (0.052) 
NMW*2006 0.019** 0.033*** 0.038*** -0.001 0.011* 0.002 0.077*** 0.177*** 0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.031) (0.036) (0.058) 
NMW*2007 0.012* 0.020* 0.002 -0.003 0.011 -0.001 0.058** 0.143*** 0.045 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.026) (0.048) (0.048) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1.
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Table C 2-5. Incremental Difference-in-Differences Employment Estimates, 406 areas: pre-period 1997 only and 1998 only. 
 
Proportion paid at or below the NMW Proportion paid at NMW Kaitz Index 
 
Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) Total (16-ret) 
 Base years '97-98 Base year '97 Base year '98 Base years '97-98 Base year '97 Base year '98 Base years '97-98 Base year '97 Base year '98 
NMW  -0.006** -0.007* -0.010** 0.009 0.001 0.016* -0.041 -0.048* -0.051* 
Base year (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) 
NMW*1997 
  
0.003 
  
-0.015 
  
0.003 
   
(0.006) 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.022) 
NMW*1998 
 
-0.003 
 
 
0.015 
 
 
-0.003 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
 
(0.022) 
 NMW* 1999 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.029 -0.028 -0.025 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) 
NMW*2000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.013** -0.005 -0.020* 0.02 0.022 0.025 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) 
NMW*2001 0.004 0.004 0.007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.016 0.01 0.012 0.014 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) 
NMW*2002 0.008 0.009 0.012* -0.01 -0.002 -0.017 0.048** 0.050** 0.053** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) 
NMW*2003 0.012** 0.013** 0.016** -0.008 0.001 -0.015 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) 
NMW*2004 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** -0.003 0.005 -0.010 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) 
NMW*2005 0.013** 0.014** 0.016** -0.004 0.004 -0.011 0.072*** 0.073** 0.076*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
NMW*2006 0.019** 0.020** 0.022*** -0.001 0.007 -0.008 0.077** 0.078** 0.081** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) 
NMW*2007 0.012* 0.013* 0.015** -0.003 0.005 -0.010 0.058** 0.059** 0.062** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1. 
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Table C 2-6. Incremental Difference-in-Differences Employment Estimates: 95 areas regressions results, pre-period 1993-1997. 
  Proportion paid at or below the NMW Proportion paid at NMW Kaitz Index 
Total (16-ret) 406 areas 140 areas 95 areas 406 areas 140 areas 95 areas 406 areas 140 areas 95 areas 
   Base '97-98 Base '97-98 Base '93-97 Base '97-98 Base '97-98 Base  '93-97 Base  '97-98 Base '97-98 Base '93-97 
NMW  -0.006** -0.002 0.001 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.041 -0.034 0.050 
Base year (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.050) (0.035) 
NMW* 1999 -0.009 -0.011 -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.010** -0.029 0.023 -0.092*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) 
NMW*2000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.013** -0.007 -0.010** 00:02 0.078** 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.038) (0.028) 
NMW*2001 0.004 0.002 -0.009* -0.009 -0.017*** 0.002 0.010 0.038 -0.032 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.019) (0.042) (0.021) 
NMW*2002 0.008 0.002 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 0.048** 0.068* 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.035) (0.031) 
NMW*2003 0.012** 0.010 0.007 -0.008 0.004 0.001 0.074*** 0.184*** 0.017 
 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.024) (0.044) (0.033) 
NMW*2004 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.014** -0.003 0.008 0.013** 0.078*** 0.115*** 0.055 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.025) (0.044) (0.035) 
NMW*2005 0.013** 0.023** 0.011 -0.004 0.013*** 0.010 0.072*** 0.132*** 0.059 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.028) (0.036) (0.048) 
NMW*2006 0.019** 0.033*** 0.023** -0.001 0.011* 0.021*** 0.077*** 0.177*** 0.074* 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.031) (0.036) (0.045) 
NMW*2007 0.012* 0.020* 0.007 -0.003 0.011 0.011 0.058** 0.143*** 0.035 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.026) (0.048) (0.043) 
Notes:  see Table 2-1.
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3. The UK National Minimum Wage in Retrospect, looking 
at Unemployment and Hours of Work 
3.1  Introduction 
This third chapter is an extension of chapter 2. We apply again our "Incremental 
Difference-in-Differences" (IDiD) estimator to look at the effects of the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) in each year through its differential impact across local labour 
markets. In particular, here we examine the association of the NMW on a broader range 
of labour market measures other than employment and wage inequality, such as 
unemployment and working hours.  
Various recent papers focus on the employment impacts of the introduction of the 
NMW and its initial upratings, as summarised in Metcalf (2008). These studies suggest 
that the NMW has had a limited, if any, adverse impact on employment (see for 
example, Stewart (2002, 2004a, 2004b), Dickens and Draca (2005)). There are also 
studies that find small positive impact on employment as our previous chapter suggests 
(see also for example Dickens, Machin and Manning (1999)). Since labour adjustments 
due to the NMW may take place either at the extensive margin or at the intensive 
margin
19
, looking at how changes in the local area NMW incidence are related to 
changes in the unemployment rate and average working hours in the locality makes 
sense.  
Moreover, the UK literature generally investigates the impact of the NMW on 
employment, however, it is generally silent on its impact on unemployment. We find 
that it is worth to look also at this labour market outcome as a further robustness check 
for our employment results. Also the effects on unemployment might differ from the 
effects on employment for several reasons. For example, if we suppose that the NMW 
causes job losses, some of those who leave the job because of the policy might feel 
discouraged and become inactive, thus leaving the labour force. These will no longer 
accounted as unemployed. Furthermore, the NMW could induce an increase in labour 
supply if additional individuals enter the labour force to search for the now more 
attractive jobs, this will lead unemployment to increase.  
                                                          
19
 "Extensive" margin refers to the number of inputs that are used. For example, hiring an additional 
worker would increase an extensive margin. "Intensive" margin refers to the quantity of use extracted 
within a given extensive margin. For example, treducing production from a given group of workers would 
diminish the intensive margin. 
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There are only few papers that investigate the impact of the NMW on hours of work 
using UK data. First of all, Connolly and Gregory (2002) employ a Difference-in-
Differences technique to evaluate the effect of the UK NMW on hours worked by full- 
and part-time women (who are more likely to be affected by the NMW) for the first 
three years of NMW existence. They find no significant changes in hours worked by 
either full- or part-time women. Stewart and Swaffield (2008) also estimate the impact 
of the introduction of the NMW on the working hours of low-wage employees using 
Difference-in-Differences estimators. Their estimates suggest that the introduction of 
the NMW reduced paid working hours of both male and female low-wage workers 
significantly. For example, using the New Earnings Survey (NES) their estimates of the 
total effects (ie. initial plus lagged effects) indicate a reduction of between one and two 
hours per week in basic hours for both men and women, and similarly for total paid 
hours. More recently, Dickens et al (2009) also looked at the impact of the NMW on 
working hours testing different methods of analysis such as individual level Difference-
in-Differences analysis and aggregate level analysis, exploiting the variation in the pay 
distribution across different geographical areas. They find little evidence of any effect 
of  the NMW on either basic or total hours. 
As already pointed out in the previous chapter, only a few studies evaluate the impact 
of the NMW by exploiting geographical variation in local or regional labour markets 
(see Card (1992) and Neumark and Wascher (1992) for the US and Stewart (2002) for 
the UK). The longstanding geographic variation in wage rates across the UK has 
consequences for the "bite" of the NMW in different areas. Stewart (2002) points out 
how the NMW reaches further up the wage distribution in certain parts of the country 
than in others. This chapter builds on that small literature by examining the impact of 
the NMW in the UK over the period 1997-2007, comparing the period of two years 
before its introduction with the subsequent history of the NMW and its up-ratings.  
Our additional insight, as in the previous chapter, is to differentiate between a period 
in which there was no NMW policy and the incremental up-rating of the NMW each 
year, now afforded by the longer run of data available and to extend the analysis to a 
broader range of potential channels through which the NMW may have had effects. 
Our results suggest that over the medium term, unemployment fell in areas where the 
NMW had the strongest "bite" during the second half of the sample period. The results 
on hours of work suggest that hours worked by part-timers grew more in areas more 
affected by the NMW. When we consider the effect on full-time workers, it would 
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appear that there are no significant effects. However, causal interpretation of the results 
might be compromised by concomitant policy interventions over the sample period. The 
simultaneous presence of these policies may have effects that are also correlated with 
changes in the local "bite" of the NMW. 
In the interests of clarity and brevity, the methodology and the issues linked to it are 
already described in chapter 2. Here, we simply attempt to summarise the main 
conclusions from our IDiD regression estimates of unemployment and working hours in 
what follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 examines the unemployment 
effects and Section 3.4 considers the effects on hours of work. Section 3.5 presents 
some robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Data 
The central idea is to see whether geographic variation in the "bite" of the NMW is 
associated with geographic variation in indicators of local market performance. Chapter 
2 extensively describes the data employed in this analysis. In this section we will 
therefore briefly focus only on the description of the labour market outcomes that we 
analyse in this chapter, namely: hours of work and unemployment. In particular, here 
we focus on average total working hours for part-time and full-time workers separately. 
Data on working hours is drawn from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE). The ASHE dataset has the advantage of providing relatively accurate data on 
hours, being an employer based dataset. However, the ASHE has also a potential 
drawback as most of the employees earning below the PAYE threshold are excluded 
from the survey especially in the years before 2004. This could affect particularly part-
time workers, who are more likely to earn the NMW. However, from 2004 onwards the 
ASHE sample was boosted by a sample of firms not registered for PAYE, therefore 
improving representation of low-paid employees, particularly those that usually work 
part-time and tend to earn below the PAYE threshold. Therefore, we expect that 
measurement error in terms of working hours more prevalent in earlier years of the 
sample. We use 35 basic hours of work as a threshold for part-time and full-time work. 
In order to have consistent data on unemployment disaggregated at local area level for 
the entire period of the analysis we use the claimant count data from NOMIS. The 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) claimant count records the number of people claiming JSA 
and National Insurance (NI) credits at Jobcentre Plus local offices. It should be beared 
in mind that not everyone who is unemployed is included in the claimant count data. For 
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example, some employees (low paid in particular) that loose their jobs do not have 
enough NI contributions to be elegible for claimant count NI based JSA. Even if it is not 
an internationally agreed measure of unemployment, it is the only indicative statistic 
available at our levels of geographical aggregation for the time period considered in the 
analysis. In the analysis, the number of claimant resident in an area is measured as a 
percentage of population in working age resident in that area
20
.  
3.3 Unemployment and the NMW 
Figure 3-1 shows the pattern of change that has taken place in unemployment over the 
period 1997 to 2007.  The figure shows ranges of the claimant count rate across the 406 
local authorities and districts at two points in time. In the before-NMW period, the 
claimant count rate was above 4% in many of the most outlying geographical areas in 
Scotland, Wales and the North, with those in most of the rest of the country being 
between 1.7% and 2.7%. However, by 2007, the unemployment rate in most of the 
country was below 1.6%, with just a few of the outlying geographical areas having a 
rate of up to 2.7% and a very few being between 3% and 4%. 
Table 3-1 gives estimates of the IDiD model used in chapter 2 when the dependent 
variable is now the claimant unemployment rate in each local area. Together with tables 
of regression estimates, we also summarise our results in a graphical representation of 
the estimated coefficients from the underlying IDiD regression model, detailed in 
chapter 2. This approach facilitates a convenient comparison across years and a simple 
retrospective look at the effect of the NMW since 1999. Figure 3-2 shows the estimated 
coefficients along with the 95 per cent confidence interval for both the 406- and 140-
areas levels of aggregation when the claimant count rate is regressed on the NMW share 
variable (the share of people earning at or below the NMW), a set of area fixed effects, 
time dummies and a set of within-area time-varying controls. The results are for all 
workers between 16 and retirement age. For all workers (age 16 to retirement), the IDiD 
estimates in column 1 and 2 of table 3-1, also graphed in figure 3-2, suggest that there 
may have been some positive association between the NMW and the unemployment 
rate in the earliest years of the NMW’s existence. Areas where the NMW has more 
"bite" appear to have experienced higher unemployment growth in the early years of the 
                                                          
20
 The claimant count in this chapter is an average of the monthly data for the period May-September of 
each year. For a detailed explanation of the  timing of data collection, please refer to paragraph 2.2 of 
chapter 2. 
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NMW. However, the IDiD estimates show significant negative effects in later years: 
unemployment rates fell more in areas more affected by the NMW after 2002
21
.    
3.4 Hours of work and the NMW  
Our second outcome variable of interest is the level of working hours, since one 
intensive margin at which change in the NMW may operate is through hours.  When 
confronted by rising costs resulting from a higher NMW, firms may try to cut back on 
hours, while low-wage workers may seek to compensate by working more hours if the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect. Thus, a changing NMW may also 
impact directly on the fraction of workers who move from part-time to full-time 
employment. Stewart and Swaffield (2004) report small cuts of around one or two hours 
following the introduction of the NMW for men and women. Connolly and Gregory 
(2002) find no hours reductions for their sample of female workers. Dickens, et al. 
(2009) found no evidence of a consistent impact on hours worked.  
If one examines the geographical pattern of working hours it is clear that there is a 
substantial year-to-year shift in the fraction working part-time. This may in part be due 
to the sampling frame (measurement error) rather than genuine labour supply shifts.  
Hence, we report in the four-paneled figure 3-3 and in column 3 and 4 of table 3-1 our 
estimated year-on-year IDiD effects for both the 406 and the 140 geographies for part-
time workers and for full-time workers. When looking at the NMW estimates on part-
time hours (average total paid hours worked during the reference period, including 
overtime) for all workers in figure 3-3, all of the coefficients become positive and 
significant during the second half of the sample period, suggesting that hours worked by 
part-timers grew more in areas more affected by the NMW
22
. When we consider the 
effect on full-time workers, it would appear that there are no significant effects. 
Nevertheless, we suggest these results be interpreted with some caution, bearing in mind 
data limitations and the difficulty in modeling both hours of work and participation 
decisions endogenously. 
                                                          
21
 For example, looking at the results in column 2 of table 3-1 for 2004, results suggest that 
unemployment growth in 2004 was 0.69% lower in an area where 10% of employees were paid at or 
below the NMW compared to areas where no-one was paid the NMW compared to the respective growth 
rate in 1997-1998. 
22
 For example, looking at the results in column 4 of table 3-1 for 2006, results suggest that average part-
time hours growth in 2006 was 0.24% higher in an area where 10% of employees were paid at or below 
the NMW compared to areas where no-one was paid the NMW compared to the respective growth rate in 
1997-1998 (pre-period). 
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3.5 Robustness checks 
One important question to ask is how long it should take the introduction (or changes) 
in the NMW to have its full effects on economic indicators. From an empirical point of 
view, this raises the specification issue about using a lagged effect of the NMW variable 
in the regression. On the one hand, employers might react relatively quickly to increases 
in minimum wages. On the other hand, it might take time for employers to adjust factor 
inputs to changes in factor prices. Table 3-2 mirrors table 3-1 in this chapter, but using 
last year’s relative minimum rather than the current year’s as the regressor. The table 
shows that using a lagged minimum wage variable in the regression instead of the 
current one does not influence the results.  
The local wage distribution and the NMW shares depend on local industry and 
labour force composition effects. For this reason, all the main results in our chapter 
include controls for education, age and gender, as in chapter 2. Moreover, as a 
robustness check we replicated our IDiD regressions controlling also for industry 
composition in the local area (the proportion of workers in the manufacturing sector). 
The results in table 3-3 are qualitatively similar to those in table 3-1 in this chapter.  
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter, similarly to the previous one, summarises our estimated associations of the 
NMW with an additional set of measures of local labour market performance, focusing 
on the incremental effects of each up-rating of the NMW since 1999 up to 2007 against 
a base period prior to 1999 in which no NMW operated. In this chapter particularly, we 
estimate the effects of the NMW by looking at whether geographic variation in the 
"bite" of the NMW was associated with geographic variation in unemployment and 
hours of work. 
Our estimation strategy uses two sources of variation to try to identify the effect of 
the NMW. The first is the natural variation in how the NMW "bites" in different 
geographical locations, since the minimum wage is set nationally but other local wages 
are not. Our second source of variation is the effect of changes in the up-rating of the 
NMW over the years since it was introduced. This estimation is based on an IDiD 
method which allows us to estimate the marginal (interaction) effect of each year’s 
change in the NMW.  
As shown in chapter 2, the NMW appears to be associated with a significant 
narrowing of wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution. Wage inequality is 
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lower and has fallen further in areas where NMW bit most in the latter half of the 
sample period. When estimating the marginal effect of each year’s change in the NMW, 
we find a significant positive association between the NMW "bite" and employment in 
recent years. Similarly, in the present chapter, the areas where NMW bit most have 
experienced larger falls in unemployment, particularly in latter half of sample period. 
The evidence on working hours is mixed, but overall there is no compelling evidence to 
indicate that the NMW up-rates had an adverse affect on full-time total hours of work 
and they may have been associated with an increase in hours worked by part-time 
employees. 
Our findings, consistent with much of the recent literature focusing on the 
introduction of the NMW, suggest that over the medium term, alongside a significant 
fall in wage inequality, employment grew (slightly) faster and unemployment fell 
further in areas where the NMW bit most during the latter half of the sample period. Of 
course there may have been other policy instruments in operation over the period and it 
may be that identification of a NMW effect is compromised by any correlation of these 
other interventions with changes in the local "bite" of the NMW.  While, positive 
employment effects of the NMW are in line with theories where firms have some degree 
of monopsonistic power or the existence of other labour market frictions, they are also 
consistent with the idea that there may have been adjustments along margins other than 
employment, notably prices, profits, productivity and hours. The evidence collected in 
Metcalf (2008) suggests changes along all these margins in the UK. In the end all we 
can say that it seems unemployment did not rise over the period in which the NMW was 
in operation.  
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Figure 3-1. Claimant count (persons of working age) 
   1997-1998        2005 – 2006 - 2007 
                           
Source: NOMIS. Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 3-2. Incremental Difference-in-Differences unemployment estimates:  
All (16 to retirement age) 
 406 areas 
Source: ASHE, LFS,NOMIS. Authors' calculations. 
 140 areas 
 
Source: ASHE, LFS,NOMIS. Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 3-3. Incremental Difference-in-Differences total hours estimates:  
All (16 to retirement age)    
a) Part-Time Employees: All (16 to retirement age) 
406 areas 
 
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations. 
140 areas 
 
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations. 
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b) Full-Time Employees: All (16 to retirement age) 
406 areas 
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations. 
140 areas 
 
Source: ASHE and LFS. Authors' calculations.
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Table 3-1. Incremental Differences-in-Difference Unemployment and Hours of Work 
Estimates 
 Proportion paid at or below NMW 
 Total  
16-ret. 
406 areas 
Total 
16-ret. 
140 areas 
 Total  
16-ret. 
406 areas 
Total  
16-ret. 
140 areas 
Total 
16-ret 
406 areas 
Total 
16-ret 
140 areas 
 Unemployment  Part-time hours  Full-time hours 
NMW  
Base years 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.025) 
 -0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
        
NMW*1999 0.078*** 
(0.016) 
0.100*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.002 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
NMW*2000 0.094*** 
(0.016) 
0.103*** 
(0.031) 
 0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
NMW*2001 0.091*** 
(0.015) 
0.086*** 
(0.031) 
 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
NMW*2002 -0.005 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
NMW*2003 -0.065*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073** 
(0.032) 
 0.009 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
NMW*2004 -0.074*** 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.035) 
 0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
- 0.001 
(0.003) 
NMW*2005 -0.063*** 
(0.015) 
-0.059* 
(0.032) 
 0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
NMW*2006 -0.066*** 
(0.018) 
-0.132*** 
(0.035) 
 0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
NMW*2007 -0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.053 
(0.037) 
 0.008 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Notes: All regressions contain year, area effects + controls (education, age and gender). Sample all aged 16 to 
retirement. NMW variable is the  proportion of employees in each area paid at or below the NMW. HAC robust fixed 
effect estimates in brackets.  The base years are 1997-1998. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-2. Lagged Incremental Difference-in-Differences Unemployment and Hours of  
Work Estimates 
 Unemployment Part-time hours Full-time hours 
 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 
       
NMW -0.002 -0.037* -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* 
Base Years (0.010) (0.020) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
NMW*2000 0.114*** 0.166*** -0.001 -0.012 0.002 0.008*** 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2001 0.093*** 0.125*** 0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.004* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
NMW*2002 -0.024** -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.004* 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) 
NMW*2003 -0.077*** -0.067** 0.010 0.010 0.004** 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2004 -0.080*** -0.052* 0.011* 0.019* 0.001 0.004* 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) 
NMW*2005 -0.068*** -0.024 0.010 0.021*** -0.001 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
NMW*2006 -0.067*** -0.085*** 0.013* 0.024** 0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
NMW*2007 -0.049** -0.081** 0.017** 0.022** 0.002 0.004* 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
Notes:  All regressions contain year, area effects + controls (education, age and gender). Sample all aged 16 to 
retirement. NMW variable is the  proportion of employees in each area paid at or below the NMW. HAC robust fixed 
effect estimates in brackets. The base years are 1997-1998. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-3. Incremental Difference-in-Differences Unemployment and Hours of  Work 
Estimates (prop. if workers in the manufacturing sector included as a control for 
industry) 
 Unemployment Part-time hours Full-time hours 
 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 406 areas 140 areas 
       
NMW 0.008 0.003 -0.014*** -0.022*** 0.003** 0.001 
Base Years (0.011) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
NMW*1999 0.076*** 0.095*** -0.001 0.010 0.002 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2000 0.094*** 0.108*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2001 0.091*** 0.089* 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2002 -0.005 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.001 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2003 -0.065*** -0.070* 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2004 -0.076*** -0.061* 0.015** 0.022* -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.007) (0.012) (0.001) (0.003) 
NMW*2005 -0.066*** -0.055* 0.022*** 0.026** -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2006 -0.069*** -0.128* 0.023*** 0.023** -0.001 0.005* 
 (0.018) (0.035) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
NMW*2007 -0.021 -0.054 0.009 0.019* -0.001 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
Notes: All regressions contain year, area effects + controls (education, age, gender). Sample all aged 16 to retirement. 
NMW variable is the  proportion of employees in each area paid at or below the NMW. HAC robust fixed effect 
estimates in brackets. The base years are 1997-1998. 
*** *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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4. The International Experience of Minimum Wages in an 
Economic Downturn. 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have focused on the medium-run effects of the Minimum Wage 
(MW) in the UK, a period which covers years of positive growth in the UK. However,  
the effects of an upgrade in the MW may not be constant across the economic cycle. 
What should governments do with the level of the MW in times of recession? In an 
economic downturn when many firms face downward pressure on demand and costs, is 
it appropriate to let the MW fall, in real or even nominal terms, or are the positive 
effects of the MW on inequality enough to justify up-rating the MW – and if so - what 
might be the consequences on a country’s employment level?  
The purpose of the chapter is to obtain new estimates of the employment effect of the 
MW by focusing on the recessionary experiences across countries. Using international 
data we will exploit: cross-national variation in the timing and up-rating of the MW and 
the exact timing of the recessionary experiences in different countries with a panel data 
set comprising 33 OECD and European countries for the period 1971-2009. Our panel 
data allow us to differentiate the effect of MWs on employment in periods of economic 
downturn as well as periods of economic growth. We will also be able to account for 
institutional and other policy related differences that might have an impact on 
employment other than the MW. 
Over the last 30 years there has been considerable controversy regarding the impact 
of MW legislation, particularly on employment levels. From a theoretical point of view, 
in a perfectly competitive labour market, a MW set above the market-clearing level 
reduces labour demand and thus decreases employment. However, alternative economic 
models have been put forward that predict insignificant or positive employment effects 
of MWs, for example, theories where firms have some degree of monopsonistic power 
or where labour market frictions exist (see Dolado et al, 1996).  
Economic recessions clearly impose aggregate shocks to employment conditions 
which may affect the working of the MW. So there are good reasons for being 
concerned about the effect of the economic cycle in an analysis of the effects of the MW 
on employment. This can easily be seen in a simple elaboration of the standard 
competitive equilibrium in the labour market. The conventional analysis would suggest 
the logic in figure 4-1a. Here as a MW,   is imposed, equilibrium employment falls 
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from e* to e’. Now consider what happens when a recession occurs at the same time. 
This can be represented in figure 4-1b. In a recession aggregate labour demand falls 
shifting D to D’. This means that the competitive labour market would routinely 
contract and employment would fall from e* to e’. But this is precisely the fall in 
employment which would have occurred by the imposition of the MW   . Hence it is 
impossible to determine whether the fall in employment (e*-e’) is due to the imposition 
of the MW or to the recession. To make matters worse consider the effect of a 
simultaneous interaction of a MW and a recession.  The recessionary contraction of 
labour demand moving D to D’ at the same time as an imposition of a MW    would 
reduce still further labour demand to E’’’.  Hence there is a potential for a large negative 
interaction employment effect if a high MW is imposed at the same time as a recession 
occurs in the labour market. In contrast, consider that we are instead in a time of 
economic growth with the aggregate demand for labour rising, moving D to D’’. Again 
assuming that the MW of    has been imposed, here we reach a new equilibrium 
employment level of e’’. Now without controlling for rising employment due to 
economic growth we could erroneously attribute the growth in employment (e’’-e*) to 
the MW rather than to the effect of the growth in labour demand. Hence it is quite clear 
that any time series analysis of the MW across countries should control for changing 
aggregate demand conditions and the possible interaction between macroeconomic 
conditions and the MW to prevent any possible misattribution of growth in employment 
to the MW. 
Since economic theory leaves us in an ambiguous position of possibly expecting 
either a negative or a positive effect of the introduction (or up-rating) of the MW on 
employment, then any serious study of the effects of the MW must adopt the tools of 
applied econometric analysis to make any progress on determining what has actually 
happened. A considerable literature – which we briefly review in the next section – has 
so far not yielded a consensus and indeed only fuelled the controversy of what the real 
effects of the MW are on employment. We seek to throw some more light on this 
controversy using extensively new data over a large number of countries, over a longer 
time period which also permits the study of the interaction between the MW and 
economic recessions. 
Despite the controversy which surrounds the effects of the MW on employment there 
seems to be nearly universal consensus on the effects of the MW on inequality. More 
specifically, the prevailing view from the literature is that increasing the MW reduces 
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inequality. In some respects this is not a surprising conclusion as, if one considers 
simply truncating the bottom end of the wage distribution by outlawing wages below a 
certain level, then almost by definition, any measure of inequality will be reduced, other 
things equal. This simple basic fact is even reflected at the country level when one 
examines the association between the Gini coefficient (as a measure of inequality) and 
the level of the Kaitz index (which measures where the MW is, relative to the average 
wage). In figure 4-2 this basic association is graphed for the countries in our data. The 
plot shows that even at a crude aggregate level if a country has a higher level of the MW 
relative to the average wage – a higher "bite" of the MW- then inequality will be lower 
in the country. 
This provides us with the first clue to our policy analysis of the MW.  Most 
importantly if the MW is good for inequality but potentially bad for employment then 
any government may have a possible trade off which might be more relevant in a 
recession to resolve in setting the MW. In such a simple framework the question each 
country’s government must ask itself is: Does it want lower inequality enough to trade 
off the possible higher unemployment to get it? This is the question which must be 
returned to in any policy analysis of the MW and provides an excellent motivation to 
study this question. 
The reference point for our work is the paper by Neumark and Wascher (2004) 
which provides some limited, dated, international evidence on the question of the MW 
impact. We seek to extend and test their results in six ways. Firstly, by extending the set 
of countries to include an additional 10 countries and extending the time period under 
investigation both backwards and forwards in time. Secondly, by extending their 
controlling regressors to a time varying policy context. Thirdly, we seek to explicitly 
investigate how the results change separately for young people and adults, in times of 
recession and with different measures of the "bite" of the MW. Fourthly, we have as our 
guiding motivation, the possible interaction of the timing of MW changes with the 
prevailing macro-economic position. Fifthly, we use three different measures of the 
"bite" of the MW. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we seek to explore the 
difficult problem of the possible endogeneity of the MW or Kaitz variable in an 
employment equation. 
These advances need some justification and motivation.  The first advance relates to 
extending the data set of Neumark and Wascher (2004), by including more countries 
and by extending the time period under scrutiny.  This is completely justified on the 
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grounds that if the results of  Neumark and Wascher are robust then they should hold up 
over a larger dataset relating to more countries and time periods. An additional 
justification for this approach is that the most recent time period throws up different 
macro-economic conditions (particularly in the last two years during the recession). 
This places the mechanisms through which the MW operates under additional stress. 
Specifically, for example, if the MW stays constant in real terms whilst the average 
wage is falling in real terms, then the Kaitz index is rising without the government 
taking any decisive action. The question then arises of whether this may have the same 
effect on employment as a conventional rise the real MW. 
The second contribution of the chapter is to add more controls in the analysis in order 
to allow us to net out the effects of changes in policies other than the MW that might 
affect employment. In the literature to date this has not be adequately modeled. The 
paper by Neumark and Wascher (2004) only allows these to be fixed country specific 
characteristics which are immutable across time. In this chapter we are able to control 
for active labour market policies (ALMP), employment protection legislation (EPL), 
unemployment insurance programs and union density (see section 4.5.2 below for a 
detailed explanation of these indicators). 
The third area of advance relates to the sensitivity of our estimates to: considering 
young people and adults separately
23
, modeling the interaction of the MW effect with 
the macro-economic cycle and to different measures of this cycle and of the "bite" of 
the MW are central to any analysis of its effects. We find all these sensitivity checks 
reveal important insights concerning the effects of the MW on employment.  Most 
notably: negative effects of the MW on employment are only robust for young people 
and not adults, the definition of what the MW "bite" is largely immaterial, and that the 
inclusion of interaction terms on the effect of the MW with the recessionary indicator 
are important in identifying separate further MW effects in time of recession on young 
people. 
The fourth area of advance relates to the starting point and guiding motivation of this 
research which is to examine the possible interrelationship between the macroeconomic 
health of the economy and the impact of changes in the MW.  Clearly one might expect 
                                                          
23
 Most of the literature focuses on young workers. This is because most probably a relatively large 
fraction of young workers are likely to be affected by the policy and potentially pay  its price in terms of 
reduced employment. However, Brown et al (1982) p.512  point out  that the literature that focuses on 
adults is rather scant: “Uncertainty about the effects on adults is a serious gap in the literature, since half 
of all MW workers are adults (and of course a larger fraction of all workers) are adults”. After 30 years 
that Brown et al (1982) mentioned this gap in the literature, still there is not much evidence for adults. 
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that the impact of changes in the MW might be different in a recession rather than a 
time of expansion in the economy. Evidence of this interrelationship could be crucial in 
framing policy about what to do with the MW in the current recessionary times. 
The fifth contribution is to use different measures of the "bite" of the MW, checking 
the robustness of the results. As Neumark and Wascher (2004) and in most of the MW 
literature, we use the Kaitz Index as the ratio of the MW to an average wage. However, 
we also look at the percentile at which the MW "bites" the wage distribution and the 
MW relative to GDP per head. We use different measures of the MW to test the 
robustness of our results and allow for the fact that there are potential flaws in each 
measure of the MW "bite" (see methodology section).  Clearly, if each of these 
measures offers a very different metric on the toughness of the MW then this constitutes 
an effective robustness test on our modeling. 
The final area of our robustness investigation is the most problematic. The core 
problem with any MW regression, however formulated, is that arguably the 
measurement errors of the determination of employment are not independent of the 
"bite" of the MW. This endogeneity of the MW is most likely to be related to the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries. This is true to the extent that any country’s 
government which invokes a MW (or has favourable policies relating to its up-rating in 
real terms) will also have unmeasured, unobserved attributes which separately affect the 
employment level.  So far in the literature there have been no studies which have 
discussed this issue. This seems to be a crucial problem in that there must be a strong 
likelihood that any country which up-rates its MW favourably might also have 
government which seeks to increase employment and drive down unemployment. 
The usual approach to this problem in panel data is to add conditioning regressors 
and argue that the remaining unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant. We, of course, 
do this by including controlling regressors on all aspects of employment policy and 
ALMP. But still there is a suspicion that the unobserved heterogeneity in an 
employment equation may relate to the "bite" of the MW.  The logic would be that 
whether a country decides to change its MW may well depend on the prevailing state of 
employment. In the absence of the experimental data the only other recourse to 
identification is to search for an appropriate instrumental variable (IV). This requires us 
to find a variable which is correlated with the Kaitz index but uncorrelated with the 
stochastic factors which determine employment. 
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Our suggestion is that one determinant of the likelihood of adopting a more generous 
MW is what political flavour of government is in power. Specifically, a more left wing 
government, which is, presumably, more averse to wage inequality, is more likely to 
favour a MW with a higher "bite" relative to the average wage. But the determination of 
the political makeup of the government is down to the political and electoral process – 
and the aggregation of votes which determines the political complexion of the 
government - and this is exogenous to the determination of employment.  So 
specifically, we argue, that the political complexion of the government is independent of 
the unobserved heterogeneity or stochastic shocks which affect employment. Having 
already controlled for all the other politically determined employment and ALMP 
policies, then one might reasonably expect that the remaining unobserved heterogeneity 
relates to macroeconomic shocks which condition employment and will be independent 
of where, in the political spectrum, the electorate determines that the government comes 
from.  We explore the extent to which our results are robust to this form of identifying 
assumption. 
In summary, the purpose of the chapter is to obtain new estimates of the employment 
effect of the MW – but to do so with much more comprehensive and up to date data and 
to investigate the sensitivity of the results to different econometric identification 
assumptions. Using international data we exploit: cross-national variation in the timing 
of the introduction of the MW, the level and timing of its up-rating with a panel data set 
comprising 33 OECD and European countries for the period 1971-2009. We will also 
be able to account for institutional and other policy related differences that might have 
an impact on employment, other than the MW. The large differences across OECD and 
European countries in the Kaitz index (the MW relative to average wages) are a great 
potential source of variation in the "bite" of the MW. In common with the rest of the 
literature, we will evaluate the impact of MWs on employment using the variation in 
this "bite". What distinguishes this study from most of the literature is that we explicitly 
use the variation in the MW "bite" across time and countries.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes the literature which 
precedes and sets the context of our work. Section 4.3 describes the dataset used and the 
characteristics of the data. Section 4.4 outlines the methodology for the analysis. The 
main results are presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 sets out the policy implications of 
our findings. 
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4.2 The literature 
It is clear that to ascertain the actual effect of MWs on employment, we must resort to 
empirical econometric research. However, data limitations and econometric 
identification issues complicate this process. There have been a number of studies 
which use data from a single country.  Some of these studies use time series variation in 
the MW policy (or its level) over time to try and identify the impact of the policy. The 
consensus of these earlier studies is summarized by Brown et al (1982). They suggest 
that these earliest empirical studies, based on time-series data, confirmed standard 
economic theory showing a negative impact of MW on employment.  
However, this debate really began in earnest after the findings of Card and Krueger 
(1995). In a quasi experimental setting they found that MW increases can, in some 
circumstances, result in net job gains rather than the losses predicted by conventional 
wisdom. They used data from fast food restaurants in neighbouring US states in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where the latter state up-rated its state MW and the 
former kept it fixed. They argue that this exogenous change in the MW in Pennsylvania 
constituted a quasi experiment which allowed them to identify a positive causal impact 
of the MW up-rating. 
The work of Card and Krueger has, in turn, been subject to intensive scrutiny and 
launched a wave of further empirical work on the impact of the MWs on employment. 
While many assessments of MWs have been carried out on a national basis, there have 
been few from an international perspective. The large differences across OECD and 
European countries in the Kaitz index (the MW relative to average wages) are a great 
potential source of variation in the "bite" of the MW. In common with the rest of the 
literature we will evaluate the impact of MWs on employment using the variation in this 
"bite". What distinguishes this study is that we explicitly use the variation in the MW 
"bite" across time and countries.  
Further fuel has been added to this debate by panel data based studies which relate to 
US States over time or different countries over time (Neumark and Wascher (1992, 
2004)). The attraction of this kind of panel study is that different countries (states) will 
have different policies on the MW and its up-rating, different employment policies and 
face different macroeconomic conditions. Such natural variation facilitates possible 
identification of the effect of MW policies on employment. So far, these studies support 
the view that the "bite" of the MW (as measured by the Kaitz index) has a significant 
and negative impact on employment. It is important to appreciate that the Neumark and 
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Wascher results (2004) only applies to the labour market for young people and clearly 
one important extension to their work involves at looking at adult labour markets, which 
is what we do below. Of course, the usual identification assumption here is that the 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries remains fixed over time.  To the extent that 
this identification assumption is justified then these results must be taken seriously.  
Since the analysis of the labour market impact of the MW is so widely policy relevant 
(as a lot of countries now have a MW) it merits careful scrutiny. This is the motivation 
for the present chapter. 
There is a related substantial literature that uses cross-country comparisons to 
investigate the impact of labour market policies generally: for the impact of labour 
market rigidities on unemployment see Nickel (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005); for a review of cross-country studies on the impact 
of Employment Protection Legislation see Addison, J. and Teixieira (2003). However, 
few studies have used cross-country analysis to estimate the MW effects on 
employment. Indeed, apart from an older OECD study (1998), Neumark and Wascher 
(2004) is the only extensive study which looks at how changes in the incidence of the 
MW across countries are correlated with changes in country specific’s youth 
employment rates, using a panel of countries from 1976 to 2000.  
While there are a large number of studies on the labour market impact of the MW, 
especially on the impact on employment, (see Brown et al (1982), Card and Krueger 
(1995) and Neumark and Wascher (2008) for extensive reviews of the literature), only a 
few studies evaluate the impact of the MW by exploiting geographical variation in 
regional or cross country labour markets, (see Card (1992) or Neumark and Wascher 
(1992) for the United States, Stewart (2002) for the UK and Baker et al (1999) for 
Canada). This chapter builds on that small literature by examining the impact of a MW 
across countries of the world over the period 1971-2009.  
There is good reason to expect that imposition and then raising of the MW will have 
positive effects in reducing wage inequality at the bottom end of the income distribution 
(see chapter 5). If one truncates the income distribution from the left by forcing 
employers to pay the lowest earners at a specified minimum then automatically one 
expects that (unless there are large spill-over effects) that inequality would be reduced 
as the MW rises, other things equal. Dickens and Manning (2004b) report evidence of 
these inequality effects in the UK around the introduction of the MW and other authors 
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report similar findings from the US. (See DiNardo et al (1996), Lee (1999) and Autor et 
al (2010)).   
4.3 Data 
The data used in this study is necessarily collected from different sources.  Most of the 
data on population, unemployment and employment rates are drawn from the OECD 
Annual Labour Force Statistics database for OECD members and the European Union 
Labour Force Statistics for the remaining countries. This allows us to disaggregate our 
dependent variable into two age groups: young people (15 to 24) and adults (25 to 64 
years).
24
   
As in the second chapter, we use three different measures of the MW in our analysis: 
the Kaitz index, the Percentile at which the MW "bites" and the real MW divided by the 
GDP per head
25
. Data on the Kaitz index is available from the OECD MW database and 
from the European Union Labour Force Statistics for those countries in which the 
national MW is set by statute or by national collective bargaining agreement. For those 
countries in which no national minimum exists, but in which industry- or occupation-
specific minimums are set by legislation or collective bargaining agreement, we use 
summary estimates constructed by Dolado et al. (1996)
26
. OECD and European Union 
Labour Force Statistics allow us to use as an indicator of the MW the Kaitz Index, the 
ratio of the MW to the average wage, as measured in this study by the median wage
27
. 
Using median rather than mean wages in the denominator provides a better basis for 
international comparison because of differences across countries in the dispersion of 
earnings. The Kaitz Index is one of the standard indicators used in the literature and it is 
intended to measure the extent to which the MW "bites" into the wage distribution, and 
to capture variation in the relative prices of less-skilled and more skilled labour induced 
                                                          
24
 There are few exceptions in the age groups: Italy, where prior to 1993 lower age limit is 14. Portugal, 
where the lower age limit from 1976 to 1991 is 12 years old and from 1992 to 1997 it is 14 years old. 
Spain, UK, US and Sweden where the lower age limit in the survey is 16 years. Finally, in Hungary, 
where up to 1994 the adult and total age groups refer to ages 15 to 74. 
25
 Our MW variables measures in common with much of the literature are not adjusted for coverage 
because of data limitatios. 
26
 For these 4 countries the panel length is shorter (Italy, from 1976 to 1991; Germany from 1976 to 1994; 
Denmark from 1983 to 1994; and finally Sweden from 1976 to 1992) . However, our main results are 
robust if we omit these countries from the analysis. In these countries no national minimum wage exists, 
but a set of industry- or occupation specific minimums, the Kaitz index for these countries is computed as 
an average minimum hourly wage divided by the average wage. We would like to thank Neumark and 
Wascher for providing us with the data. 
27
 Because of data limitations, for a subset of 9 countries, we had to use mean wages in constructing the 
indices. These countries are: Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Croazia and 
Mexico. 
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by MWs. The closer the Kaitz index is to one the "tougher" the "bite" of MW legislation 
in any country and specific year (appendix 4.C contains a detailed description of the 
MW variable by country). Details of the definitions and measurement of the other two 
alternative measures of the MW are described in the methodology section and appendix 
4.C. 
Our analysis controls for many other characteristics of the MW systems which might 
have an influence on employment, so confounding effects of the MW. First of all, we 
include an indicator of whether the MW is a product of collective bargaining process, 
with unions, employers and the government all participating in the negotiations or 
whether MW levels are simply set by statute
28
. Data is drawn from two main sources: 
the ILO MW database and EUROSTAT. Secondly, we add an indicator of whether 
countries have youth sub-Minimum Wages or not
29
. Information is taken from the ILO 
MW database and the Low Pay Commission report (2009). (We refer to appendix 4.D 
for a list of countries included in the analysis and their characteristics of the MW 
system.) 
We also add controls for the importance of other labour market policies and 
institutions which might have an influence on employment. Here our data is superior to 
that used by Neumark and Wascher (2004), as all of our measures are in panel form, i.e. 
these controls are time varying for each country, whereas those in previous studies have 
only been cross-sectional form, i.e. constant across countries over time. 
The first of these measures is the OECD index of EPL, a constructed indicator of the 
strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts. A second 
measure is the level of public expenditure on ALMP, designed to bring unemployed 
workers to work, as a percentage of GDP. Again this variable is drawn from the OECD. 
A third measure again constructed from OECD data is trade union density which is 
measured by the number of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, 
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. The final measure constructed 
by the OECD is the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates as a 
percentage of earnings and it is meant to quantify the generosity of unemployment 
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 If the MW is a product of a collective bargaining process, labour unions take part in the decision of the 
rate of the MW. This could potentially lead to a relatively high rate of the MW that possibly could harm 
employment more than in other countries where statutory MW exists. 
29
 Having a youth sub-minimum lower than the adult rate could potentially help to reduce the negative 
effects of the MW, if there are any, in the young population, compared to countries where there is only 
one rate of the MW. 
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insurance program (a detailed explanation of these variables, their possible effects on 
employment and our findings are reported in section 4.5.2 below).  
As a supply side control we use the relative size of each cohort, such as the 
population of the regression specific age group to the total population in working age 
(Brown et al (1982) p.501)
30
. Finally, we include an aggregate demand variable to 
account for changes in the level of economic activity over the business cycle. Initially 
we use the adult unemployment rate taken from the OECD Annual Labour Force 
Statistics database, to ensure comparability with Neumark and Wascher (2004) but we 
then use other measures of aggregate demand and macroeconomic shocks including our 
recession indicator (described in the methodology section) and the actual level of GDP 
growth to test for robustness
31
.  
Our full sample consists of 33 OECD and European countries, but is reduced to 23 
OECD countries when the full set of controls is added into the analysis. We refer to the 
appendix 4.D for a detailed list of the countries in the analysis (and we clearly show 
beneath each table the countries which are used in the estimations). 
In figure 4-3a countries are ranked by the Kaitz index. As can be seen there is 
substantial variation in the "bite" of the MW across countries, with the level of the MW 
ranging from more than 70% of the average (median) wage in Italy to under 30% in 
Korea. Generally, the continental European countries have the highest levels of the 
"bite" of the MW. Australia is the only non-European country with a Kaitz index of 
around 60%. In contrast, US and UK and Japan are towards the bottom, together with 
Mexico and some new European accession countries such as Estonia, Croatia, Czech 
Republic and Latvia with a Kaitz index under 40%. Figures 4-3b and 4-3c graph the 
ranking of countries with our two alternative measures of the "bite" of the MW.  
Specifically we graph the level of the MW relative to the GDP per head and the 
Percentile of the MW.  These alternative measures are defined and motivated in the 
methodology section. They represent measures of the "bite" of the MW, normalised, 
respectively, to the level of aggregate wealth per head in the economy, and by 
pinpointing  where the MW level is in the wage distribution. Looking at the ranking of 
the countries in figures 4-3b and 4-3c we can see that there is a fair degree of 
concordance between these 3 rankings, however they are sufficiently different to 
                                                          
30
 It is widely accepted in the literature to use a supply side control, especially in the youth equation. 
Brown et al (1982) stress the importance of this control on p.501 of his paper. 
31
 GDP growth in the employment equation is generally significant (and less so the dummy for 
downturn). Results do not change much qualitatively with or without GDP growth. 
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warrant their use as specification checks on the main variable of interest, as they 
constitute quite different interpretations of what the "bite" of the MW is.   
Figure 4-4a shows changes in the Kaitz index across (some selected) countries over 
the period of our analysis. It is interesting to see how some countries like the 
Netherlands, (and Belgium, Spain, Australia and Mexico not pictured here) have 
experienced a decreasing "bite" of the MW over the years. However, other countries 
such as France, (and the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Turkey and Korea not 
pictured here) show an increasing Kaitz index especially over the last few years. The 
corresponding figures for the MW/GDP per head variable are similarly informative and 
follow most of the times a similar trend as the Kaitz with a slightly different metric. The 
third measure of the Percentile in figure 4-4c is most interesting as it follows a 
structurally different path to the alternative measures in figure 4-4a and 4-4b, 
particularly for the USA and the Netherlands prior to 1980. The measure is also useful 
to graph as it reminds us that the MW in most developed countries only affects between 
2-5% of people
32
.  In this context, it is asking quite a lot for macroeconomic aggregate 
data to identify a statistically significant effect of an intervention that affects such a 
small proportion of the labour force.  It is especially demanding to expect the same 
relationship to be revealed in metrics – like the Kaitz and the Percentile – which exhibit 
quite a different trend over time. 
Changes in the real level of the MW (as measured in US dollar purchasing power 
parities) by country are very variable as plotted in figure 4-5. Particularly notable is that 
over the last 10 years, nearly all countries have allowed the MW to increase in real 
terms. However, in some countries (e.g. Netherlands, US, Canada) there was a 
substantial erosion of the real value of the MW since the mid-1979s to the late 1980s,  
which continued into the 2000s in the US. It is also important to point out how, for 
some countries, changes in real level of the MW do not always correspond to changes in 
the Kaitz index. For example, Australia has experienced an increase in the real level of 
the MW but a decrease in the Kaitz index. Also, in Japan, Luxembourg and France the 
increase in real minimum wages is more marked than the raise in the Kaitz index. The 
same is true for Ireland and the UK from 2000 onwards. These different movements of 
the Kaitz index (measured as the MW relative to the median wage) compared to the real 
                                                          
32
 In general, in western countries the MW is generally set to bite the lower tail of the wage distribtuion. It 
is also true that in some developing countries and in eastern european countries it might be different (for 
example the bite of the MW could be even lower). 
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level of the MW could be a result of changes of position of the MW in the distribution 
of earnings
33
.   
An indication of the variation in the dependent variable of concern, the youth 
employment to population ratio is graphed for our selected countries in figure 4-6. We 
can see that for most of our period this ratio has been declining in some countries, like 
France, growing in others, like the Netherlands, and roughly constant for others, like the 
US and the UK
34
. There is also evidence of cyclical variation and considerable variation 
across years to be explained by our data.   
4.4 Methodology 
In this section we describe the economic modelling strategy employed in our 
investigation. 
4.4.1 Modeling strategy and baseline regression 
Among the first to use panel data to address the question of the impact of the MW were 
Neumark and Wascher (1992) who used US state data from 1973-1989. Later, Neumark 
and Wascher (2004) exploited cross-national variation in the MW to estimate the effects 
of MWs on employment rates using a pooled cross-section data set comprising several 
OECD countries for the period 1976-2000. We update their investigation by adding a 
longer time period from 1971-2009 and a larger set of countries. We apply their model 
to the estimation of the employment rate across countries, in this specification the 
variable MW is assumed to capture the "bite" of the wage condition:  
Ejt                                (4.1) 
Where tE  is the employment to population ratio at time t in country j , jtMW  
is the 
Kaitz Index (the MW divided by the median wage)
35
 at time t in country j,  Xjt  is a set 
of controlling regressors at time t in country j, tT  is a set of year effects and, jJ  is a set 
of country fixed effects. Country fixed effects are included to control for omitted 
variables that vary across countries but not over time such as unmeasured economic 
conditions of specific countries independently of international labour market conditions 
                                                          
33
 The Kaitz index measures where the MW bites in the wage distribution. By definition in this study the 
Kaitz index is the MW relative to the median wage. If the MW increases and the median wage does 
increase more than the MW the the Kaitz index decreases. However, the real MW might increase anyway. 
34
 However, even a constant ratio disguises changes in the workforce composition: tipically, a large rise in 
female employment and a decline in male employment. 
35
 Usually the kaitz Index is also weighted by some measure of 'coverage' of the MW in the sense of the 
fraction of the labour force that the MW applies to. 
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(government policies as well as cultural and institutional differences across countries). 
Time fixed effects control for omitted variables that are constant across countries but 
evolve over time (global shocks or policies that might influence employment rates in all 
countries at the same time).  
We also investigated specifications that include country-specific time trends in order 
to control for incremental changes in the employment rate associated with longer-term 
developments in labour force participation or labour demand that are unrelated to 
changes in a country’s MW laws36. In all of our reported regressions standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of unknown form (Wooldridge, 2010, 
p.61).  
An important issue with panel data and the validity of fixed effect (FE) results is the 
extent to which omitted regressors may change over time. To the extent that they could 
vary over time then the FE results could be biased. Our approach to this problem has 
been prompted by precisely this concern with the paper by Neumark and Wascher 
(2004)
37
.  It is for this reason that we have sought to use all the available data on other 
controlling regressors, particularly those relating to labour market institutions and how 
they vary over time. Of course it is still possible that we have not included all the 
controlling information that one would ideally like (which remains unmeasurable or 
unobserved). To this extent our (FE) results are valid only under the condition that these 
other sources of unobserved heterogeneity remain fixed over time.  
We seek to model the employment effect for adults and young people rather than just 
young people. In turn we also address the difficult issue of what constitutes a 
satisfactory measure of the MW by using three alternatives.  
The idea behind using the Kaitz index as a measure for the MW is that the larger the 
value of this index then the higher up into the wage distribution the minimum will 
"bite". Of concern in the use of the Kaitz index is its particular sensitivity to movements 
in the earnings distribution and the variability of this distribution, particularly at the 
upper end. We explicitly examine the issue of how robust the results are to the use of 
this variable by also considering the ratio of the MW to the level of GDP per head and 
the position of the MW in the wage distribution.  
A crucial issue which one must consider in modeling the effect of the MW is how 
this level should be measured. Clearly simply putting this nominal level on the right 
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 See the results section 4.5.1.2 below for a discussion on the results using contry-specific time trends 
37
 This is the first time such data has been used in this context as Neumark and Wascher (2004) only used 
non-time varing regressors to control for these influences. 
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hand side of a regression is open to the criticism that such a variable is endogenous.  
Hence, for many years the literature has been dominated by the use of the ratio of the 
MW to the average or median wage. This Kaitz Index is also vulnerable to many 
criticisms.  Most notably, since it is a ratio, its movement could be heavily influenced 
by movements in the average wage or indeed in the distribution of earnings – rather 
than a change in the MW. Clearly, since the wage distribution in many countries in the 
West has been shifting to the right in the last 20-30 years this Kaitz index could be 
moving largely as a result of these changes (and figures 4-3 to 4-5 seems to bear this 
out).   
In many microeconometric studies (see Dolton et al (2012), for example) other 
measures of the MW have been used as they can be computed easily.  Specifically we 
are talking about the percentile in the empirical wage distribution that a MW hits, and 
the location of the spike in the wage distribution associated with the MW. In 
international aggregate country data such measures are impossible to compute as we do 
not have cross section data on individual wages.   
In this chapter we use two such alternative measures of the MW.  Firstly, the level of 
the MW expressed as a fraction of the GDP per head level, which is a measure of 
average income. Our second measure of the MW "bite" is to compute the percentile at 
which the MW "bites" in the income distribution by estimating this using the level of 
the MW, the average wage and the estimated Gini coefficient for the country. Using this 
data and assuming that the income distribution is lognormal then we can retrieve the 
percentile that MW is paid at in the wage distribution of the economy. (In the appendix 
4.C a detailed explanation of how this variable is computed). 
4.4.2 Modeling recessions 
At the outset of this chapter we set out a key problem in the potential identification of 
MW effects on employment – specifically whether the shocks experienced by countries 
in a recession have been adequately captured in existing empirical studies and in 
addition whether there might not be an interaction between the MW and the timing or 
the scale of its introduction or up-rating and the prevailing macro-economic conditions. 
Our long cross-country panel can be exploited  in order to estimate a model that takes 
into account the different effects of the MW on employment in periods of economic 
downturn as distinct from periods of economic growth. This can be done by extending 
our estimation model to analyse the MW effects during economic recessions.  
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Hence in equation (4.2) we extend the model of equation (4.1) accordingly:  
 
                                                         (4.2) 
 
Where the term in Cjt measures the direct effect of the recession on the employment rate 
(we measure recession in three different ways and compare the results, as clarified and 
pointed out below in this section). The term Cjt * MWjt measures the interaction effect of 
any recession and the MW. All other variables are as specified in equation (4.1). The 
coefficient of interest will be θ, which measures the differences of the effect of the MW 
on employment in periods of recession relative to periods of economic growth. 
Therefore, the hypothesis being tested here is whether the interaction of a downturn 
with the "bite" of the MW has an employment effect, over and above, the effect of 
either the downturn per se (δ) or the imposition of the MW, per se, (β).  
The countries in the study have very different patterns of MW changes over time, 
and very different patterns of recession experiences. Table A 4-1 (in appendix 4.A) lists 
the timing of recessions across countries and shows how different they are between 
countries. This observed heterogeneity helps to separate the influences of MWs from 
the influences of other macroeconomic events affecting employment in multiple 
countries. We also seek to investigate how robust our estimations are to using this 
dichotomous recession indicator by replacing it with a continuous measure of the 
macroeconomic cycle in each country – by using the actual level of GDP growth in the 
year or the actual level of unemployment in the year. 
A measurement issue for this study is how exactly one should measure a recession. 
The formal accepted definition of a recession is 2 quarters of consecutive negative GDP 
growth.  This definition is clear and unambiguous in the context of quarterly data but 
leaves us with a difficulty when we work with annual data. We explored three possible 
definitions of a recession for yearly data: 
i) The year contains at least 2 consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth (for 
example, this would give the years 1980, 1990, 1991 as recessionary years for the UK). 
ii) The year contains any 2 two quarters (not necessarily consecutive) of negative 
growth (for example this would give the years 1979, 1980, 1990, 1991, as recessionary 
years for the UK). 
iii) The year has negative growth on average over all 4 quarters (for example, this 
would give the years 1980, 1981, 1991 as recessionary years for the UK). 
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We found that the different possible definitions of a ‘recession’ as a discrete variable 
was unimportant and did not change the nature of our conclusions – hence the results 
we report look only at the effect of a recession defined as per definition ii) above.   
The next consideration is that a simple dichotomous variable representing whether a 
recession was in progress or not may not adequately capture not simply whether a 
recession was in progress but also the depth of its severity.  Hence, the next alternative 
is to use the level of GDP growth directly, instead of the recessionary indicators defined 
above. The third logical alternative is to use the level of the youth/adult unemployment 
as the recessionary indicator for the adult/youth employment equation. Hence, in section 
4.5.3 of the text we explore how sensitive our results are to using these different 
definitions and methods of measuring a recession.   
4.4.3 Endogeneity of the MW variable 
We now turn to the most difficult potential problem in identifying the effect of the MW 
on employment.  This is that, arguably, the MW variable is itself endogenous in the 
sense that this is a decision variable subject to change by a government after it observes 
the employment level and so takes this (and other macroeconomic circumstances) into 
account when the level is set.  So there is a suspicion that the unobserved heterogeneity 
in an employment equation may relate to the "bite" of the MW. The logic would be that 
whether a country decides to change its MW may well depend on the prevailing state of 
employment. In the absence of the experimental data the only other recourse to 
identification is to search for an appropriate instrumental variable (IV). This requires us 
to find a variable which is correlated with the Kaitz index but uncorrelated with the 
stochastic factors which determine employment. So, in this framework we seek to find 
an appropriate IV,     . Our suggestion is that one determinant of the likelihood of 
adopting a more generous MW is what political flavour of government is in power.   
Specifically, a more left wing government, which is averse to wage inequality, is 
more likely to favour a MW with a higher "bite" relative to the average wage. But the 
determination of the political makeup of the government is down to the political and 
electoral process – and this aggregation of votes which determines the political 
complexion of the government - must be exogenous to the unobserved stochastic factors 
which determine employment. So specifically, we argue, that how right or left wing a 
government is – which is determined by the electorate and the election process – is 
related to whether or not the government will seek to impose or uprate the MW 
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favourably – but that - the political complexion of the government is independent of the 
unobserved heterogeneity or stochastic shocks which affect employment. Having 
already controlled for all the other politically determined employment and ALMP, then 
one might reasonably expect that the remaining unobserved heterogeneity relates to 
macroeconomic shocks which condition employment and will be independent of where, 
in the political spectrum, the electorate determines that the government comes from. We 
explore the extent to which our results are robust to this form of identifying assumption. 
To elaborate the logic of this IV model consider what determines the political 
complexion of the government in power in any country. In most countries which have 
either a proportional representation system or a ‘first past the post’ electoral system the 
prevailing swing of the electorate – right or left – will determine which political party 
gets into power. This will then reflect the composition of the ruling body – a 
government cabinet (or similar configuration) which could be the result of coalitions 
between more than one political party. So – what we argue is that there is a mapping – 
albeit a fuzzy one – between the prevailing view of the electorate and the political 
complexion – right or left – of the resulting government.  Now what determines the 
voting behaviour of the electorate is conditioned on many things – past events, political 
scandals (Watergate, Monica Lewinsky, MPs expenses etc), outcomes of wars 
(Vietnam, Iraq, the Falklands), crises in industrial relations (Mr Heath’s and Mrs 
Thatcher’s conflict with the miners’ unions), one-off popular policies (selling council 
houses), terrorism attacks (Zapatero’s election in Spain the day after the Madrid train 
bombings), policy announcements (neutrality to wars, Schroeder’s election after he 
declared he was against thr participation of Germany to war in Iraq) or the prevailing 
state of the world economy and the collapse of major banks. What an electorate is 
extremely unlikely to be voting on is the stated position of the parties on the MW or the 
unobserved stochastic factors which determine employment (and remember in our 
empirical model this cannot include observable implementable employment policies 
like ALMP or EPL – which we have conditioned on). For an extensive and recent 
review of the relevant and highly cited literature on voting behaviour, please refer to 
Bartel (2010). See also Montalvo (2011). 
Once the political complexion of the government is determined by the electorate – 
left or right – then their political position on the MW is likely to be determined by their 
underlying political philosophy. It is an important feature of Socialist governments that 
they give a high priority to poverty and income inequality issues. Equally it is an 
 83 
 
important dimension of most right wing political parties that they favour letting wages 
and prices be determined by unfettered market forces.  It is this logic which suggests 
our specific IV. Empirical examination of this basic relationship is found in a scatter 
plot of the Kaitz index and the Schmidt index – which we present in figure 4-8.  There 
is a clear correlation between where the MW "bites" in a country (on average) and how 
left wing their government is (on average).  It is this correlation and its movement over 
time in each country which we wish to exploit. 
Hence our econometric model is now as follows (where we omit the macro-
economic recession and its interaction term for notation convenience): 
Ejt                                           (4.3) 
                                           (4.4) 
Where our notation is as for equation (4.1) except that now there are two different sets 
of country fixed effects in (4.3) and (4.4). In this context we seek to find an appropriate 
IV,    . Our suggestion is that one determinant of the likelihood of adopting a more 
generous MW is what political flavour of government is in power. The estimation 
procedure in the model set out in equations (4.3) and (4.4) involves using the Fixed 
Effects Instrumental Variable (FEIV) (see Wooldridge (2010), p 354) which is a two 
stage procedure estimated in Stata. First, having estimated the country and year fixed 
effects (which we assume to be constant across both equations) we then estimate the 
reduced form of this model. Predictions of MW are then used in the second stage 
estimation of the structural form equation (4.4). In this model the country fixed effects 
   are assumed constant over time and year fixed effects constant across countries. In 
addition it is necessary that:                       . Assuming that our IV is valid then 
these IV estimates of the effect of the MW then provide consistent estimates of the MW 
effect on employment which potentially have a causal interpretation. 
4.5 Results 
In this section we will describe our estimation results relating to equation (4.1). We will 
separately consider: the results for young people and adults (section 4.5.1), the effect or 
otherwise, of conditioning for government employment policy (section 4.5.2). We then 
go on to consider the model of equation (4.2) which allows for the possibility of the 
interaction of macroeconomic shocks and the MW (section 4.5.3). Finally, we consider 
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equations (4.3) and (4.4) jointly which treat the MW as potentially endogenous and 
examines the consequences of this (section 4.5.4).  
As a baseline specification we will focus mainly on results that use the Kaitz index as 
MW indicator and GDP growth as demand side control. However, we will report also 
some robustness checks where we test two other MW measures and we assess two other 
different controls for the business cycle. 
4.5.1 Estimates of the MW model 
4.5.1.1 Young people aged 16-24 
One possible concern is a lack of focus on the outcomes of groups thought to be 
potentially more at risk, or at the margin of adjustment, following any change in labour 
costs. Therefore, it is important that we assess whether the estimates differ for young 
people (those aged 16-24) compared to adults (aged 25 to retirement). 
Column 1 of table 4-1 presents results for young people, while column 2 focuses on 
adults. Each column reports estimates from a regression in which we add fixed year 
effects to control for global shocks or policies that might influence employment rates in 
all countries. We also add country fixed effects to capture persistent country-specific 
unobserved factors that might influence employment rates. Examples of such factors 
might include government policies as well as cultural or other institutional differences 
across countries that lead to cross-sectional variation in the propensity to work. 
If we concentrate on young people, we find the coefficient of the Kaitz index to be 
negative and significant and the estimated labour demand elasticity with respect to the 
MW (shown in the bottom row of the table and evaluated at the sample means) is -0.21, 
in line with the literature and very close to Neumark and Wascher’s (2004). 
In table 4-2, panel A, we test the robustness of our results repeating the analysis 
using two other demand side controls: first, in column 1, our dummy for downturn and 
secondly, in column 2, adult unemployment rate. This makes very little difference to the 
estimates confirming the results in table 4-1. The coefficients of the Kaitz index using 
the dummy for downturn as a control for the business cycle are very close in size to 
those in table 4-1 with the signs pointing in the same direction. The coefficients of the 
Kaitz index using adult unemployment rate as a demand side control are as well 
qualitatively similar, pointing again in the same direction (although they are qualitative 
larger and this reflects the metric on the unemployment rate compared to the GDP 
growth rate). 
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In table 4-2, panel B, we repeat the analysis using two other measures of the MW. 
An important part of our contribution is posing the question of how the MW should be 
measured. In the methodology section we suggested that there are 2 alternatives with 
aggregate countrywide data. Namely, the value of the MW relative to the GDP per head 
and secondly the Percentile that the MW is paid at in the wage distribution. In column 
1, where the MW/GDP per head variable is used instead of the Kaitz index, we see that 
the negatively significant effect of this MW measure remains, and the coefficients are 
larger in absolute size, with an estimated MW elasticity of -0.36. The use of the 
percentile, in column 2, confirms the negative and significant results, even if the 
coefficient is smaller in absolute size, with an estimated elasticity of -0.17. Hence our 
overall conclusion is that the effect of a 10% rise in the MW will induce a 2-3% fall in 
employment of young people and that this effect is invariant to how one measures the 
MW of controls for demand shocks. 
4.5.1.2 Adults 
Column 2 of table 4-1 presents the estimation results of the effects of the Kaitz index on 
employment for the adult age group from 25 to 64 years. The coefficient on the MW 
variable is negative and significant, although the coefficient is close to zero and much 
smaller in absolute size compared to young people in column 1. The estimated elasticity 
for adults is -0.046 compared to -0.214 for young people. 
In order to test the robustness of our results, in table 4-2, panel A, we repeat the 
analysis using other demand side controls: first, in column 3, our dummy for downturn. 
Secondly, in column 4, the youth unemployment rate. This makes very little difference 
to the estimates confirming the results in column 2 of table 4-1. The coefficients of the 
Kaitz index using the dummy for downturn as a control for the business cycle are very 
close in size and direction to those in column 2 of table 4-1. The coefficients of the 
Kaitz index using youth unemployment as a demand side control again point in the 
same direction to those in column 2 of table 4-1. 
Finally, in table 4-2, panel B, we repeat the analysis using the other two measures of 
the MW. In column 3, where the MW/GDP per head variable is used instead of the 
Kaitz index, we see that the negatively significant effect of this MW measure remains, 
and the coefficients are larger in absolute size, with an estimated elasticity of -0.195. 
The use of the percentile, in column 4, confirms the negative and significant results, 
even if the coefficient is slightly larger in absolute terms, with an estimated elasticity of 
-0.073. 
 86 
 
In both the analysis for the adults and young people we experimented with country 
specific time trends. This would theoretically capture factors that might influence 
employment trends within a country. However, we found that some of the estimation 
results were less stable when we do this. In some cases adding time trends removed the 
significance of the coefficients, suggesting no overall difference in employment 
between countries where the MW "bites" most compared to areas where the MW has 
less impact. Since there is no a priori reason to impose these restrictions we favour an 
unrestricted specification which is more flexible in allowing separate year and country 
fixed effects. One should also be cautious in interpreting such results because of the loss 
in terms of degrees of freedom that country-specific time trends might cause. Further, 
one should be aware that asking this small panel data to recover 33 country effects, 39 
year effects and imposing a restriction of a trend to be identical across all countries is 
simply too restrictive for the model.  
4.5.2 The role of other labour market institutions on employment 
In the tables of estimation results we present, we also control for the labour market 
policies and institutions that might affect employment other than the MW.  Therefore in 
this section we summarize the results for these policies and institutions, concentrating 
on specifications which include controls and both year and country effects (table 4-1, 
column 1 for young people and column 2 for adults). 
The first OECD indicator we consider measures the level of public expenditure in 
ALMP to bring unemployed workers to work as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, a 
lower value indicates a lower commitment to such policies and institutions. 
In particular, such policies could include public employment services, training, 
employment incentives (such as recruitment and employment maintenance incentives), 
supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation.  
By improving the efficiency of the job matching process and by enhancing the work 
experience and skills of the unemployed, ALMP can increase employment. However, 
the efficacy of ALMP has been found to vary significantly between different types of 
programs and how these programs are designed. Furthermore, the positive effects need 
to be weighted against the costs of taxes necessary to fund them, which may in turn 
increase unemployment. Also, certain programs may reduce job search effort amongst 
the unemployed. In this chapter, a high degree of commitment to ALMP legislation is 
found to be associated with lower employment prospects for all employment groups.   
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The second measure provides information on employment protection regulations 
across countries. This OECD index of employment protection is an indicator of the 
strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts.  
In particular, it measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or 
temporary work agency contracts. High values are associated with countries having a 
high degree of employment protection, while low values indicate relative ease in 
dismissing employees.  
Basic economic theory relating to EPL would predict that EPL lowers labour 
turnover (both hiring and layoff) on the one hand, but increases the length of 
unemployment spells on the other hand, with ambiguous net effects on aggregate 
employment and unemployment rates. Econometric estimates of the impact of EPL on 
the unemployment rate do not clearly provide an unambiguous conclusion on this 
matter. For example, Nickel (1997) and Nunziata (2002) find no significant effect. 
However, by reducing turnover, the job prospects of those relatively weakly attached to 
the labour market, such as young workers, have found to be compromised (OECD 
2004). 
In this chapter, a high degree of EPL is found to be associated with lower 
employment prospects for young people (16 to 24) and for adults. However, the 
coefficient is insignificant for young people and only slightly significant for adults.  
The third measure we use as a control is a measure of the generosity of 
unemployment insurance programs. The summary measure constructed by OECD is 
defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates as a 
percentage of earnings.  
Relatively high unemployment benefits that are available for a relatively long 
duration can have adverse effects on labour market performance, by reducing the job-
search intensity or by lowering the economic cost of unemployment.  In this chapter and 
in accordance with most of the literature, high unemployment benefits are found to be 
generally associated with lower employment prospects for all groups. 
The final additional measure we use as a control is union density again constructed 
from OECD data. Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of workers that are trade 
union members, divided by the total numbers in the labour force. 
In theory, strong trade unions have the ability to push wages above market clearing 
levels, at the cost of lower employment. However, it has long been argued that, in 
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practice, union influence on wage formation varies depending on the structure of 
collective bargaining. The empirical literature, however, remains inconclusive overall. 
In this chapter, high union density is found to be associated with higher employment 
prospects for young people and adults. However, the coefficient is insignificant for 
adults and only slightly significant for young people. This finding agrees with some 
empirical studies (e.g. Boone and Van Ours (2009)), that use cross-country analysis to 
find negative and significant impact of union density on unemployment. However, the 
fact that the result largely disappears when other measures of the MW are used (not 
shown) suggests that the result is not robust to specification analysis and seems to break 
down whenever the Kaitz is not used as the MW measure and the unemployment level 
is not used as the demand side control. These findings prompt scepticism about the 
relationship between trade union density and its effects on employment.  
4.5.3 Accounting for differences in MW effects in period of economic downturn 
and growth 
In the fourth part of the analysis, we add interaction terms to distinguish between MW 
effects on employment in periods of economic downturn relative to periods of economic 
growth. Table A 4-1 (in appendix 4.A),  shows for each country the years in which the 
dummy variable we use to distinguish between periods of growth (zero) from periods of 
downturn (one) is equal to one. It is essential for our identification strategy that there is 
variation across countries in periods of downturn. Also, it is important that countries are 
entering and exiting from global recessions at different times. Table A 4-1 clearly 
shows that countries in our sample are facing different periods of economic downturn 
and it also shows how diverse is the time span of global recessions across countries. 
One of the main motivating factors at the outset of this investigation is the extent to 
which the effects of the MW on employment may or may not be influenced by their 
timing and interrelation with the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. In the 
methodology section we describe how these conditions – or more specifically – how a 
recession, can be measured. Here we adopt the logic of equation (4.2) from our 
methodology (the logic of this specification is spelt out in more detail in the 
methodology section). We present our results of this investigation in table 4-3. In the 
first columns are the results for young people and in the second are the results for 
Adults.  
Looking first at the left hand side of this table and concentrating on the results for 
young people there is clearly a significant interaction coefficient (which is positive for 
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GDP growth). In other words the effect of the MW is largely negative on employment 
for young people but so is the interaction between the MW and the level of the demand 
shock. Thus the negative effect of the MW is quite large both in terms of its direct 
impact and its indirect impact via the macroeconomic position. 
To facilitate interpretation of the results, in table 4-5 we present some simulations to 
indicate the size of the effect of the Kaitz index under various cyclical circumstances. In 
table 4-5 we report (respectively by column) the simulated effect on the elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to employment when GDP growth is at a minimum of -
0.12%, at -0.01%, at 0.0%, at the mean of +0.03% at +0.04% and at the maximum value 
of +0.11%. The estimated elasticity when GDP growth is equal to the average over the 
recessionary period (of -0.01% growth) (shown in column 2 and evaluated at the sample 
means) is equal to -0.26 to -0.41. However, the estimated elasticity varies from -0.510 
when GDP growth reaches its sample lowest level (-0.12) to -0.079 when GDP growth 
reaches its sample highest level (+0.11).  Clearly these simulations suggest that the 
negative employment effect of the MW on young people is around 40% worse in times 
of recession than when there is average growth (of +0.03%) in the economy.  This is a 
sizeable interaction effect. 
In table 4-4, panel A, column 1 and 2, we test the robustness of our results using 
other demand side controls. When we use the level of the adult unemployment, again a 
significant interaction coefficient emerges (which is negative consistently with the 
positive interaction term for GDP growth). When we focus on our dummy for 
downturn, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative in line with the other 
demand side controls but insignificant. However, the effects of the interaction between 
the depth of the recession and the MW are understandably more clearly estimated when 
one uses a continuous measure of GDP growth rather than the dichotomous measure of 
the recessionary 0 or 1 indicator. 
In table 4-4, panel B, column 1 and 2, we concentrate on other MW measures and we 
see that the presence of an interaction effect is confirmed for the Percentile, column 2, 
while it is less significantly so for the MW divided by GDP per head in column 1. 
Now looking at the right hand side of table 4-3 we can see that the results for adults 
are in sharp contrast. Here it would appear that there is no evidence of any interaction 
effect of the MW with the aggregate demand variable. This is also true, no matter which 
demand side control we use, table 4-4, panel A, columns 3 and 4 and no matter which 
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MW measure we use, table 4-4, panel B, column 3 and 4. This suggests that for adults 
there are no differences in the effect of the MW over the economic cycle. 
4.5.4 Examining the endogeneity of the MW 
One clear and important concern with all our results relating to the effect of the MW on 
employment, and indeed the whole literature to date, is that the level of the MW is 
directly or indirectly a decision variable of the government (or its delegated authority) 
in power in a given country. Hence, one would expect the government’s decision on 
whether or not to raise the MW to be influenced by what was happening to employment 
and unemployment. To the extent that this happens the MW in any regression (and in 
any form on the right hand side of a regression) is endogenous. That is to say, it is hard 
to argue that it would be independent of the excluded error term. The standard applied 
econometrician’s tool when faced with this problem in the context of non-experimental 
data is to seek an IV which is correlated with the MW and independent of the stochastic 
term in the employment equation.  The logic of this approach and our motivation is 
provided  in section 4.4 above with the econometric details. In this section we seek to 
describe the results of our IV estimation. 
We repeated our analysis using an instrument for the MW variable, the Schmidt 
index, that ranks countries from 1960 to 2008 by cabinet composition. More 
specifically, the indicator ranges from 1 to 5 where higher values indicate an hegemony 
of social-democratic and left wing parties and lower values indicate dominance of right 
wing parties
38
. The computation of the Schmidt index is based on the share of social 
democratic and other left wing parties compared to total cabinet posts, weighted by 
days. The Schmidt index is then defined as: 
1. hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties (share of left parties=0) 
2. dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties (share of left parties<33.3) 
3. balance of power between left and right (33.3<share of left parties<66.6) 
4. dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (share of left parties>66.6) 
5. hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties (share of left parties=100). 
We expect the Schmidt index to be positively correlated with the Kaitz Index (countries 
where left wing parties dominate are the countries where the MW cuts the most into the 
wage distribution) and uncorrelated with the error term. Figure 4-7 shows what our 
instrument looks like across countries and years. It clearly demonstrates lots of 
                                                          
38
 The index is taken from the CPDS (Comparative Political Dataset) of the Institute of Political Science 
of the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
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variability across countries and within countries over time. This variability is related to 
the desire to see a lower level of inequality and hence this could be reflected in what 
happens to the MW. Tables B 4-5 and B 4-6 in appendix B show the average and 
standard deviation of the Schmidt index by country and by year. 
In table 4-6 we report instrumental variable results for our different age groups using 
the Schmidt index as an instrument for the MW. The first thing to report is that our IV 
in the first stage regressions is always positively significant – implying that the more 
left wing a government is the higher will be the "bite" of the MW.  This is consistent 
with our initial hypothesis.   
Moving to the examination of the coefficient on the MW variable we see that when 
we use the IV estimation procedure the coefficient for the Kaitz is still negatively 
significant for young people, column 1. In contrast, for adults the MW variable is now 
insignificant, column 2. 
If we concentrate on young people, where the effect of the MW is negative and 
significant similarly to the OLS regression, the estimated elasticity (shown in the 
bottom row of  table 4-6 and evaluated at the sample means) is -0.368, larger than the 
elasticity for the OLS estimation in table 4-1.  
The potential problems of applying the IV procedure is that the IV may be weak and  
that the two stage least squares standard errors have a tendency to be larger than the  FE 
standard errors. This imprecision in the estimates is, of course, directly related to the 
strength of the correlation between the IV and the MW variable.  This may (or may not 
be) an acceptable price to pay for tackling the endogeneity and being assured of 
consistent estimates.  Our use of IV methods and the issue is no different from any other 
study which has used this identifications strategy. In particular, our standard errors 
reported in our instrumental variable results in table 4-6 are  larger than standard errors 
reported for our FE estimation in table 4-1. However, in order to support our argument, 
we report in table 4-6 that our IV passes the conventional test associated with weakness 
of instruments. Specifically, we generally have an F test statistics which indicates that 
the IV in question is not a weak instrument. However, overall, our conclusion is that 
since our IV results give us the same conclusion as our FE results then we may be 
cautiously optimistic that the MW effect we estimate is robust. 
Tables 4-7, panel A and B, show that however one chooses to measure the MW or 
the recession  it is the case that the IV estimates of the MW impact on employment is 
robustly negative and larger than the corresponding estimated effect when the MW 
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measured is not instrumented. It should be stressed that this effect is only apparent for 
young people and not adults 
We suggest that this result is an important contribution to the understanding of 
modelling the effect of the MW on employment. These results confirm much of the 
evidence which suggests that the negative effects, where they exist, are clearly 
important for young people on the margins of employment, but possibly they are 
insignificant for adults. This accords with the basic fact that, in most countries, the MW 
affects less than 5% of people and most of these will not be adult workers. 
4.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
The main purpose of this chapter was to exploit the substantial differences across 
countries in relative MW levels to obtain new estimates of the employment effects of 
the MW. Even though an important source of variation is provided by the large 
differences across countries in the MW relative to average wages, relatively few studies 
have tested such propositions directly. We also have been able to account for 
institutional and other policy-related differences that might have an impact on 
employment other that the MW. 
The chapter examined whether the MW has any effect on employment using panel 
data on 33 countries over the 1971-2009 period. We examined our data to compare it 
with an earlier study over a shorter period of time with fewer countries.   
The main finding of this chapter – which comes directly from our analysis, is that 
there are significant negative employment effects of MW rises for young people – but 
that there are less significant negative employment effects for adults – which are only 
found clearly when one uses the alternative measures of the "bite" of the MW. It would 
also appear that there are important additional interaction effects of these policies for 
young people in times of recession. It is worth stressing that these negative employment 
effects are now found over a much wider set of 33 countries and a much longer period 
of time – namely 39 years - than previously in the literature. These advances make our 
conclusions much more generally valuable. It is also worth stressing that these negative 
employment effects are generally invariant to how one measures recessions and how 
one measures the level of the MW.  However, the effects of the interaction between the 
depth of the recession and the MW are understandably more clearly estimated when one 
uses a continuous measure of GDP growth rather than the dichotomous measure of the 
recessionary zero or one indicator. 
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An important component of our analysis has been to raise the issue of the potential 
endogeneity of the MW variable in the standard approach to estimating an employment 
equation. If one considers that setting or (up-rating) a MW is a choice variable for a 
government then it is likely to be partially determined by what happens to employment.  
In this sense – one cannot reasonably assume that the variable which measures the MW 
is a valid exogenous variable to be included on the right hand side of such an equation. 
This problem was tackled in this chapter by the use of an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
identification strategy. This involved using the de facto degree of right or left wing 
political orientation of each country’s government as an IV for the MW. In short, we 
used a ‘political complexion of the government’ instrumental variable – the Schmidt 
Index. The motivation was that the electorate will determine the nature of the 
government and how right or left wing it is.  This process will not be driven by the 
employment rate but the aggregation of the political preferences of voters. However the 
political complexion of the government will have a direct bearing on how sympathetic 
the government is towards setting a MW or how generous it is towards uprating it. 
Specifically, left wing governments are usually much more interested in low pay and 
the distribution of income in the economy. We establish that (using the conventional 
tests) this Schmidt Index variable is a valid IV. Using this IV we find that the MW 
again has a negative impact on employment of young people. This is quite a remarkable 
and yet simple result. It suggests that there is indeed considerable, time varying, 
unobserved heterogeneity in the determination of employment and that the Kaitz index 
is itself endogenous to these processes which are at a country specific level. However if 
one uses the Schmidt index as an IV we essentially purge ourselves of this endogeneity 
and reveal the true underlying relationship between the MW and employment. Our 
examination of the wider set of evidence with robust econometric methods has given a 
clearer consensus of the negative effect of the MW on employment for young people. 
A number of interesting, slightly more methodological, conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, that cross country regressions, even using good panel data, can be plagued by 
unobserved heterogeneity which gives rise to endogeneity problems. Secondly, that the 
Kaitz Index, in this context may well be an endogenous variable and that if one takes 
account of this endogeneity one gets reassuringly stable IV. Finally, most substantively, 
it would appear that the conclusions regarding the employment effects of the MW are 
very different for adults and young people. Our analysis was conducted separately for 
these two groups and we found that when we used the IV identification strategy that 
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there was a clear negative employment effect of MW for young people, but that this 
effect was not present with adults. It would appear that the most vulnerable groups in 
the labour market, whose wages are ‘closest’ to the MW, are most affected by it. One 
should also be clear that our results suggest that not only does a MW have a negative 
effect on the employment of young people but that this effect is clearly magnified by a 
huge margin when there is an economic recession. Overall our elasticity simulation 
results suggest that over the 2008-9 recessionary period when average growth was only 
-.01% then a 10% increase in the MW could reduce employment by as much as 2.6-
4.1%. This sizeable impact is not mirrored in adult employment. 
This leads us to the important problem of possible policy conclusions. The 
immediate response is that – the literature may well have come full circle and it looks 
possible that we are back to ‘as you were’ – with the possibility that higher Minimum 
Wages could have harmful aggregate employment consequences and that this effect is 
most clearly delineated for young people rather than adults.  This would be a boost for 
conventional economic thinking but one must hesitate to reach too strident policy 
inferences from a single set of results. Clearly, more studies of the MW are required that 
address the possible endogeneity of the MW in an employment equation. In addition, 
studies are required which will explain the differences in these cross country results and 
those found in microeconomic datasets where the identification comes from cross time 
and geographical location variation (see Card and Krueger (1994), Stewart (2002), and 
Dolton et al. (2012)). 
The second logical area of policy implications of this research is that countries that 
have not already adopted a separate youth MW rate for young people should consider 
doing so. Our results would suggest that this is a good idea and that in times of 
recessions it may be prudent not to raise this young people’s MW. Further our results 
would suggest that with separate MW rates for adults and young people – those relating 
to young people should not be raised if those for adults are raised.  
To return to the question which began our motivation. What should a government do 
with the MW in recessionary times. Unfortunately economic theory cannot provide a 
single, clear-cut answer. So our only guidance must come from the best empirical 
evidence that is available. It would appear that raising the MW will, in all probability, 
lead to a reduction of employment for young people – but it would reduce wage 
inequality. What happens is that for those who are on low pay – but stay in work when 
the MW rises – they will be better off - and hence inequality will be reduced. But 
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equally, firms who are at the margin of profitability will try to shed labour (or hire less 
labour) when the MW rises and so a rising MW – especially in recessionary - times will 
mean lower employment.  
So this means there is a price to be paid by those who are at the margins of 
employment – like young people – will be more likely to lose their jobs. Hence there is 
a clear trade-off in choosing to raise the MW. Each government faces the dilemma of 
raising the MW and reducing inequality and accepting that this will reduce employment 
levels amongst young people. Things are potentially worse in times of recession for 
precisely that group and so at the time of writing, governments need to be very careful 
when raising the MW – especially in these recessionary times. It is possible that in 
recessionary times, a fixed MW will actually be a rising real level of the MW (assuming 
that there is deflation) or a rising level of the relative MW compared to average wages. 
Therefore, the best policy may be, to leave the MW fixed in nominal terms.  This means 
that the government does not face the political storm of a reduction of the MW at a 
politically sensitive time, but at the same time a falling real value of the MW will not 
have too adverse a consequence on the employment of young people. In contrast, if the 
MW is raised at a time of deflation, this would of course generally create a positive 
effect on inequality but it is likely that this would have a considerable effect on the 
employment of levels of young people – partly due to the direct effect of the MW level 
and partly because of the effect of the interaction between the recession and the MW. 
Hence, in recessionary times, leaving the MW constant in nominal terms (and perhaps 
thereby falling in real terms) may be the prudent option.  
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Figure 4-1. MW and movements of the aggregate demand 
 
 
 a)     b)   
  
 
Figure 4-2. Kaitz index and Gini coefficient 
 
Source: Kaitz Index, OECD Minimum Wage database; Gini coefficient, UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database. 
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Figure 4-3. MW measures ranked across countries 
(for each country, mean of the MW measure across years in the panel) 
a. Kaitz Index 
 
Sources: OECD MW database and EUROSTAT. 
 
b. MW relative to GDP per head 
 
Source: OECD, authors’ calculations. 
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c. Percentile at which the MW "bites" 
 
Source: OECD and UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Australia AU, Belgium BE, Bulgaria BG, Canada CA, Croatia HR, Czech Republic CZ, Denmark DK, Estonia 
EE, France FR, Germany DE, Greece GR, Hungary HU, Ireland IE, Italy IT, Japan JP, Korea KR, Latvia LV, 
Lithuania LT, Luxembourg LU, Malta MT, Mexico MX, Netherlands NL, New Zealand NZ, Poland PL, Portugal PT, 
Romania RO, Slovak Republic SK, Slovenia SI, Spain ES, Sweden SE, Turkey TR, United Kingdom UK, United 
States US. 
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Figure 4-4. MW measures across countries and year 
 
a. Kaitz Index 
 
Sources: OECD, MW database. Kaitz index relative to the median earnings. 
For  UK before 1994, source: Dolado et al. (1996), Kaitz index relative to average earnings. 
 
b. MW relative to GDP per head 
 
Source: OECD, authors’ calculations. 
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c. Percentile at which the MW "bites" 
 
Sources: OECD and UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database. Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4-5. Real Hourly MW (US dollars PPP) across countries and years 
 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 4-6.  Employment to population ratio (15-24) across countries and years 
 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 4-7. Schmidt Index across countries and years
 
Source: CPDS (Comparative Political Dataset), Institute of Political Science of the University of Berne, Switzerland.
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Figure 4-8. Kaitz Index and Schmidt Index 
 
Source: OECD Minimum Wage database. CPDS (Comparative Political Dataset), Institute of Political Science of 
the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
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Table 4-1. Fixed effects estimates of the MW model, Kaitz Index 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable FE   FE 
    
 Youth (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
    
Kaitz Index (L.) -0.200***  -0.067*** 
 (0.043)  (0.020) 
GDP growth (L.) 0.245**  0.216*** 
 (0.099)  (0.058) 
Rel. pop. -0.372**  0.379*** 
 (0.167)  (0.082) 
Bargained Min. 0.077**  0.018** 
 (0.016)  (0.007) 
Youth Submin. -0.006  -0.036*** 
 (0.022)  (0.011) 
Act. Policies -0.021***  -0.006* 
 (0.008)  (0.003) 
Empl. Prot.  -0.011  -0.010* 
 (0.012)  (0.006) 
Repl. Rate -0.076***  -0.014*** 
 (0.008)  (0.005) 
Union Density 0.014*  0.003 
 (0.008)  (0.004) 
    
Observations 573  573 
R-squared 0.893  0.898 
    
MW Elasticity -0.214  -0.046 
    
Years Effects Y  Y 
Country Effects Y   Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets.  
The 23 countries included in the analysis are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. 
The sample period is from 1971 to 2009, except for the following countries: Spain (1972-2009); Japan, Portugal 
(1975-2009); Canada (1976-2009); Germany (1976-1994); Italy (1976-1991); Sweden (1976-1992); Denmark (1983-
1994); Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg (1983-2009); United Kingdom (1984-2009); Australia (1985-2009); New 
Zealand (1986-2008); Korea (1988-2009); Hungary, Poland (1992-2009); Czech Republic (1993-2009); Slovak 
Republic (1993-2009); Ireland (2000-2009). 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4-2. Robustness checks, Fixed effects estimates of the MW model (alternative 
demand side controls and MW measures) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable FE FE FE FE 
     
 Youth (16-24) Adults (25-64) 
 Panel A 
Kaitz Index (L.) -0.205*** -0.230*** -0.071*** -0.061*** 
 (0.043) (0.031) (0.020) (0.015) 
 
Downturn 
 (L.) 
Adult  
unempl.rt 
Downturn  
(L.) Youth unempl.rt 
Demand control -0.003 -1.761*** -0.006*** -0.340*** 
 (0.005) (0.094) (0.003) (0.021) 
     
Observations 573 573 573 573 
R-squared 0.892 0.936 0.895 0.934 
     
MW Elasticity -0.220 -0.247 -0.049 -0.042 
     
 Panel B 
 MW/GDPperhead Percentile  MW/GDPperhead Percentile  
MW measure (L.) -0.397*** -0.227*** -0.337*** -0.152*** 
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.020) (0.017) 
     
Observations 475 485 475 485 
R-squared 0.883 0.876 0.925 0.891 
     
MW Elasticity -0.364 -0.176 -0.195 -0.073 
     
Years Effects Y Y Y Y 
Country Effects Y Y Y Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets. 
Panel A: See table 4-1.  
Panel B: Results using MW/GDP per head as MW indicator: differently from table 4-1: data only goes up to 2008; 
Germany, Sweden, Italy and Denmark data is missing; UK data goes from 2000 to 2008; Portugal  data goes from 
1974 to 2008. 
Results using Percentile as MW indicator: Differently from table 4-1: data on Germany, Sweden, Italy and Denmark 
is missing; UK data goes from 2000 to 2009; US data from 1973 to 2009. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
Table 4-3. Differences in MW effects by periods of growth, Kaitz Index 
  (1) (2) 
Variable FE FE 
   
 Youth (16-24) Adults (25-64) 
   
Kaitz Index (L.) -0.264*** -0.070*** 
 (0.051) (0.024) 
   
GDP growth (L.) -0.553 0.178 
 (0.345) (0.166) 
Kaitz*GDP growth (L.) 1.789** 0.084 
 (0.734) (0.359) 
   
Observations 573 573 
R-squared 0.894 0.898 
   
Years Effects Y Y 
Country Effects Y Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets. See table 4-1.  
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4-4. Robustness checks, differences in MW effects by periods of growth 
(alternative demand side controls and MW measures) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable FE FE FE FE 
     
 Youth (16-24) Adults (25-64) 
 Panel A 
Kaitz Index (L.) -0.200*** -0.160*** -0.071*** -0.087*** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.020) (0.027) 
 
Downturn  
(L.) Adult unempl.rt 
Downturn  
(L.) Youth unempl.rt 
Demand control 0.019 -1.154*** -0.006 -0.430*** 
 (0.021) (0.363) (0.011) (0.087) 
Kaitz*Demand contr. -0.046 -1.298* 0.001 0.189 
 (0.045) (0.778) (0.023) (0.167) 
     
Observations 573 573 573 573 
R-squared 0.892 0.936 0.895 0.935 
     
 Panel B 
 MW/GDPperhead Percentile  MW/GDPperhead Percentile  
MW measure (L.) -0.426*** -0.305*** -0.330*** -0.175*** 
 (0.053) (0.060) (0.022) (0.025) 
     
GDP growth (L.) -0.509 -0.516 0.246 -0.014 
 (0.426) (0.444) (0.173) (0.204) 
MW*GDP growth (L.) 1.764 2.507* -0.397 0.763 
 (1.107) (1.313) (0.406) (0.592) 
     
Observations 475 485 475 485 
R-squared 0.884 0.877 0.926 0.891 
     
Years Effects Y Y Y Y 
Country Effects Y Y Y Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets. 
Panel A: see table 4-2, panel A 
Panel B: see table 4-2, panel B 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4-5. Simulations for young people, MW effects under various cyclical 
circumstances 
  GDP growth 
 Min 2008-2009  0 Mean >=0 Max  
  - 0.12 -0.01 0.00 + 0.03 +0.04 + 0.11 
       
Kaitz Index (L.) -0.477 -0.281 -0.264 -0.210 -0.202 -0.074 
Elasticity -0.510 -0.301 -0.283 -0.225 -0.216 -0.079 
       
Percentile(L.) -0.603 -0.329 -0.305 -0.226 -0.215 -0.038 
Elasticity -0.468 -0.256 -0.237 -0.175 -0.167 -0.029 
       
MW/GDPperhead (L.) -0.635 -0.444 -0.426 -0.372 -0.364 -0.238 
Elasticity -0.583 -0.407 -0.390 -0.341 -0.334 -0.218 
              
 
Table 4-6. IV estimation, Schmidt index as an instrument for the Kaitz Index 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable FE   FE 
    
 Youth (16-24)  Adults (25-64) 
    
First stage 0.014***  0.011*** 
Schmidt Index (0.004)  (0.004) 
    
Second stage    
Kaitz Index -0.381***  0.073 
 (0.143)  (0.084) 
GDP growth (L.) 0.117  0.192*** 
 (0.088)  (0.061) 
    
Observations 549  549 
    
Hausman p value 0.368  0.052 
F-test   14.879  10 
    
MW Elasticity -0.407  0.051 
    
Years Effects Y  Y 
Country Effects Y   Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets. See table 4-1; Korea data is missing, Portugal data goes from 
1976 to 2009. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4-7. Robustness checks, IV estimation 
(alternative demand side controls and MW measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable FE FE FE FE 
     
 Youth (16-24) Adults (25-64) 
 Panel A 
First stage 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
Schmidt Index (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Second stage     
Kaitz Index -0.369*** -0.371*** 0.088 0.191* 
 (0.141) (0.106) (0.086) (0.099) 
 Downturn (L.) Adult unempl.rt Downturn (L.) Youth unempl.rt 
Demand control -0.001 -1.638*** -0.006** -0.326*** 
 (0.004) (0.051) (0.003) (0.016) 
     
Observations 549 549 549 549 
     
Hausman p value 0.424 0.278 0.030 0.000 
F-test 15.107 17.099 10 8.202 
     
MW Elasticity -0.394 -0.396 0.061 0.133 
     
 Panel B 
First stage     
Schmidt Index 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Second stage     
 MW/GDPperhead Percentile  MW/GDPperhead Percentile  
MW measure (L.) -0.594*** -0.524** -0.316*** -0.053 
 (0.118) (0.209) (0.042) (0.109) 
     
Observations 437 467 437 467 
     
Hausman p value 0.099 0.123 0.544 0.372 
F-test 27.498 21.119 24.927 14.173 
     
MW Elasticity -0.530 -0.407 -0.181 -0.026 
     
Years Effects Y Y Y Y 
Country Effects Y Y Y Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets.  
Panel 1: See table 4-6 
Panel 2: For Percentile regressions: see table 4-2, panel B. For MW/GDP per head regressions: see table 4-2, panel B. 
Korea data is missing. Portugal data goes from 1976 to 2009; Spanish data goes from 1977 to 2009. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix 4.A 
 
Table A 4-1. Years of economic downturn across countries 
(years in which at least two quarters of downturn per year, 0 otherwise) 
Australia 1961,1972,1974,1975,1977,1982,1983,1991      
Belgium 1975, 1977, 1980, 1992, 2001, 2008      
Canada 1980, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1990, 2008, 2009     
Czech Rep. 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2009      
Denmark 1974, 1977, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2005,  
   2006, 2008, 2009  
France 1975, 1980, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2008      
Germany 1967, 1971, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2008 
Greece 1962, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987,  
   1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2009 
Hungary 1985, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2007, 2008, 2009   
Ireland 1966, 1983, 1985, 1986, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009 
Italy  1964, 1975, 1977, 1982, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998 , 2001, 2003, 2008, 2009 
Japan  1974, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009  
Korea 1979, 1980, 1998, 2008     
Luxembourg 1967, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2008  
Mexico 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1995, 2001, 2008  
Netherlands 1973, 1980, 1981, 1982, 2002, 2008, 2009    
New Zealand 1961, 1962, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973,  1975, 1977,   
   1978, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2008   
Poland 1991, 2001       
Portugal 1969, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1992, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009 
Slovak Rep. 1990, 1991, 1992, 1998, 1999, 2002     
Spain  1975, 1978, 1981, 1992, 1993, 2008, 2009    
Sweden 1965, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981,1989, 1990, 1991,1992  
   2008, 2009        
Turkey 1979, 1980, 1988, 1994,1998, 1999, 2001, 2008    
UK  1961, 1973,1974, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1990, 1991, 2008, 2009  
US  1960, 1970, 1974, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1990, 2001, 2008, 2009  
Lithuania 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2008, 2009    
Romania 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008, 2009  
Slovenia 2009        
Malta  2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009     
Latvia 1999, 2008, 2009       
Estonia 1999, 2008, 2009       
Bulgaria 2009        
Croatia 1999, 2008, 2009        
Sources: OECD, EUROSTAT. 
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Appendix 4.B 
 
Table B 4-1. Means of the main variables by country 
  Empl. to pop. ratio MW measures IV 
  Young (%) Adults (%) Kaitz Percentile MW/GDP per head Schmidt Index 
Australia 61.36 67.12 0.60 4.07 0.49 2.87 
Belgium 28.96 64.03 0.54 3.89 0.51 2.46 
Bulgaria 22.61 64.78 0.40 _ _ 2.00 
Canada 57.04 71.59 0.42 3.48 0.41 1.00 
Croatia 25.99 62.51 0.33 _ _ _ 
Czech Rep. 36.48 74.52 0.34 2.69 0.24 2.53 
Denmark 64.54 77.66 0.62 _ _ 2.54 
Estonia 30.38 73.68 0.36 2.70 _ 2.11 
France 32.80 69.99 0.51 3.68 0.46 2.51 
Germany 52.78 67.78 0.59 _ _ 2.82 
Greece 27.29 63.35 0.57 3.81 0.52 3.03 
Hungary 27.97 62.52 0.43 3.02 0.28 3.00 
Ireland 44.49 61.60 0.54 3.84 0.32 1.62 
Italy 29.59 59.73 0.75 _ _ 2.26 
Japan 43.46 74.43 0.31 2.38 0.31 1.13 
Korea 31.79 70.56 0.30 2.34 0.38 _ 
Latvia 32.28 70.67 0.38 3.20 _ 2.08 
Lithuania 25.18 72.38 0.46 3.23 _ 3.06 
Luxembourg 38.91 65.80 0.38 2.86 0.31 2.31 
Malta 47.66 56.29 0.56 3.99 _ 1.54 
Mexico 47.16 65.25 0.34 3.28 0.25 _ 
Netherlands 54.98 64.27 0.57 3.95 0.47 2.10 
New Zealand 57.38 74.38 0.52 3.43 0.44 2.87 
Poland 25.43 64.93 0.40 3.23 0.37 2.68 
Portugal 48.13 70.71 0.54 3.53 0.40 2.44 
Romania 29.58 70.18 0.45 2.75 _ 3.26 
Slovak Rep. 29.66 68.31 0.43 3.25 _ 2.24 
Slovenia 34.08 72.53 0.45 3.66 _ 3.31 
Spain 39.94 58.39 0.51 3.23 0.40 3.36 
Sweden 54.58 81.18 0.53 _ _ 3.74 
Turkey 37.73 54.44 0.61 _ 0.31 _ 
UK 60.89 72.61 0.37 3.24 0.38 2.82 
US 56.82 72.97 0.39 3.00 0.35 1.00 
Sources: OECD, EUROSTAT, Dolado et al. (1996), UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database, CPDS 
(Comparative Political Dataset), Institute of Political Science of the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
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Table B 4-2. Means of the dependent variables by country 
  ALMP  EPL RR  UD  Adult unempl.  Youth unempl. GDP growth  Rel. size pop. 
Australia 0.38 1.03 23.28 37.0 4.77 12.48 0.03 23.84 
Belgium 1.16 2.82 42.28 52.3 7.36 19.59 0.02 19.91 
Bulgaria _ _ _ _ 10.61 24.56 0.04 19.85 
Canada 0.51 0.75 17.10 32.2 7.19 14.18 0.03 22.80 
Croatia _ _ _ _ 9.70 29.63 0.03 19.43 
Czech Rep. 0.18 1.91 6.00 39.2 5.44 13.62 0.02 21.18 
Denmark 1.32 2.05 50.67 73.7 5.78 10.00 0.02 19.59 
Estonia _ 2.10 _ _ 8.63 18.93 0.05 21.65 
France 0.83 2.89 34.21 13.0 6.81 18.47 0.02 22.37 
Germany 0.87 2.84 27.62 29.9 6.25 7.67 0.02 19.91 
Greece 0.23 3.39 10.26 31.3 6.77 26.38 0.03 19.58 
Hungary 0.50 1.32 13.00 39.4 6.99 17.24 0.02 20.67 
Ireland 1.00 0.96 28.69 45.9 8.92 16.28 0.05 26.35 
Italy 0.61 3.10 13.69 40.3 5.54 26.21 0.02 21.39 
Japan 0.31 1.71 9.87 26.2 2.74 5.67 0.03 20.55 
Korea 0.33 2.51 9.85 13.4 2.85 9.22 0.07 24.35 
Latvia _ _ 27.00 _ 10.31 20.03 0.05 21.92 
Lithuania _ _ _ _ 10.24 21.31 0.01 22.12 
Luxembourg 0.34 3.25 _ 45.6 2.39 8.30 0.04 18.54 
Malta _ _ _ _ 4.68 15.36 0.02 21.45 
Mexico _ 3.13 _ 21.4 2.69 6.73 0.03 32.24 
Netherlands 1.34 2.55 48.62 27.6 4.78 9.94 0.02 22.21 
New Zealand 0.71 1.01 28.67 42.6 4.67 12.87 0.02 23.11 
Poland 0.28 1.49 10.94 41.5 11.93 31.07 0.04 21.58 
Portugal 0.40 3.90 26.10 37.4 4.75 13.93 0.03 23.51 
Romania _ _ _ _ 5.48 19.38 0.01 22.41 
Slovak Rep. 0.31 1.72 11.38 51.1 12.25 28.54 0.02 23.74 
Slovenia _ 2.51 _ _ 5.17 14.81 0.03 19.84 
Spain 0.53 3.48 30.87 12.5 10.68 27.16 0.03 21.39 
Sweden 1.95 2.95 27.54 78.0 3.75 11.63 0.02 18.69 
Turkey _ 3.75 9.10 16.4 6.54 17.38 0.04 29.70 
UK 0.55 0.63 19.51 38.3 6.16 13.97 0.02 19.05 
US 0.21 0.21 13.00 17.3 4.74 12.65 0.03 22.03 
Notes: Active labour market policies (ALMP), employment protection legislation (EPL), replacement rate (RR), 
union density (UD) 
Sources: OECD and EUROSTAT. 
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Table B 4-3. Means of the main variables by year 
  
 
Empl. to pop. ratio MW measures IVs 
  Young (%)  Adults (%) Kaitz_median Percentile MW/GDP per head Schmidt Index 
1971 56.41 63.84 0.56 3.81 0.51 1.80 
1972 55.64 64.06 0.55 3.76 0.51 2.00 
1973 55.42 64.79 0.59 3.55 0.48 2.60 
1974 56.01 65.16 0.58 3.63 0.53 2.63 
1975 53.79 63.70 0.56 3.96 0.55 2.63 
1976 53.17 65.12 0.55 3.60 0.54 2.24 
1977 52.53 64.72 0.55 3.58 0.53 2.17 
1978 51.84 66.60 0.55 3.57 0.52 1.94 
1979 52.44 66.17 0.54 3.54 0.50 1.67 
1980 51.77 67.45 0.52 3.59 0.49 1.56 
1981 50.65 66.32 0.52 3.66 0.49 1.89 
1982 48.47 66.72 0.51 3.55 0.49 2.06 
1983 46.38 64.96 0.51 3.61 0.48 2.28 
1984 46.48 64.89 0.51 3.59 0.46 2.50 
1985 46.73 65.16 0.52 3.61 0.46 2.56 
1986 48.18 66.09 0.52 3.57 0.45 2.39 
1987 49.06 66.84 0.52 3.65 0.44 2.33 
1988 48.89 67.00 0.50 3.42 0.42 2.50 
1989 49.27 67.44 0.47 3.40 0.39 2.56 
1990 48.67 68.05 0.47 3.38 0.37 2.37 
1991 47.81 67.73 0.48 3.26 0.37 2.24 
1992 44.93 67.30 0.46 3.03 0.38 2.13 
1993 42.89 66.99 0.44 3.34 0.37 2.24 
1994 42.34 67.14 0.42 3.25 0.35 2.52 
1995 42.28 67.61 0.40 3.27 0.34 2.84 
1996 41.98 68.04 0.40 3.19 0.34 2.72 
1997 41.43 68.89 0.41 3.14 0.33 2.66 
1998 41.10 69.06 0.40 3.18 0.33 2.59 
1999 40.66 69.34 0.41 2.88 0.33 2.55 
2000 40.40 68.79 0.42 3.11 0.33 2.62 
2001 39.74 68.98 0.43 3.16 0.33 2.79 
2002 38.67 68.94 0.44 3.10 0.33 2.59 
2003 37.81 69.20 0.44 3.23 0.33 2.38 
2004 37.48 69.60 0.45 3.23 0.33 2.34 
2005 37.42 70.21 0.45 3.21 0.33 2.52 
2006 38.01 71.15 0.45 3.24 0.32 2.55 
2007 38.61 71.93 0.45 3.22 0.32 2.62 
2008 38.53 72.26 0.45 3.26 0.33 2.62 
2009 35.42 70.62 0.47 3.33 0.39 2.48 
Sources: OECD, EUROSTAT, Dolado et al. (1996), UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database, CPDS (Comparative 
Political Dataset), Institute of Political Science of the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
The sample period is from 1971 to 2009, except for the following countries: Spain (1972-2009); Japan, Portugal 
(1975-2009); Canada (1976-2009); Germany (1976-1994); Italy (1976-1991); Sweden (1976-1992); Denmark (1983-
1994); Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg (1983-2009); United Kingdom (1984-2009); Australia (1985-2009); New 
Zealand (1986-2008); Korea (1988-2009); Hungary, Poland (1992-2009); Czech Republic (1993-2009); Slovak 
Republic (1993-2009); Ireland (2000-2009). 
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Table B 4-4. Means of the dependent variables by year 
  ALMP EPL RR UD Adult unempl.  Youth unempl. GDP growth  Rel. size pop. 
1971 0.64 2.36 17.30 40.02 2.16 5.33 0.04 12.56 
1972 0.64 2.36 18.04 40.35 1.84 5.47 0.06 11.98 
1973 0.64 2.36 18.04 40.70 1.64 5.12 0.07 12.01 
1974 0.64 2.36 20.00 41.32 1.74 5.51 0.03 12.07 
1975 0.64 2.36 20.00 41.97 3.25 8.73 0.01 12.48 
1976 0.62 2.32 20.21 42.90 3.15 9.44 0.05 12.39 
1977 0.62 2.32 20.21 43.20 3.73 11.40 0.03 12.69 
1978 0.62 2.32 20.33 43.64 3.57 11.98 0.04 12.42 
1979 0.62 2.32 20.33 43.52 3.81 12.05 0.04 12.73 
1980 0.62 2.32 21.21 43.19 3.85 12.99 0.02 12.86 
1981 0.62 2.32 21.21 42.83 4.75 14.28 0.02 13.00 
1982 0.62 2.32 21.42 42.69 5.37 16.43 0.02 12.54 
1983 0.62 2.32 21.42 42.35 6.67 18.38 0.02 12.43 
1984 0.62 2.32 22.50 41.81 6.93 18.62 0.04 12.12 
1985 0.62 2.32 22.50 40.92 6.99 18.29 0.03 11.88 
1986 0.64 2.32 23.04 40.08 6.64 16.96 0.03 11.86 
1987 0.63 2.32 23.04 39.58 6.44 15.95 0.03 11.68 
1988 0.63 2.32 22.88 39.24 6.08 15.04 0.04 11.89 
1989 0.61 2.31 22.88 39.07 5.90 13.85 0.03 11.65 
1990 0.62 2.32 23.25 38.44 5.63 13.46 0.03 11.43 
1991 0.67 2.31 23.25 38.60 6.06 14.20 -0.01 11.65 
1992 0.81 2.31 23.79 38.31 6.87 15.90 0.00 11.36 
1993 0.79 2.28 23.79 37.87 7.40 17.54 0.01 11.13 
1994 0.77 2.24 24.21 36.84 7.62 18.01 0.03 11.01 
1995 0.76 2.21 24.21 35.38 7.20 17.26 0.04 10.88 
1996 0.74 2.20 24.42 33.81 7.07 17.08 0.04 10.76 
1997 0.70 2.12 24.42 32.23 6.72 16.69 0.04 10.65 
1998 0.72 2.08 25.13 30.80 7.02 16.66 0.03 10.48 
1999 0.72 2.04 25.13 29.80 6.92 17.08 0.03 10.34 
2000 0.68 2.06 25.08 28.98 6.98 16.51 0.05 10.26 
2001 0.67 2.05 25.08 28.24 6.75 17.00 0.03 10.09 
2002 0.66 2.04 25.04 27.74 7.06 17.54 0.03 9.99 
2003 0.63 2.02 25.04 27.74 6.95 17.84 0.03 9.95 
2004 0.62 2.02 23.50 27.17 6.93 17.94 0.04 9.87 
2005 0.60 2.03 23.50 26.66 6.58 17.17 0.04 9.81 
2006 0.58 2.03 23.13 26.04 5.91 15.88 0.05 9.75 
2007 0.54 2.02 23.13 25.39 5.23 14.15 0.05 9.67 
2008 0.55 1.99 23.13 24.88 5.20 14.45 0.01 9.52 
2009 0.55 1.98 23.13 24.88 7.43 19.91 -0.05 9.35 
Notes: Active labour market policies (ALMP), employment protection legislation (EPL), replacement rate (RR), 
union density (UD). 
Sources: OECD and EUROSTAT. 
The sample period is from 1971 to 2009, except for the following countries: Spain (1972-2009); Japan, Portugal 
(1975-2009); Canada (1976-2009); Germany (1976-1994); Italy (1976-1991); Sweden (1976-1992); Denmark (1983-
1994); Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg (1983-2009); United Kingdom (1984-2009); Australia (1985-2009); New 
Zealand (1986-2008); Korea (1988-2009); Hungary, Poland (1992-2009); Czech Republic (1993-2009); Slovak 
Republic (1993-2009); Ireland (2000-2009). 
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Table B 4-5. Mean of the Schmidt index by country 
  Schmidt Index sd 
Australia 2.87 1.92 
Belgium 2.46 0.82 
Bulgaria 2 0.71 
Canada 1 0.00 
Croatia _ _ 
Czech Rep. 2.53 1.23 
Denmark 2.54 1.60 
Estonia 2.11 1.18 
France 2.51 1.60 
Germany 2.82 1.59 
Greece 3.03 1.89 
Hungary 3 1.30 
Ireland 1.62 0.67 
Italy 2.26 0.85 
Japan 1.13 0.34 
Korea _ _ 
Latvia 2.08 0.28 
Lithuania 3.06 1.51 
Luxembourg 2.31 0.89 
Malta 1.54 1.33 
Mexico _ _ 
Netherlands 2.1 0.94 
New Zealand 2.87 1.89 
Poland 2.68 1.20 
Portugal 2.44 1.54 
Romania 3.26 1.19 
Slovak Rep. 2.24 0.97 
Slovenia 3.31 0.63 
Spaiò 3.36 1.92 
Sweden 3.74 1.77 
Turkey _ _ 
UK 2.82 1.94 
US 1 0.00 
Source: CPDS (Comparative Political Dataset), Institute of Political Science of the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
The sample period is from 1971 to 2009, except for the following countries: Spain (1972-2009); Japan, Portugal 
(1975-2009); Canada (1976-2009); Germany (1976-1994); Italy (1976-1991); Sweden (1976-1992); Denmark (1983-
1994); Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg (1983-2009); United Kingdom (1984-2009); Australia (1985-2009); New 
Zealand (1986-2008); Korea (1988-2009); Hungary, Poland (1992-2009); Czech Republic (1993-2009); Slovak 
Republic (1993-2009); Ireland (2000-2009). 
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Table B 4-6. Mean of the Schmidt index by year 
  Schmidt Index sd 
1971 1.8 1.32 
1972 2 1.36 
1973 2.6 1.64 
1974 2.63 1.54 
1975 2.63 1.54 
1976 2.24 1.48 
1977 2.17 1.47 
1978 1.94 1.35 
1979 1.67 1.08 
1980 1.56 1.20 
1981 1.89 1.23 
1982 2.06 1.39 
1983 2.28 1.71 
1984 2.5 1.72 
1985 2.56 1.76 
1986 2.39 1.75 
1987 2.33 1.78 
1988 2.5 1.76 
1989 2.56 1.65 
1990 2.37 1.61 
1991 2.24 1.48 
1992 2.13 1.46 
1993 2.24 1.36 
1994 2.52 1.48 
1995 2.84 1.52 
1996 2.72 1.34 
1997 2.66 1.42 
1998 2.59 1.45 
1999 2.55 1.50 
2000 2.62 1.59 
2001 2.79 1.57 
2002 2.59 1.55 
2003 2.38 1.66 
2004 2.34 1.52 
2005 2.52 1.60 
2006 2.55 1.48 
2007 2.62 1.42 
2008 2.62 1.42 
2009 2.48 1.45 
Source: see table B 4-5 
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Appendix 4.C 
Definition of the Kaitz index 
Australia 
MW: Federal minimum weekly wage (August each year) -- extrapolated from 1997 back 
to 1985 in line with Metals Industry Award C14 wages and National Wage Case 
decisions.  
Median wage:  Median gross weekly earnings of full-time workers in main job (August 
each year).  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Belgium 
MW: Minimum monthly wage (annual averages) -- Revenu Minimum Mensuel Moyen 
Garantie (RMMMG) -- for experienced workers aged 22 and over (21 and over prior to 
1992). 
Median wage: Median gross monthly earnings of full-time workers.  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Bulgaria 
MW: Monthly MW 
Mean wage: Mean value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time workers 
including overtime earnings, regular and irregular bonuses and payments for time not 
worked. Only enterprises with at least 1 employee are covered (industry and services 
excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Canada 
MW: Weighted (by labour force) average of provincial minimum hourly wage (Can$).  
Median wage: Median gross hourly earnings of full-time workers.  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Croatia 
MW: Monthly MW 
Mean wage: Mean value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time and part-
time workers, only enterprises with at least 10 employees are covered (industry and 
services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Czech Republic 
MW: Minimum gross monthly wage (annual average). 
Median wage: Median monthly earnings of employees who worked at least 1 700 hours 
during the year. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Denmark 
The average hourly MW divided by an average hourly wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
Estonia 
MW: Monthly MW 
Mean wage: Mean value of the October gross monthly earnings of full-time workers 
(industry and services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
France 
MW: Gross monthly equivalent of the hourly MW -- Salaire Minimum 
Interprofessionnel de Croissance (SMIC) -- and the Garantie Mensuelle de 
Rémunération (GMR) for 2000-2005.  
Median wage: Median gross annual earnings of full-time workers in the private and 
semi-private sector. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Germany 
Average monthly MW divided by an average monthly wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
Greece 
MW: Minimum monthly wage for an unqualified, single, worker with no work 
experience (annual average and assuming paid for 14 months).   
Median wage:  Median gross annual earnings of full-time workers.  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Hungary 
MW: Minimum gross monthly wage (May each year).  
Median wage: Median monthly earnings of full-time employees (May each year). 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
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Ireland 
Before 2000: 
The average hourly MW divided by an average hourly wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
From 2000: 
MW: minimum gross hourly wage (March each year).  
Median wage: median hourly earnings of full-time employees. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Italy 
Average minimum monthly wage divided by an average wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
Japan 
MW:  Weighted average of prefectural hourly MWs (June each year and weighted by 
employment). 
Median wage: Median gross monthly earnings, including overtime and all special 
payments, for June of each year (estimated by applying the ratio of mean total to mean 
scheduled earnings to median scheduled earnings). 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Korea 
MW: minimum hourly wage (June each year). 
Median wage: median gross monthly earnings, including overtime and all special 
payments, for June of each year. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Latvia 
MW: Monthly MW 
Mean wage: Mean value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time workers 
(industry and services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Lithuania 
MW: Monthly MW 
Median wage: Median value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time workers 
(industry and services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Luxembourg 
MW: minimum monthly wage -- Salaire Social Minimum (SSM) -- (October each year).  
Median wage: median gross monthly earnings of full-time, full-year workers (annual 
earnings divided by 12).  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Malta 
MW: Monthly MW (in Malta the MW is fixed at a weekly rate. These hourly or weekly 
rates have been converted to a monthly rate). 
Median wage: Median value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time workers 
(industry and services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Mexico 
MW: Weighted average of regional daily MWs (annual average and weighted by 
employment).  
Mean wage: Mean hourly wages of manual workers in manufacturing. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Netherlands 
MW: Minimum weekly earnings -- Minimumloon -- for persons aged 23 to 64 (annual 
average). 
Median wage:  Median gross annual earnings of full-time employees (including 
overtime payments). 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
New Zealand 
MW: minimum weekly wage for workers aged 20 and over (February each year). 
Median wage: median usual weekly earnings of full-time employees (February each 
year).  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Poland 
MW: Minimum monthly wage (September of each year) (Zl).  
Median wage: Median gross monthly earnings of full-time workers. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
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Portugal 
MW: Minimum monthly wage -- Salário Mínimo Nacional (SMN) -- for non-
agricultural workers aged 20 and over (annual average).  
Median wage: Median gross annual earnings of full-time workers.  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Romania 
MW: Monthly MW 
Median wage: Median value of the average gross monthly earnings including non-
standard payments (industry and services excluding public administration). 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Slovak Republic 
MW: minimum monthly wage.  
Median wage: median gross monthly earnings of full-time workers.  
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Slovenia 
MW: Monthly MW 
Mean wage: Mean value of the average gross monthly earnings of full-time and part-
time workers, including 13th month payments (industry and services excluding public 
administration). 
Spain 
MW: Salario minimo interprofesional per month (Ptas) for workers aged 18 and over. 
Median wage: Median gross annual earnings of full-time workers. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Sweden 
The average hourly MW divided by an average hourly wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
Turkey 
MW: Minimum daily wage (TL) for workers aged 16 and over. 
Mean wage: Mean daily earnings of manufacturing workers. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
United Kingdom 
Before 1994: 
The average hourly MW divided by an average hourly wage.  
Source: Dolado et al. (1996). 
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From 1999: 
MW: national minimum hourly wage. 
Median wage: median hourly earnings of full-time adult employees. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
United States 
MW:  Federal minimum hourly wage rate (US$). 
Median wage: Median usual weekly earnings of full-time employees. 
Source: OECD MW Database. 
Definition of the Percentile at which the MW "bites" 
The percentile at which the MW "bites" is constructed from the Gini coefficient, real 
MW and real average wages. The logic is as follows. Let ln(x)≈N(θ,σ2) so that x has a 
lognormal income distribution with parameters θ and σ2. The median is exp{θ}, the 
mode is exp{θ-σ2}and the mean is exp{θ+(1/2)σ2}. If u(p) is the value in the N(0,1) 
distribution at percentile point p (so that u(1/2)=0, etc) then x(p)=exp{θ+u(p)σ} is the 
income level at percentile p. The Gini coefficient is G=1-2u| σ/√2|, or, indeed, twice the 
area under N(0,1) between the ordinates u = 0 and   u = σ/√2. So if you know the Gini 
coefficient, you can infer σ. And then, knowing the mean (or median or mode) you can 
infer θ. So if the MW is x , you can get their average percentile p  by solving ( ).x x p    
Data on the Gini coefficient comes from the UNU WIDER, World Inequality Database. 
We try to use a definition of the Gini coefficient as consistent as possible across 
countries and years. In most of the series the Gini coefficient is constructed from 
disposable income. Exceptions are Australia (where the Gini is constructed from 
monetary income), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia where the Gini is constructed 
from gross earnings. The income sharing unit is the household and the unit of analysis is 
the household and the unit of analysis is person, meaning that the needs of different 
sized households have been taken into account. Exceptions are:  Japan and Romania, 
where the unit of analysis is the household; Lithuania and Latvia where the income 
sharing unit is the person. The equivalence scale varies among countries being either the 
OECD scale in most of the countries or per capita when the OECD scale is not 
available.
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Definition of MW relative to GDP per head 
Data on MW relative to GDP per head come from different OECD sources. 
Data on real hourly MW in US dollars Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) comes from 
the OECD Minimum Wage database. This data is calculated by deflating the series 
using the CPI, taking 2005 as the base year. The series are then converted by the OECD 
into a common currency unit using PPPs in 2005.  
Data on GDP per head current prices, current PPPs is taken from OECD National 
Accounts data. In order to get data on GDP per head consistent with the real MW data, 
the GDP series has been deflated using the CPI, taking 2005 as the base year. Moreover, 
the series has been converted into US dollars using PPPs in 2005. 
In order to get data on MW consistent with the GDP per head series, data on real hourly 
MW has then been multiplied by average annual hours worked per worker from OECD 
Productivity database. 
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Appendix 4.D 
 
Table D 4-5. Characteristics of MW systems 
Country Method of setting System Youth subminimum 
Australia statute national-state yes 
Belgium negotiated national yes 
Canada statute provincial limited 
Czech Republic statute national yes 
Denmark negotiated sectoral collective agr. yes 
France statute national limited  
Germany negotiated sectoral collective agr. some 
Greece negotiated national no 
Hungary statute national no 
Ireland before 2000 Lab. Committees sectoral collective agr. yes 
Ireland from 2000 statute national yes 
Italy negotiated sectoral collective agr. some 
Japan statute regional no 
Korea statute national limited  
Luxemburg statute national yes 
Mexico statute regional no 
Netherlands statute national yes 
New Zealand statute national yes 
Poland statute national no 
Portugal statute national no 
Slovak Rep. statute national yes 
Spain statute national no 
Sweden negotiated sectoral collective agr. yes 
Turkey statute national yes 
UK before 1994 Wage Councils sectoral collective agr. yes 
UK from 1999 statute national yes 
US statute national-state limited 
Lithuania statute national no 
Romania statute national no 
Slovenia statute national no 
Malta statute national yes 
Latvia statute national yes 
Estonia statute national no 
Bulgaria statute national no 
Croazia statute national no 
Sources “Method of Setting”: ILO, MW Database; Eurostat, “MWs in January 2009”. 
Sources “System”: The MW Revisited in the Enlarged EU, table 1.1 pg.2; for extra-European countries: ILO, MW 
data base. 
Sources “Youth minimum”: ILO, MW database; Low Pay  Commission Report 2009. 
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Appendix 4.E 
Institutional control variables 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Synthetic indicator of the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary 
contracts
39
. High values are associated with countries having a high degree of 
employment protection, while low values indicate relative ease in dismissing 
employees. 
Source: OECD. The measure is available for 28 of the countries included in the analysis 
from 1985. We use 1985 values for previous years. 
Active labour market programs 
Level of public expenditure in ALMP to bring unemployed workers to work as a 
percentage of GDP.  
Source: OECD. The measure is available for 24 of the countries in the analysis from 
1985. We use 1985 values for previous years. 
Union density 
 Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners
40
. 
Source: OECD. This measure is available for 24 of the countries in the analysis. 
Replacement rate 
Average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates as a percentage of 
earnings and it is meant to quantify the generosity of unemployment insurance 
programs
41
. 
Source: OECD. This measure is available for 24 of the countries in the analysis and it is 
drawn every two years for the entire length of our panel. 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 See www.oecd.org/employment/protection for details on the methodology and weights used to 
compiled the indicators. 
40
 For more information and full methodology, see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/2/35695665.pdf. 
41
 For further details, see OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study (chapter 8) and Martin J. (1996), 
“Measures of Replacement Rates for the Purpose of International Comparisons: A Note”, OECD 
Economic Studies, No. 26. Pre-2003 data have been revised. 
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5. The National Minimum Wage and the Decrease in Wage 
Inequality in the UK 
5.1  Introduction 
The National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced in the UK in April 1999 and 
subsequently up-rated every October since then. One of the motivations for the 
introduction of the NMW was to help to "make work pay" and address in-work poverty, 
against a background of rising wage inequality which characterised the British labour 
market in the 1980s and early 1990s. At the outset, the Low Pay Commission (1998) 
hoped that the NMW might take "greater inroads into pay equality" without putting jobs 
at risk. That is why the chapter aims at having a deep insight of the impact of the NMW 
on wage inequality. As figure 5-1 shows, from the 1980s to the early 1990s there was a 
rapid decrease in the log 10:50 hourly wage ratio, this means the 50
th
 percentile was 
rising relative to the 10
th
 percentile of the hourly wage distribution for most of the 
period. The trends since the beginning of the 1990s were less marked but have not 
reversed the earlier decrease. From the mid-nineties the situation reversed with a 
gradual increase in the log 10:50  wage ratio (a decrease in lower tail inequality). 
Applied economics research has put a lot of weight  in evaluating the impact of the 
introduction of the NMW on employment (see chapter 2). However, very few UK 
studies have been focusing on wage inequality. It is therefore of policy interest to 
explore the role of the NMW  in the trend towards lower inequality in the recent years. 
The introduction and up-rating of the NMW might affect wage inequality for several 
reasons. First of all, assuming reasonable levels of enforcement and compliance, the 
NMW increases the wages of those earning below the wage floor to the level of the 
minimum, creating a spike in the wage distribution at the minimum. In other words, 
workers whose wages are bound by the minimum, experience a wage increase. Secondly, 
an increase in the NMW can also possibly provide some boost to wages for workers 
who previously earned a bit more than the NMW, leading to changes in wages higher up 
in the wage distribution. These effects are often called spill-overs. Figure 5-1 shows the 
trend of lower tail wage equality, as measured by the log 10:50 ratio, from 1975 to 2010 
together with the movement of the real value of the NMW from its introduction in 1999. 
It is quite evident that in some of the years when the real value of the NMW increased 
the log 10:50 wage differential also increased similarly. Furthermore, in some of the 
years when the real value of the NMW decreased lower tail wage equality seems to 
have decreased as well. There are several reasons that could explain why the log 10:50 
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wage differential moves with the NMW. If the NMW is binding at the 10
th
 percentile of 
the wage distribution then we might expect the NMW to move together with the log 
10:50 wage differential. If the NMW, as in the UK case, is generally binding at lower 
percentiles of the wage distribution than this co-movement of the NMW and the log 
10:50 wage differential could be explained by the presence of some measurement error 
in our hourly wage data or alternatively by the presence of spill-over effects of the 
NMW up the wage distribution
42
. 
American economists have explored the role of minimum wages in the context of 
rising inequality in the US wages. A few studies, in particular, claimed that the decrease 
of the real value of the minimum wage was an especially important factor in the rise in 
wage inequality in the 1980s. The first, by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), used 
non-parametric density estimation of wage distributions to decompose changes in 
various measures of between-group and within-group wage inequality into the portions 
associated with changes in the minimum wage, changes in unionisation, changes in 
individual attributes, supply and demand influences, and a residual category not 
explained by any of these factors. The basic strategy of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 
requires constructing counterfactual, unobserved wage densities that capture how the 
distribution of wages would have evolved absent a particular change (such as the 
decline in the value of the real minimum), assuming no general equilibrium effects. 
Their results indicate that the falling real value of the minimum wage played a major 
role in the increase in inequality over the 1980s, especially among women. 
Lee (1999) also analysed the effects of the minimum wage on changes in wage 
inequality in the US. Noting that, as we observed in chapter 2, a national minimum 
allied to local wage distributions generates the potential for area-level variation in wage 
inequality, he looks at differences between state median wages and the state-level or 
federal minimum to try and identify a minimum wage effect on wage inequality. He 
assumes that, in the absence of the minimum wage, wage inequality would have been 
the same across all US states. The model specifies an identifiable function for the latent 
wage distribution (the one that would have been observed in the absence of the 
minimum wage) and it attributes any deviation around this function to the effect of the 
minimum wage. 
Lee concludes that the observed increase in the 50/10 differential from 1979 to 1988 
was largely due to the decline in the real value of the minimum wage. He also suggests 
                                                          
42
 The picture looks roughly the same if we use the log 5:50 wage differential. 
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that, with the exception of men aged twenty-five to sixty-four, the entire increase in the 
50/10 differential is attributed to the declining minimum wage. 
However, Lee also finds significant effects of the minimum on log 90:50 wage 
inequality, an effect which is hard to explain. With this in mind, Autor et al (2010) 
reassess the effect of state and federal minimum wages on US earnings inequality, 
addressing two issues that appear to bias Lee's (1999) work, namely the omitted 
variable bias due to the absence of state fixed effects in Lee’s model and the inherent 
measurement error in the variables. Consequently, they introduce state fixed effects in 
the analysis as needed for consistent estimation. Moreover, they suggest that the 
presence of measurement error in the hourly wage variables lead to a spurious 
correlation between the measures of wage inequality and the minimum wage variable, 
and they therefore instrument their minimum wage variable. They use the differential 
variation in the minimum wages of the US states over and above the federal minimum 
wage as an instrument for the measure of the minimum wage in each state. This is a 
valid instrument to the extent that legislated minimum wages by area do not adjust 
endogenously to differences in the levels or trends in local latent inequality.  Allowing 
for these factors, the authors find that the decrease of the real minimum wage raises 
inequality in the lower tail of wage distribution, but the impacts are less than half than 
those reported by Lee (1999). 
A recent paper by Bosch and Manacorda (2010) applies and extends Lee's 
methodology to urban Mexico. Specifically, it analyses the contribution of the minimum 
wage to the rise in earnings inequality in Mexico between the late 1980s and the early 
2000s, using household micro data from municipalities in Mexico. Bosch and 
Manacorda borrow from Lee's (1999) and Autor et al's  (2010) analyses of the effect of 
the minimum wage on changes in wage inequality in the United States. Similarly to 
Autor et al (2010) they observe that any measurement error in a specific percentile of 
the wage distribution will lead to a spurious positive correlation between different 
measures of inequality and the minimum wage measure, hence possibly leading to 
biased estimates of the effect of the minimum wage. To circumvent this problem, they 
instrument the minimum wage measures by municipality calculated using the ENEU 
data  with the same measure computed using another dataset, Social Security data. They 
argue that the instrument purges the estimates of potential correlation between the 
regressors and the error term due to measurement error. They find that a substantial part 
of the growth in inequality at the bottom end of the distribution is due to the steep 
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decline in the real value of the minimum wage. They show that, at least in the early 
years, not only did the minimum wage create a floor to the earnings distribution, but it 
also had spill over effects that spread to higher percentiles of the distribution. 
Most of the existing UK literature on inequality and the NMW has focused solely on 
the year of the introduction of the NMW and provide evidence of whether the NMW 
creates spikes in the wage distribution at the minimum. Excluding a specific case where 
measurement error in the hourly wage data might have hidden the presence of a spike in 
the wage distribution at the minimum (Dickens and Manning, 2004a), there is general 
agreement that the introduction of the NMW in the UK resulted in a spike at that point 
in the wage distribution. In particular, Dickens and Manning (2004b) find evidence of 
such a  spike using hourly wages in the low-wage residential home sector. Also Stewart 
and Swaffield (2002) examining data from the British Household Panel Survey report 
similar evidence. 
The UK literature has also looked  for evidence of spill-overs to wages above the 
wage floor. Regarding the presence of spill-over effects there is less of an agreement. 
Dickens and Manning (2004a and 2004b) find virtually no spill-over effects of the 
NMW in the year of its introduction for both the whole economy and the care home 
sector. Butcher et al (2009) find evidence of cumulative significant spill-over effects for 
each year relative to 1997 and 1998 (years when the NMW was not yet been 
introduced). The minimum wage directly affected up to the 6th percentile, at which the 
spill-over effect was largest, raising wages by about 7 per cent more than in the absence 
of the minimum wage. This effect stretched up the pay distribution (wages were raised 
by about 4 per cent at the 10th percentile and still over 1 per cent at the 17th percentile). 
The effect was larger for women than men. The Low Pay Commission (2009) find 
evidence suggesting spill-overs for the first years of NMW existence (1998-2004), but a 
smaller impact for 2004-2008. Nanos (2008) finds a positive NMW spill-over effect in 
the UK. In contrast, Stewart (2011a and 2011b) using different approaches (such as 
using a Difference-in-Differences estimator and comparing quantiles of the observed 
wage distribution after an increase in the minimum wage with those of an estimated 
counterfactual wage distribution if there had not been an increase in the minimum) find 
no evidence or, in some cases very small evidence, of spill-over effects in the wage 
distribution. 
None of these papers specifically explore the role of the NMW in the recent trend 
towards lower tail wage inequality in UK wages. We aim to do precisely this. In order to 
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estimate the effect of the NMW on wage inequality in the UK, in this chapter we borrow 
from the methodology used by Lee (1999) for the US. We assume that wage inequality 
would have been similar across areas (or would have changed similarly),  if it were not 
for the effect of the NMW. Differences in average wage levels across areas, that are 
assumed to be exogenous, therefore induce useful variation in the real "bite" of the 
NMW across areas that allow the identification of its effect net of other confounding 
forces. 
We also try to address some of the problematic issues that emerges from previous 
research. As in Lee (1999), we find evidence of a significant effect of the minimum 
wage variable on upper tail wage inequality, such as the log 90:50 wage differential. We 
attribute this result to a misspecification in the model and we attempt to address it. First 
of all, differently from Lee's model, we expect there to be permanent differences in 
latent wage inequality across areas, and therefore we include area fixed effect in our 
main specification. Secondly, we also attempt to address simultaneity bias and 
measurement error problems in our regression equation by instrumenting our measure 
of the NMW.  
We finally test different measures of wage inequality where the NMW might have 
had a different impact. We do not focus only on the log 10:50 wage differential, but we 
also look at measures of inequality that, arguably, have a normative basis, derived from 
a social welfare function which includes values of society regarding equality and justice, 
such the Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini (for a review of different measures of 
wage inequality see Cowell, (2011) and Lambert (2001))
43
. When the sample size 
allows, we look at men and women separately. This is mainly to see whether the relative 
minimum has a higher impact on lower tail wage inequality for groups traditionally low 
paid (such as women, who are also most likely to work part-time,  itself another 
significant correlate with low pay). 
By looking at log wage differentials of different percentiles q relative to the median 
wage (w
q
it – w
50
it), we find an effect of the NMW on the wage distribution. Using 2SLS 
estimation, the point estimates tend to become smaller at higher deciles and are 
statistically significant only up to the first decile, suggesting a negative impact of the 
NMW on lower tail wage inequality and perhaps some small spill-over effects. By 
                                                          
43
 The Gini (and Atkinson) indexes are effectively a weighted average of the centiles of the wage 
distribution, and they can be sensitive to movements in particular parts of the distribution. Therefore, we 
would not expect the same response as the log 10:50 wage differential. In appendix 5.C a detailed 
description of how these variable are defined. 
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looking also at different measures of wage inequality, such as the Atkinson index and 
the Generalised Gini, we find again a significant contribution of the NMW in reducing 
wage inequality. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data. Section 5.3 
presents the theoretical  relation between wage dispersion and the minimum wage. 
Section 5.4 focuses on the empirical methodology. Section 5.5 shows OLS regression 
results. Section 5.6 addresses some of the specification problems. Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2  Data 
As in chapter 2, this chapter utilises microdata from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE) for the period 1999 to 2010. The ASHE, developed from the earlier 
New Earnings Survey (NES), is an employer reported individual-level dataset and it is 
conducted in April of each year. One of the advantages of the ASHE dataset is that 
information on earnings and paid hours is obtained in confidence from employers, 
usually reporting this information directly from their payroll record. It is therefore a 
relatively accurate  record of earnings and hours with which to construct a measure of 
hourly wages. Secondly, the ASHE sample is relatively large, allowing analysis at 
different levels of geographic aggregation. Finally, ASHE consists of point-in-time 
measures of hourly wages, which make it appropriate for a study of the impact of a 
wage floor on wage inequality.   
One of the disadvantages of the ASHE is that it is based on a sample of employees 
taken from HM Revenue and Customs PAYE records and, in the past, this reduced 
coverage of those at the lower end of the earnings distribution. However, from 2004 
onwards ASHE sample was boosted by a sample of firms not registered for PAYE, 
therefore improving representation of low paid employees, particularly those that 
usually work part-time (eg. female) and tend to be below the PAYE threshold. 
The ASHE wage variable used for the analysis is defined as average hourly earnings 
for the reference period, excluding overtime. Specifically, it is average gross weekly 
earnings excluding overtime divided by  basic weekly paid hours worked.  
The data used here are restricted to those aged 22 to retirement, meaning that we 
focus mainly on the adult wage rate. When the sample size allows we focus not only on 
the pooled sample, but also on women and men separately.  
The analysis is undertaken disaggregated by geography, where each cell corresponds 
to a specific area in the UK. This allows us to exploit variation in our measure of the 
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extent to which the NMW was sweeping up the tail of the wage distribution across areas 
and years in order to evaluate the effect of the NMW on lower tail wage inequality. 
The geographic variation in wages will reflect the demographic and industrial 
composition of each local labour market. The changing industrial composition of an 
area over time and the extent to which industries are low and high paying will affect the 
changing incidence of the NMW working in a locality. Likewise the skill, age and 
gender composition of the local workforce. We can control for variation in these factors 
with a set of time varying local labour market control variables, drawn from either 
ASHE or matched in from complementary Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. The 
analysis is conducted at Unitary Authority and County level including 34 English 
counties, 6 English metropolitan counties, 46 English Unitary authorities, Inner and 
Outer London and finally 52 Unitary authorities in Scotland and Wales.
 44
 This gives 
140 local areas in Great Britain.   
Figure 5-2 depicts the Kernel density estimates of the distribution of hourly log-
wages from ASHE data for the years 1998 and 2010 for the pooled sample (men and 
women). 
The two vertical lines denote the NMW levels in each year. We assume that the 
notional NMW in 1998, when the NMW was not been introduced yet, is the nominal 
NMW in 1999 deflated by the AEI (Average Earnings Index). The figure clearly 
suggests that in 2010 the NMW had a large effect on hourly wages.  
The available time series data on the UK wage distribution also point to a close 
connection between the NMW and changes in inequality. Figure 5-3, plots changes in 
percentiles of the wage distribution, relative to the median, for the fifth, tenth, twenty-
fifth, seventy-fifth and ninetieth wage percentiles between 1999 and 2010. These 
measures of wage dispersion as well as the log-difference between the NMW and the 
median wage (also shown in figure) are normalised to be zero in 1999, the year in which 
the NMW was introduced. The figure shows that after decreasing in the first years of its 
introduction, the NMW (relative to the median wage) raised in the period between 2001 
and 2010, with a slow down from 2007 to 2009. The reason for the decrease of the 
NMW (relative to the median wage) in the first years of its existence is that the NMW 
was not raised in line with average earnings (see figure 2-1 of second chapter). 
                                                          
44
The Orkney Islands, Shetland Isles and Western Isles are aggregated together. The 36 English 
metropolitan districts are combined into 6 English Metropolitan Counties. London Boroughs are 
aggregated into Inner and Outer London. This allows us to match the LFS geographical units with the 
ones of NES/ASHE, using the same geography as the variable “uancty in the LFS. 
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The figure illustrates that especially from 2004 on movements in wage dispersion in 
the lower half of the wage distribution moved in close tandem with changes in the 
NMW.  This is especially true for the 5
th
 percentile of the wage distribution since the 
average coverage of the NMW from 2004 to 2010 is around 3.5%. Finally, the figure 
shows that the 90
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles have been pretty stable relative to the NMW in 
the period of the analysis. However, the NMW is unlikely to have played any part in this 
particular trend since it "bites" on average only around the 3rd percentile of the hourly 
wage distribution in the period of analysis. However, no analysis of aggregate time 
series data will be able to distinguish a NMW effect from a decreasing trend in latent 
wage inequality (a decrease in wage inequality which would have occurred in absence 
of the NMW policy), which is why we attempt to distinguish the effects using 
disaggregated data. 
The time series pattern of lower tail wage inequality is not uniform across local areas 
in the UK. Figure 5-4 plots trends in two average log-wage quantile differentials from 
1999-2010 for two groups of local areas: the ten highest-wage local areas
45
 and the ten 
lowest-wage local areas
46
. The low-wage areas experience for the entire period of the 
analysis a more compressed lower tail as measured by the 5-50 log hourly wage gap, 
than the high wage areas. Also the figure shows that the log 5:50 differential for both 
high- and low-wage areas appears relatively stable during the 1999-2010 period
47
. 
This additional dimension of wage inequality and its relation to the relative level of 
the minimum wage across areas offers an opportunity to distinguish the minimum wage 
effect from a national trend in latent wage dispersion. In particular, the interaction of a 
NMW and wide variation in wages across areas yields variability in the minimum wage 
bindingness levels. 
The NMW highly impacts low-wage areas, while minimally affecting high-wage 
areas. This is demonstrated in figure 5-5, which plots Kernel density estimates of log-
                                                          
45
High wage areas: Inner and Outer London, Derby UA, Bracknell Forests UA, West Berkshire UA, 
Reading UA, Slough UA, Windsor and Maidenhead UA, Wokingham UA, Surrey. 
46
Low wage areas: Hartlepool UA, Blackpool UA, Lincolnshire, Herefordshire UA, Cornwall, Torbay 
UA, Blaneau Gwent, Ceredigion, Pembrokeshire, Moray. 
The twenty areas high wage and low wage areas where selected from the area-level panel dataset 
described in the data  section of this paper. Average median wages for the entire period where computed. 
The ten highest and the ten lowest overall averages were chosen. The differentials are for the entire adult 
sample. 
47
 From Figure 5 it seems there has been an average decrease in lower tail dispersion in low-wage areas. 
However, the trend in lower tail dispersion for these areas is not significantly different from zero. 
 133 
 
wages in 1999 for three groups of areas: high-, medium-, and low-wage areas
48
. The 
horizontal scale measures the log-wage of each point in the local wage distribution 
relative to the local median wage. The vertical lines represent the NMW, also relative to 
each group’s relative median. Figure 5-5 gives the impression that low-wage areas are 
indeed more highly impacted by the NMW than higher wage areas. It is precisely this 
variation that is exploited in the present study. 
5.3  Theoretical relation between wage dispersion and the NMW 
In order to identify the effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of earnings, we 
follow Lee (1999) and more recently Autor et al (2010), who use this strategy for the 
US. 
Following Lee (1999), in each UK's specific local area, there are two wage 
distributions: the wage distribution that is observed and the latent wage distribution, 
which is the wage distribution that would have been observed in the absence of the 
NMW.  Let w
q
i the q-th percentile of the log wage distribution in area i and let the w*
q
i  
the q-th percentile of the latent wage distribution. Now suppose there is a sufficiently 
high percentile p such that workers at this or higher percentiles are unaffected by the 
minimum wage, ie. w
s
i = w*
s
i  s>=p. Similarly to Lee (1999) and Autor et al (2010) we 
assume that for the UK earnings at or above the median are unaffected by the NMW, 
implying that p=50. 
The scope of our chapter is to look at the effect of the real value of the NMW on 
wage inequality. Wage inequality is measured by wage dispersion, which is proxied by 
the differential between percentile q and a measure of centrality of the log(wage) 
distribution, such as the median (w
q
i - w
50
i). In a similar way latent wage inequality, or 
wage dispersion in the absence of a NMW policy, is given by (w*
q
i - w
50
i). To generate a 
NMW measure which varies across local areas, we create a measure of the “bindingness” 
                                                          
48
 I rank each area by the mean log-wage. I choose the bottom twenty, middle twenty and highest  twenty 
for the three groups. 
Bottom twenty: Hartlepool UA, Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, 
Herefordshire UA, Shropshire, Cornwall, Torbay UA, Devon, Isle of Wight UA, Blaneau Gwent, 
Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Convy, Gwynedd, Povys, The Scottish Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, 
East Refrewshire. 
Middle twenty: Stockton-on-Tees, Lancashire, North Lincolnshire UA, York UA, Leicester UA, Rutland 
UA, Nottingham UA, Staffordshire, Somerset, Norfolk, East Sussex, Pembrokeshire, Swansea, Torfaen, 
Clackmannanshire, East Ayrshire, East Dumbartonshire, Highland, North Lanarkshire, West 
Dumbartonshire. 
Highest  twenty: City of Bristol UA, South Gloucestershire UA, Swindon UA, Luton UA, Hertfordshire, 
Inner London, Outer  London, Bracknell Forest UA, West Berkshire UA, Reading UA, Slough UA, 
Windsor and Maidenhead UA, Wokingham UA, Milton Keynes UA, Buckinghamshire UA, Oxforshire, 
Surrey, West Sussex, Aberdeen City, City of  Edinburgh. 
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of the NMW such as the difference between the log minimum and the median of the log 
wage distribution (MW – w50i). Following Lee (1999),  we will also call this variable 
“relative minimum” or “effective minimum wage.” 
If, following Lee (1999), we assume that the shapes of the latent wage distribution in 
all areas are strictly identical up to percentile q: w*
r
i – w
50
i = w*
r
j – w
50
j  for all regions 
and for all percentiles r <= q (in other words, this simply means the absence of 
stochastic variation in the latent wage dispersion across areas), the theoretical relation 
between these two quantities is characterized under three scenarios. 
1)  Censoring (no spill-overs, no disemployment) 
In the censoring case, the effect of the minimum wage is to increase the wages of 
those earning below the wage floor to the level of the minimum. The censoring model 
implies that the log q and log 50 earnings differential can be expressed as: 
(wqi - w50i) = (w*qi - w50i)   if  w*qi >= MW    (5.1) 
(wqi - w50i)  = (MW – w50i)      if w*qi < MW   (5.2) 
Equation (5.1) states that the differential between the q-th percentile and the 50
th
 
percentile of the observed wage distribution in area i equals the latent differential if  the 
latent w*
q
i is above the minimum. In other words, in areas with relatively high wages 
where the latent w*
q
i is higher than the minimum and therefore the NMW is not binding, 
there is no relation between wage inequality and the NMW. 
Equation (5.2)  states that the differential between the q-th percentile and the 50
th
 
percentile of the observed wage distribution in area i equals the differential between the 
NMW and the 50
th
 percentile otherwise. In other words, in areas with relatively low 
wages and therefore where the NMW is binding, there is a linear relation between the 
relative minimum and the observed wage inequality, given by a 45
0
 line. 
2) Spill-overs, no disemployment 
In this case the NMW may have an effect on the q-th percentile even if the q-th 
percentile is in a higher position in the wage distribution than the percentile where the 
NMW is binding. 
In that case therefore we have a non linear relationship: 
(wqi - w50i)  = g(MW – w50i)     (5.3) 
where g is an increasing function, with the spill-overs effects monotonically 
diminishing the higher the wage percentile. In other words, in areas with relatively low 
wages and therefore where the NMW is likely to be binding, there is a linear relation 
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between the relative minimum and the observed wage inequality, given by a 45
0 
line. 
However, in areas where the NMW does not bind, the relationship is non  linear and it 
depends on how big is the gap between percentile q and the NMW (there will be smaller 
spill-overs effects in areas where this gap is bigger). 
3) Truncation (no spill-overs, full disemployment) 
In this case, the NMW causes a truncation of the wage distribution: it causes job 
losses for all workers with latent wages below the minimum. It also has no impact on 
workers with latent wages above the minimum. The loss of the sample in the lower tail 
of the wage distribution (those paid at or below the minimum) leads to automatic 
changes in the observed percentiles of the wage distribution. 
5.4  Regression specification and identifying assumptions 
The three theoretical cases explained above rely on the assumption that there is no 
stochastic variation in latent wage dispersion across local areas. This assumption was 
useful in order to make the theoretical explanation simpler and more intuitive. However, 
in order to be able to empirically estimate the effect of the minimum wage on wage 
inequality, this assumption is abandoned. 
As in Lee (1999), the following equation is the starting point for our empirical 
specification: 
(wqit - w50it)  = (w*qit - w50it) + β1 (MWt – w50it) + β2 (MWt – w50it)2  +εit (5.4) 
the value of percentile q relative to the median is a function of latent wage inequality at 
percentile q and a quadratic of the bindingness of the NMW for area i at time t. 
The quadratic term specifically is included to capture the most important features of 
the three theoretical cases explained above, and more specifically, that the NMW has a 
linear and non linear effect on wage inequality. 
In order to be able to estimate the effects of the NMW on wage inequality it is 
necessary to make assumption on the latent wage distribution that cannot be observed. 
First of all, the cumulative distribution function gives the latent wage distribution of 
area i at time t : 
   
 *    
   
    (5.5) 
where w* is the latent wage, μit is the centrality and σit the scale parameters. The shape 
of the latent wage distribution F(.) is assumed to be the same for all local areas. 
So we can write that the percentile q of the latent wage distribution can be summarized 
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by: 
wqit =  μit  + σit Ft-1(q) (5.6) 
and we have normalisation F-1(50) = 0 so that μit is the median wage in area i at time t. 
Secondly, Lee (1999) assumes that conditional on the year, the centrality measure of 
the wage distribution (the median) is uncorrelated with cross-area variation in latent 
wage inequality 
σit ﬩ μit ∣ t 
On the basis of these assumptions, we would estimate the following equation for the UK: 
(wqit - w50it    αt + β1 (MWt -  w50it) + β2 (MWt - w50it)2  + εit  (5.7) 
It is worth noting that the term for latent wage dispersion in equation (5.7) disappears 
and it is simply substituted by time effects. This is simply because by assumption cross-
area variation in latent wage dispersion is uncorrelated with area medians conditional on 
the year. 
If the observed median wage w
50
it is an adequate measure of μit  and recalling the 
normalisation Ft
-1
(50)=0,  then for any year and percentile q of the wage distribution: 
cov ((w*qit - w50it), (MWt -  w50it) ∣ t)  =  cov (σit Ft-1(50), (MWt – μit) ∣ t) = 0 (5.8) 
The association between wage inequality and the effective minimum in (5.7) is the 
causal impact of the NMW on wage inequality, if we assume independence between 
latent local area wage distribution and area wage medians. 
An important point of Lee’s model in (5.7) is that,  subject to the identifying 
assumptions presented above, one can estimate the effect of the NMW on wage 
inequality without having to know the latent wage distribution. 
5.4.1 Omitted variables bias due to the lack of area specific fixed effects 
One of the identifying assumptions of Lee (1999) is that latent local area wage 
inequality is uncorrelated with median wages. For this reason Lee’s (1999) main 
regression equation only includes years effects in order to approximate latent wage 
inequality. However, it is reasonable to expect permanent differences in latent wage 
inequality across areas, justifying the presence of area fixed effects in the main 
regression equation as Autor et al (2010) point out. 
In order to test whether local area latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with the 
median wage, we regress the log(60) – log (40) on the median and time dummies. The 
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latent wage distribution is the wage distribution that would have been existed  in the 
absence of the NMW legislation. If the log (40) is not affected by the NMW legislation 
and the density function is symmetric around the median, the log (60) – log (40) should 
represent this latent wage distribution. As table 5-1 shows the coefficients on the median 
wage are always positive and significant suggesting that areas with high median wages 
are the areas with high latent wage inequality. The results clearly suggest the presence 
of permanent differences in latent wage inequality across areas, therefore areas fixed 
effects will be included in our regression specification. 
The estimated baseline equation in our study will therefore be: 
(wqit - w50it    αt αi + β1 (MWt -  w50it) + β2 (MWt - w50it)2  + εit  (5.9) 
In addition to equation (5.7) area fixed effects are added in the analysis. Also, in some 
specifications we will include area time-varying demographic controls such as the 
proportion of female in the labour force, the average age and  the proportion of highly 
educated (with NVQ4 or more). We will also investigate specifications that include 
area-specific time trend in order to control for shocks in the wage distribution that are 
correlated with changes in the NMW. However, one should be cautious in interpreting 
such results because of the loss in terms of degrees of freedom that areas-specific time 
trends might cause.  
When data allow, we will report estimates for the overall adult sample and for men 
and women separately. In all of our reported regressions standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of unknown form (Wooldridge, 2010, p.61). 
5.5  OLS results 
Panel A of table 5-2 reports least squares estimates of equation 5.9 (ie. the relative local 
wage gap on the effective minimum and its square) using the panel data set of 140 local 
areas across 12 years from 1999 to 2010 for the entire sample of earners (both men and 
women). Other than coefficients of the effective minimum and its square, marginal 
effects are also reported estimated at the average of the effective minimum over all local 
areas and years. 
The first three columns report estimates of the effective minimum and its square on 
the 10
th
 decile of the wage distribution relative to the 50
th
 decile. The second three 
columns present estimates of the effective  minimum and its square on the 5
th
 percentile 
of the wage distribution relative to the 50
th
 decile. 
The first column is based on an OLS regression with year and area fixed effects. In 
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the second column controls for specific demographic characteristics of each area year 
cell (such as average education, age and the proportion of women) are also added. 
Finally, in the  third column local area specific time trends are also included to control 
for shocks to the wage distribution that are correlated with changes in the NMW. Unless 
otherwise specified, regression are weighted by cell size (local area sample populations) 
and the standard error in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form. 
It is interesting to note that the coefficients for the quadratic terms are always 
significantly different from zero, demonstrating the importance of the nonlinear aspect 
of the relation. The presence of this non-linearity implies that there is a disproportionate 
response of the wage distribution at the bottom to changes in the NMW. 
The coefficients on the marginal effects are always positive and significant, 
suggesting that an increase in the effective minimum wage reduces wage inequality at 
the bottom of the wage distribution. For example, the fixed effect regression estimates 
shown in column 5 of panel A show that a 10 p.p. rise in the effective minimum wage is 
associated with a statistically significant rise in the 5
th
 and 50
th
 wage differential (and 
therefore a reduction of lower tail wage inequality) of around 8 p.p.. (0.850*10).  
When area specific time trends are added into the analysis, the marginal effects 
generally become smaller in absolute size even if the differences in the estimates are not 
statistically significant. Also, as expected, the point estimates tend to become bigger at 
lower percentiles. This may indicate limited spill-over effects of the NMW as the lower 
percentile used in the measure of inequality moves further away from the percentile at 
which the NMW "bites". 
Panel B and Panel C of table 5-2 report results for men and women separately. It is 
not surprising to see how the marginal effects are generally larger in absolute size for 
women than for men. This is probably due to the fact that women are most likely to earn 
lower wages and especially to have low paid part-time jobs. 
Table A 5-1 and table A 5-2 in the appendix 5.A, shows additional robustness checks. 
We present a regression in first differences in table A 5-1 and we also present a 
regression that uses unweighted (as opposed to weighted by cell size) data in table A 5-2. 
Neither the results reported in first differences nor the weighting scheme make any 
substantial difference to our OLS conclusion in table 5-2. 
Table 5-3 reports the estimated first derivative of each dependent variable with 
respect to the effective minimum evaluated at the sample mean. Each entry refers to a 
 139 
 
separate regression, where each row  refers  to the differential between consecutive 
deciles of the wage distribution and the 50
th
 decile. As before, column 1 presents a 
specification that in addition to a linear and quadratic term in the effective minimum 
wage, includes year and area effects. In column 2 demographic controls are added,  and 
in column 3 area specific time trends are also included. Looking at the lower percentiles, 
we find large significant effects of the NMW extending throughout all percentiles below 
the median for the pooled distribution. However, there are reasons to think that this 
approach is mispecified. As shown in the table 5-3, we also find large significant effects 
of the NMW at the top of the wage distribution. These results indicate a systematic 
relationship between the effective minimum and upper wage percentiles of the 
distribution. 
5.6  Specification problems 
As shown in table 5-3, when we apply our analysis to upper-tail wage inequality (such 
as the 90/50 and 75/50 wage differentials), we find evidence that an increase in the 
effective NMW appears to increase upper-tail wage inequality. This casts doubt on 
whether we are identifying NMW effects.  As with Autor, Katx and Kearney (2006) we 
could consider this a falsification exercise. If theory predicts an effect of the NMW on 
lower-tail wage inequality, and such evidence is found, it also worthy to explore 
whether there is also an effect of the NMW on upper tail wage inequality, for which 
theory does not predict an effect on upper tail wage inequality. In this specific case, the 
falsification exercise seems to have failed. One obvious question is to find out what 
might have generated this spurious correlation. 
There are two main issues in our OLS main regression equation. First of all, the 
median wage is present in both sides of the equation and this could generate 
simultaneity bias. In other words, some of the association of the effective NMW and 
wage inequality could be mechanical and arise because both the measure of the NMW 
and of wage inequality include the median log-wage. A second problem concerns 
measurement error: one of the limitations of the ASHE dataset is that, certainly before 
2004, it does not cover those at the lower end of the earnings distribution because 
anyone not registered for PAYE was not included in the sample frame. Even if recently 
the ASHE sample has been boosted since then to improve the representation of low paid 
employees, the dataset still has this problematic issue.  
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5.6.1 OLS estimates using alternative measures of wage inequality 
One possible way of addressing the simultaneity bias problem is to use an alternative 
measure of wage inequality in the OLS regression equation which does not include the 
median wage as denominator. We try two different alternative measures: the Atkinson 
index (Atkinson,  1970)  and the Generalised Gini (Yitzhaki, S., 1983). The use of these 
two measures will also have two other advantages.  First of all, the measure of 
inequality used by Lee (1999) only looks at two distinct data point in the wage 
distribution. Conversely, the Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini instead of 
throwing away the great majority of the data, will rather take into account all parts of 
the distribution. For this reason, these measures will not violate the Pigou-Dalton 
condition (or the transfer principle) according to which any (even) transfer from a 
worse-off to a better-off person worsen inequality. Finally, using these measures it is 
possible to measure inequality under different value judgments; inequality will have a 
normative basis, derived from a social welfare function which includes values of society 
regarding equality and justice. A more technical section with the definition of these 
measures of wage inequality is included in  appendix 5.C. One possible objection of 
these measures is that since they effectively weight all the quantiles of the wage 
distribution (and weight vary accordingly to the inequality aversion parameter) than 
they may smooth out the effects of the NMW at specific points in the distribution. We 
will also look explicitly at different points in the distribution for evidence of different 
effects.  
In table 5-4 these alternative measures of wage inequality are tested. In columns 1, 2, 
3 the Atkinson index as a measure of wage inequality is used as the dependent variable, 
columns 5, 6 and 7 use the Generalized Gini. Again the results are shown for the pooled 
sample and separately for men and women. The table reports both the coefficients of the 
relative minimum and its square and also the derivative implied by the coefficients 
evaluated at the overall mean of the effective minimum over all local areas and years. 
The first column refers to an OLS regression with years and areas effects. The 
second column adds controls for specific demographic characteristics of each area-year 
cell (such as average education, age and the proportion of women). Finally, the  third 
column also includes local area specific time trends. 
As expected, the marginal effects are always negative and significantly different 
from zero, suggesting that an increase in the effective minimum wage also causes a 
reduction in these measures of wage inequality. Generally, the coefficients are smaller in 
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absolute size when area specific time trends are included in the analysis. Also, as might 
be expected, the table shows that among workers with generally higher wages (men) the 
relative minimum has a more modest impact on wage inequality than for women. 
5.6.2 IV estimates 
In order to address the measurement error problem in our analysis, it is necessary to first 
think about a simple linear model of the type: 
y*  x* β  ε   (5.10) 
Measurement error in the explanatory variable, x, does result in a bias in the OLS 
estimate of β. To see this, consider the measured value of x as the sum of the true value 
x* plus a measurement error ux : 
x = x* + ux   (5.11)  
Substituting x* =  x - ux in equation (5.10) we now obtain: 
y*   xβ   ε -  βux     (5.12) 
This is obviously a problem since the presence of  ux  in the error term generates a 
mechanical correlation between the error term,  ε -  βux and the explanatory variable, x 
= x* + ux. 
Since the problem in equation (5.12) is that the error term is correlated with x, the 
standard solution is to find an instrumental variable for x that is correlated with x, but 
not with the error term (ε -  βux ). 
In particular, when the problem is that x is only an imperfect proxy for the true x*, there 
may also be other proxies for x* that are available. For instance consider a second proxy 
z, where: 
z = x* + uz  (5.13) 
Provided that the measurement error in z, uz, is uncorrelated with the measurement 
error in x, ux we find that z is a valid instrumental variable since: 
cov (z,x) = var(x*) > 0  (5.14) 
and 
cov (z, ε -  βux ) = cov (x*  + uz,  ε -  βux) = 0  (5.15) 
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So the simple solution is to use one proxy as an instrument for the other proxy, and 
consistently estimate β by two stage least squares. 
Therefore, one possible way of addressing the measurement error problem is to 
instrument the effective NMW  (and its square) calculated on the ASHE data with the 
effective NMW  (and its square) calculated using the Annual Population Survey (APS) 
data. The APS is  the official labour market survey that collects detailed labour market 
information and a large array of socioeconomic characteristics. Since the APS is survey 
based it will provide error-ridden estimates of average earnings across areas and years. 
This, however, should not invalidate the IV approach. To the extent that measurement 
error in the ASHE data is uncorrelated with measurement error in the APS data, this 
procedure will purge the estimates of potential correlation between the included 
regressors and the error term due to measurement error (Bosch and Manacorda, 2010).  
This instrument might also contribute to reduce the simultaneity bias problem. 
Assuming that in the regression equation we control for all other factors that might 
affect inequality other than the NMW, than what we are left with in the error term is the 
stochastic component of inequality. Since our IV is computed from a different dataset 
totally exogenous to the regression equation, this new measure of the effective NMW is 
unlikely to be correlated with the error term.  
Table 5-5 report the IV estimates of equation 5.9. Specifically, we instrument the 
effective NMW (and its square) calculated on the ASHE data with the effective NMW 
(and its square) calculated using the APS special licence data, similarly to what Bosh 
and Manacorda (2010) did with Mexican data. Estimates are only reported for the 
pooled sample (men and women) because of the small sample size at local area level for 
the APS measure of hourly wages for women and men separately. Because of lack of 
local area data in the APS, the IV results are only available for the seven year period 
(from 2004 to 2010). For this reason, we do not report results including area-specific 
time trends. As mentioned above, one should be cautious in interpreting such results 
because of the loss in terms of degrees of freedom that area-specific time trends might 
cause. Further, one should be aware that when doing our IV estimation, the panel 
become shorter (from 2004 to 2010) and imposing a restriction of a trend to be identical 
across all areas becomes too restrictive for the model. 
The entries in the table refer to the first and second stages of the 2SLS regressions 
and to the estimated first derivative of each dependent variable with respect to the 
effective NMW evaluated at the sample mean.  The first two columns report estimates 
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of the effective minimum and its square on the 10
th
 decile of the wage distribution  and 
the 50
th
 decile respectively. The second two columns presents estimates of the effective  
minimum and its square on the 5
th
 percentile of the wage distribution on the 50
th
 decile 
respectively. The first column refers to an IV regression with year and area effects. In 
the second column controls for specific demographic characteristics of each area year 
cell (such as average education, age and the proportion of women) are also added. In 
general, the F-test on the included instruments for the square of the effective NMW (but 
not its square root) reported at the bottom of the table is large, implying a predictive 
power of the instruments. The marginal effects of the fixed effect regression estimates 
are positive and significant for the 5
th
 percentile of the wage distribution, suggesting 
that an increase in the effective minimum wage causes reduction in lower tail wage 
inequality. The fixed effects estimates show that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
effective NMW is associated with a statistically significant rise in the gap between the 
bottom fifth percentile and the fifth decile of around 10 percentage points (1.008*10). 
Coefficients for the 10
th
 percentile of the wage distribution are also positive and 
significant. 
Table 5-6 compares marginal effects of the OLS estimation and the 2SLS estimation 
for the period 2004-2010 when the two data sets overlap. In contrast with the OLS 
results, it is quite reassuring that in the 2SLS estimation, the point estimates tend to 
become smaller at higher deciles and are statistically significant only up to the first 
decile. The regression coefficients turn from being positive for deciles below the median 
to being negative for higher deciles, but these are not statistically significant. 
Figure 5-6 aims to estimate the contribution of the NMW to the decrease in 
inequality, comparing actual and counterfactual estimates of the changes of the 5th 
percentile gap. In practice, we use 2SLS regression results to separate changes in the  
log(10th) – log(50th) percentile of the wage distribution (solid line) into a term 
attributable to the fall in the real value of the NMW (dotted line) and a term that 
ecompasses latent changes in inequality (dashed line). 
The solid line of figure 5-6 is obtained from a regression of the 5th percentile of the 
wage distribution relative to the median on additive years and area dummies. The solid 
line reports the coefficients of the year dummies relative to their value in the first year 
of the analysis, 2004. The solid line shows how the coefficients of the year dummies 
increase throughout the 7 years (2004-2010). This means that, by simply observing the 
data, there was a decrease in lower tail wage inequality in the period of interest. 
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The dashed line in figure 5-6 shows the coefficients of the year dummies when a 
linear and quadratic term of the NMW are also included in the regression. In this case, 
the coefficients of the year dummies decrease. This suggests that latent lower tail wage 
inequality (wage inequality which would have occurred without the presence of the 
NMW following our model) would have increased throughout the period. 
Finally, the dotted line in figure 5-6 reports the estimated contribution of the NMW 
to changes in wage inequality (ie. solid line minus dashed line). The trends in inequality 
due to the increase in the real value of the NMW are showing clearly how the NMW 
contributed to the decrease in wage inequality and specifically lower tail wage 
inequality. 
Figure 5-7 repeats the same exercise for the log(10
th
) – log(50th) percentile of the 
wage distribution. The patterns of the trend of the actual, latent and the contribution of 
the NMW are similar to those shown in figure 5-7. 
5.7  Conclusions 
The chapter used the Annual Population Survey micro data from the UK from 1999 to 
2010 to analyze the contribution of the NMW in the trend towards lower tail inequality 
in UK hourly wages. One of the motivations for the introduction of the NMW was to 
help to "make work pay" and address in-work poverty, against a background of rising 
wage inequality which characterised the British labour market in the 1980s and early 
1990s. At the outset, the Low Pay Commission (1998) hoped that the NMW might take 
"greater inroads into pay equality" without putting jobs at risk. For this reason the 
chapter aimed at having a deeper insight of the impact of the NMW on wage inequality. 
In order to estimate the effect of the NMW in the recent trend towards lower tail wage 
inequality in the UK, the methodology exploited by Lee (1999) for the US was 
exploited. We assumed that the level of wages would have been similar across areas (or 
would have changed similarly), if it were not for the effect of the NMW. Differences in 
average wage levels across areas induced useful variation in the real "bite" of the NMW 
across areas that allowed the identification of its effect net of other confounding forces. 
Few issues that appear to bias Lee’s (1999) work were addressed, namely, the 
omitted variable bias due to the absence of area fixed effects (Autor et al, 2010), 
measurement error in the variables (Bosh and Manacorda, 2010) and simultaneity bias. 
We addressed measurement error in the wage data by instrumenting our measure of the 
NMW computed with the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data with a 
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new NMW measure computed using the Annual Population Survey (APS). To the extent 
that measurement error in the ASHE data is not correlated with measurement error in 
the APS data, this procedure purges the estimates of potential correlation between the 
included regressors and the error term due to measurement error. We also attempted to 
solve the simultaneity bias problem in our data using alternative measures of wage 
inequality in our regression, such as the Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini.  
By looking at wage differentials of different percentiles q relative to the median 
wage (w
q
it – w
50
it), we find an effect of the NMW on the wage distribution. Using 2SLS 
estimation, the point estimates tend to become smaller at higher deciles and are 
statistically significant only up to the first decile, suggesting a negative impact of the 
NMW just on lower tail wage inequality and perhaps some small spill-over effects of 
the NMW. By looking also at different measures of wage inequality, such as the 
Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini, we find again a significant contribution of the 
NMW in reducing wage inequality. 
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Figure 5-1. Trends in wage inequality and the real value of the NMW (pooled sample) 
 
Source: NES (1975-2010). Real value of the NMW in 1999 prices (source RPI all items: ONS). Author’s calculations. 
Figure 5-2. Wage distribution Density Estimates (pooled sample), 1999-2010 
 
Source: ASHE(1999-2010). Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 5-3. Selected percentiles of the Wage Distribution, Minimum wage relative to 
the Median: 1999-2009. All series are Normalised to be 0 in 1999.  
 
Source: ASHE (1999-2010). Author’s calculations. All series are normalised to be 0 in 1999. 
 
Figure 5-4. 5-50, 75-50 Log(Wage) Differentials; High versus Low-wage areas 
1999-2010. 
 
Source: ASHE (1999-2010). Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 5-5. Wage distribution density estimates: Low-, medium- and High-wage Local 
areas, 1999. 
 
Source: ASHE (1999-2010). Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 5-6. Actual and Latent Trends in Inequality and the Effect of the NMW  
Log(5
th
) – Log(50th) percentile of the wage distribution 
 
Source: ASHE (1999-2010). Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 5-7. Actual and Latent Trends in Inequality and the Effect of the NMW  
Log(10
th
) – Log(50th) percentile of the wage distribution 
 
Source: ASHE (1999-2010). Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5-1. Relationship between log(60) and log(40) and log(50) percentiles of the 
wage distribution: OLS estimates 
  Log(60) – log(40) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Pooled sample 
Median 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.021) 
    Observations 1680 1680 1680 
R-squared 0.233 0.629 0.734 
    
 
Men 
Median 0.146*** 0.070*** 0.057** 
 
(0.007) (0.021) (0.024) 
    Observations 1680 1680 1680 
R-squared 0.403 0.672 0.722 
    
 
Women 
Median 0.054*** 0.030 0.079*** 
 
(0.009) (0.022) (0.024) 
    Observations 1680 1680 1680 
R-squared 0.106 0.511 0.632 
    Year effects Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y 
Controls N Y Y 
Notes: HAC robust fixed effect estimates in brackets.  Weighted by observation per area-year. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 5-2. OLS estimated relationship between log(q)-log(50) and log(NMW)-log(50) 
  10th percentile – Median   5th percentile – Median 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Pooled sample 
NMW - Median 1.583*** 1.562*** 0.942*** 
 
1.900*** 1.859*** 1.163*** 
 
(0.098) (0.095) (0.077) 
 
(0.106) (0.101) (0.095) 
(NMW - Median)^2 0.700*** 0.682*** 0.216*** 
 
0.813*** 0.779*** 0.288*** 
 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.057) 
 
(0.076) (0.074) (0.073) 
        Marginal effects 0.676*** 0.678*** 0.662*** 
 
0.846*** 0.850*** 0.789*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
(0.025) .(0.024) -0.022 
        Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.973 
 
0.979 0.979 0.985 
        
 
Men 
NMW - Median 1.434*** 1.377*** 0.931*** 
 
1.691*** 1.691*** 1.090*** 
 
(0.081) (0.076) (0.086) 
 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
(NMW - Median)^2 0.517*** 0.475*** 0.195*** 
 
0.604*** 0.604*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.048) (0.045) (0.051) 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
        Marginal effects 0.638*** 0.644*** 0.630*** 
 
0.760*** 0.768*** 0.774*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
        Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared 0.933 0.934 0.949 
 
0.950 0.950 0.960 
        
 
Women 
NMW - Median 1.454*** 1.431*** 0.895*** 
 
1.692*** 1.661*** 1.169*** 
 
(0.095) (0.092) (0.091) 
 
(0.070) (0.066) (0.087) 
(NMW - Median)^2 0.703*** 0.679*** 0.207** 
 
0.776*** 0.744*** 0.326*** 
 
(0.087) (0.084) (0.087) 
 
(0.059) (0.054) (0.082) 
        Marginal effects 0.721*** 0.724*** 0.680*** 
 
0.883*** 0.885*** 0.829*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.022) 
        Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared 0.960 0.961 0.972 
 
0.972 0.972 0.980 
        Year effects Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y 
 
N N Y 
Controls N Y Y   N Y Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. 
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Table 5-3. OLS relationship between log(q)-log(50) and log(NMW)-log(50) for 
selected percentiles of given wage distribution. Marginal effects reported. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Pooled sample Women Men 
5 0.846*** 0.844*** 0.797*** 0.883*** 0.885*** 0.829*** 0.760*** 0.768*** 0.774*** 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
          
10 0.676*** 0.678*** 0.662*** 0.721*** 0.724*** 0.680*** 0.638*** 0.644*** 0.630*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
          
20 0.417*** 0.432*** 0.439*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.517*** 0.439*** 0.440*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) 
          
30 0.285*** 0.300*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.357*** 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) 
          
40 0.194*** 0.209*** 0.241*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.196*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
          
75 0.217*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.153*** 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.259*** 
 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
          
90 0.367*** 0.341*** 0.326*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.397*** 0.387*** 0.391*** 0.414*** 
 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) 
          
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. N= 1680. 
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Table 5-4. OLS relationship between different measures of wage inequality and 
log(NMW)-log(50) 
  Atkinson Index   Generalised Gini 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Pooled sample 
NMW - Median -1.174*** -1.199*** -0.632 
 
-0.959*** -0.955*** -0.583*** 
 
(0.240) (0.251) (0.388) 
 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) 
(NMW - Median)^2 -0.560*** -0.583*** -0.220 
 
-0.487*** -0.484*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.138) (0.149) (0.247) 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
        
Marginal effects -0.449*** -0.445*** -0.346** 
 
-0.329*** -0.329*** -0.299*** 
 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.146) 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
        
R-squared 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
Observations 0.629 0.629 0.659 
 
0.939 0.939 0.951 
        
 
Men 
NMW - Median -0.967*** -0.818** 0.404 
 
-0.744*** -0.726*** -0.529*** 
 
(0.325) (0.336) (0.473) 
 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.065) 
(NMW - Median)^2 -0.407** -0.303 0.441 
 
-0.307*** -0.295*** -0.171*** 
 
(0.187) (0.196) (0.272) 
 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.035) 
        
Marginal effects -0.340*** -0.352*** -0.276** 
 
-0.270*** -0.272*** -0.265*** 
 
(0.123) (0.121) (0.136) 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
        
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared 0.541 0.543 0.588 
 
0.913 0.913 0.930 
        
 
Women 
NMW - Median -1.109*** -1.210*** -1.156** 
 
-0.997*** -0.997*** -0.723*** 
 
(0.280) (0.287) (0.455) 
 
(0.079) (0.080) (0.105) 
(NMW - Median)^2 -0.656*** -0.762*** -0.827** 
 
-0.604*** -0.603*** -0.361*** 
 
(0.207) (0.218) (0.400) 
 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.090) 
        
Marginal effects -0.426*** -0.416*** -0.295* 
 
-0.367*** -0.369*** -0.347*** 
 
(0.139) (0.139) (0.158) 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
        
Observations 1680 1,680 1,680 
 
1,680 1,680 1,680 
R-squared 0.588 0.589 0.621 
 
0.878 0.878 0.902 
        
Year effects Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y 
 
N N Y 
Controls N Y Y   N Y Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. 
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Table 5-5. 2SLS relationship between log(q)-log(50) and log(NMW)-log(50) 
IV: median wages from the LFS. Results reported starting from 2004 
  10
th percentile – Median   5th percentile – Median 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
Pooled sample 
First stage 
     NMW – Median 
     NMW(LFS) -0.079 -0.042 
 
-0.079 -0.042 
 
(0.072) (0.072) 
 
(0.072) (0.072) 
NMW (LFS) ^2 -0.089 -0.060 
 
-0.089 -0.060 
 
(0.060) (0.060) 
 
(0.060) (0.060) 
(NMW-Median)^2 
     NMW(LFS) 0.688*** 0.637*** 
 
0.688*** 0.637*** 
 
(0.175) (0.169) 
 
(0.175) (0.169) 
NMW (LFS) ^2 0.603*** 0.563*** 
 
0.603*** 0.563*** 
 
(0.147) (0.143) 
 
(0.147) (0.143) 
Second stage 
     NMW - Median 2.062*** 2.048*** 
 
2.396*** 2.353*** 
 
(0.516) (0.458) 
 
(0.485) (0.423) 
(NMW - Median)^2 1.016*** 1.005*** 
 
1.132*** 1.109*** 
 
(0.155) (0.149) 
 
(0.120) (0.107) 
      Marginal effects 0.830* 0.828** 
 
1.022*** 1.008*** 
 
(0.437) (0.410) 
 
(0.394) (0.364) 
      Observations 980 980 
 
980 980 
      F-test linear 1.790 1.400 
 
1.790 1.400 
P-value [0.167] [0.247] 
 
[0.167] [0.248] 
F-test quadratic 8.570 7.960 
 
8.570 7.960 
P-value [0.000] [0.000] 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
      Year effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Area effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Area trends N N 
 
N N 
Controls N Y   N Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. Results are presented for a restricted period (2004-2010): hourly wages at local area level in the 
APS are only available from 2004.  
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Table 5-6. OLS and 2SLS relationship between log(q)-log(50) and log(NMW)-log(50) 
for select percentiles of given wage distribution. IV: median wages from the LFS. 
Results reported starting from 2004. Marginal effects reported. 
  OLS from 2004   2SLS from 2004 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
Pooled sample 
      5 0.867*** 0.874*** 
 
1.022*** 1.008*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
 
(0.394) (0.364) 
      10 0.723*** 0.727*** 
 
0.830* 0.828** 
 
(0.035) (0.036) 
 
(0.437) (0.410) 
      20 0.428*** 0.428*** 
 
0.765 0.845* 
 
(0.030) (0.031) 
 
(0.497) (0.485) 
      30 0.298*** 0.300*** 
 
0.591 0.623 
 
(0.024) (0.025) 
 
(0.425) (0.403) 
      40 0.230*** 0.230*** 
 
0.524 0.549 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 
 
(0.366) (0.346) 
      75 0.199*** 0.202*** 
 
-0.048 -0.076 
 
(0.041) (0.043) 
 
(0.629) (0.591) 
      90 0.303*** 0.300*** 
 
-1.004 -0.914 
 
(0.059) (0.062) 
 
(1.235) (1.112) 
      Year effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Area effects Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Area trends N N 
 
N N 
Controls N Y   N Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. Results are presented for a restricted period (2004-2010): hourly wages at local area level in the 
APS are only available from 2004.  N=980. 
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Appendix 5.A 
Robustness checks 
Table A 5-1. Robustness checks. Results in first differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Pooled sample Women Men 
5 0.834*** 0.833*** 0.824*** 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.859*** 0.760*** 0.764*** 0.761*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
          
10 0.680*** 0.679*** 0.672*** 0.675*** 0.676*** 0.672*** 0.646*** 0.648*** 0.648*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
          
20 0.437*** 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.492*** 0.493*** 0.493*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 0.483*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
          
30 0.347*** 0.345*** 0.346*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.351*** 0.404*** 0.406*** 0.411*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
          
40 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.242*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
          
75 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.253*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 0.345*** 0.346*** 0.348*** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
          
90 0.447*** 0.445*** 0.445*** 0.452*** 0.451*** 0.450*** 0.472*** 0.474*** 0.480*** 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
          
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. N=1540. 
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Table A 5-2. Robustness checks. Unweighted results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Pooled sample Women Men 
5 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.806*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.840*** 0.759*** 0.763*** 0.775*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.058) (0.059) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
          
10 0.718*** 0.720*** 0.732*** 0.749*** 0.749*** 0.767*** 0.671*** 0.677*** 0.659*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
          
20 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.531*** 0.580*** 0.580*** 0.613*** 0.505*** 0.506*** 0.502*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) 
          
30 0.359*** 0.359*** 0.385*** 0.420*** 0.420*** 0.453*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.412*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
          
40 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.249*** 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.255*** 0.219*** 0.221*** 0.239*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
          
75 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.209*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.144*** 0.219*** 0.225*** 0.266*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
          
90 0.420*** 0.419*** 0.384*** 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.460*** 0.317*** 0.324*** 0.340*** 
 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) 
          
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area trends N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Notes:see table 5-1. Results are NOT weighted by observation by area-year. N=1680 
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Appendix 5.B 
Descriptive statistics 
Table B 5-3. Mean of the main dependent and independent variables.  
  Pooled  Men Women   Pooled Men Women 
 
1999-2010 sample   2004-2010 sample 
 
Panel A 
Wage (in)equality measures 
       
Log(5) - Log(50) -0.597 -0.653 -0.496 
 
-0.571 -0.638 -0.473 
        
Log(10) - Log(50) -0.515 -0.541 -0.435 
 
-0.501 -0.536 -0.422 
        
Log(20) - Log (50) -0.373 -0.377 -0.326 
 
-0.367 -0.376 -0.322 
        
Log(30) - Log(50) -0.243 -0.245 -0.218 
 
-0.240 -0.245 -0.216 
        
Log(40) - Log(50) -0.123 -0.123 -0.109 
 
-0.123 -0.123 -0.107 
        
Log(75) - Log(50) 0.387 0.367 0.372 
 
0.387 0.370 0.374 
        
Log(90) - Log(50) 0.741 0.718 0.740 
 
0.742 0.724 0.739 
        
Aktinson Index  0.553 0.530 0.490 
 
0.526 0.512 0.461 
        
Generalised Gini 0.529 0.539 0.491 
 
0.520 0.534 0.481 
        
 
Panel B 
Minimum Wage bindingness 
       
Log(NMW)- Log(50)     ASHE -0.648 -0.770 -0.521 
 
-0.607 -0.722 -0.492 
        
Log(NMW)-Log(50)      LFS _ _ _ 
 
-0.572 -0.692 -0.459 
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Appendix 5.C 
Measures of wage inequality 
In his seminal paper in 1970, Atkinson suggested an index of inequality that makes it 
possible to measure inequality under different value judgments. He assumes that 
introducing social values concerning inequality can be done by using a social-welfare 
function which simply ranks all the possible states of societies (in this case individual 
wages) in the order of society’s preference. The social welfare-function would be an 
additively separable and symmetric function of individual incomes: 
       
 
   
                     
For each specific area and year in our analysis, W is the social welfare function, yi is the 
hourly wage of the ith person. U(yi) gives an individual’s welfare as a function of his 
wage. It can be called social utility of person i. U(yi) is assumed to be the same for all 
individuals, an increasing function and concave. The rate at which this index increases 
is the social marginal utility or welfare weight U’(yi). The main function of this 
marginal utilities is to act as a system of weights when summing the effects of a  
redistribution of wages over the whole population. If a person wage increases we know 
from the strict concavity assumption that his welfare weight decreases. But to know by 
how much, it is important to introduce the concept of inequality adversion parameter ε, 
which is the elasticity of the social-welfare function and it is supposed to be constant: if 
a person’s income increases by 1%, his welfare weight drops by ε% of its former value. 
The higher is ε, the faster is the rate of proportional decline in welfare weight to 
proportional increase in income. Therefore, ε describes the strength of our desire for 
equality in relation to uniformly higher income for all. 
Given these assumptions a simple formula for the Atkinson index can be given by: 
      
  
  
 
Where    is the mean of the actual distribution of income: 
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 ye is the equally distributed equivalent level of income or the income corresponding to 
average social utility: 
   
 
 
      
 
   
  
Since each U(yi) is taken to be concave (i.e. with non increasing marginal social utility, 
yε cannot be larger than the mean income   . Further, it can be shown that the more 
equal the distribution the closer will yε be to   . Obviously, when ye is equal to   , wages 
are equally distributed and the Atkinson index will be zero. Also, for any distribution 
the value of Aε should lie between zero and one. As Atkinson observes, if “Aε falls, the 
distribution has become more equal- we would require a higher level of equally 
distributed income relative to the mean to achieve the same level of social welfare as the 
actual distribution”. The value judgment in the Atkinson index is expressed by the 
inequality adversion parameter ε, which ranges from zero representing indifference to 
inequality to infinity, representing the Rawlsian criterion, which evaluated distributions 
according to the income of the poorest in the society. This reflects our relative 
sensitivity to redistribution from the rich to the not-so-rich vis à vis redistribution from 
the not-so-poor to the poor. If a low value of ε is used (i.e. adversion declines),  we are 
particularly sensitive to changes in distribution at the top end of the parade and the 
Atkinson gives more weight to the upper end of the income distribution. If a high value 
is employed, then it is the bottom end of the parade which concerns us most, and the 
Atkinson measure gives more weight to the lower end of the income distribution. 
Another measure of wage inequality is the Gini coefficient, a popular and widely used 
index of measuring inequality. It can be represented geometrically by the Lorenz curve 
but unlike Atkinson’s index it does not explicitly express the value judgment underlying 
it. However, an interesting extension of the Gini coefficient proposed by Yitzhaki 
(1983), has most of the properties of the Atkinson’s index. A distributional judgment 
parameter v can be selected by the analyst and the role of v is similar in some significant 
respects to the role of the inequality adversion parameter ε defining the Atkinson index. 
The behavior of the extended Gini in the extremes, v ->1 and v -> ∞, resembles that of 
the Atkinson index at the extremes ε -> 0 and ε -> ∞ of inequality adversion. 
We therefore choose to use these two bottom-sensitive inequality index, such as 
Atkinson’s with ε=5 and the extended Gini with v=10. 
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6. Conclusions 
This thesis in applied labour economics consisted of four research chapters that were 
devoted to the empirical analysis of the impact of the Minimum Wage (MW) on various 
labour market outcomes, identifying the effect by exploiting variation of its "bite" 
across areas and years.  
Once proved empirically that the MW is binding, or, in other words, that it has an effect 
on the wage distribution, it was valuable to look at the employment effects of a MW. 
This is perhaps one of the most contentious issue in labour economics. Contrasting 
theories (Stigler (1946), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Manning (2003)) suggest that a 
minimum wage can have either positive, negative or neutral effects on employment 
depending on one’s priors and so ultimately the effects  must be a matter for empirical 
verification. Despite more than 30 years of empirical work in this area, the effects are 
still disputed and vary across space and time generating room for continued work in this 
area.  
It was also important to investigate the impact of the MW on other labour market 
outcomes. First of all, we looked at unemployment as a robustness check for the 
employment results. Moreover, the effects on unemployment might differ from the 
effects on employment for several reasons. If we suppose that the MW causes job 
losses, some of those who leave their job as a result of the policy might feel discouraged 
and become inactive, thus leaving the labour force. These individuals will no longer 
counted as unemployed. Furthermore, the MW could induce an increase in labour 
supply if additional individuals enter the labour force to search for the now more 
attractive jobs, this will lead unemployment to increase. Secondly, we also looked at 
working hours. Labour market adjustments due to the MW may take place either at the 
extensive margin or at the intensive margin. Most of the literature focuses on the 
extensive margin (employment), it was therefore worthwhile to additionally look at the 
impact on working hours.  
The thesis consisted of four chapters. Most of the analysis focused on the UK. However, 
one chapter used cross-country data. This allowed us to take into account the business 
cycle and to focus on young people, who are more likely to be affected by MW 
legislation. 
 
First of all, the thesis focused on the UK, where a National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
was introduced in 1999 and up-rated in each year since then. This rather extended 
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length of time since implementation constituted an opportunity to take a retrospective 
look at the medium-run impact of the NMW on inequality, employment, unemployment 
and hours of work, where previous studies had only looked at the short-run impacts. 
In chapter 2 and chapter 3, identification was based on variation in the "bite" of the 
NMW across local labour markets and the different sized year on year up-ratings. 
Instead of applying a simply policy-on/policy-off Difference-in-Differences (DiD) 
model, we used an "Incremental Difference-in-Differences" (IDiD) model in which 
each year's change in the NMW was considered as a separate interaction effect. This 
procedure allowed us to evaluate the year on year impact of the up-rating of the NMW 
on different labour market outcomes, using data drawn from the Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
In relation to findings on inequality it appears that raising the NMW is associated with 
reduced lower tail wage inequality in a systematic way each year since its introduction. 
Overall there seems to be no significant association of the NMW on employment, 
however, when we use the IDiD estimation method we retrieve significant positive 
effects on employment in recent years.  Most specifically in the period 2004-6. 
Our findings also suggest that unemployment fell in areas where the NMW had the 
strongest "bite" during the second half of the sample period. Finally, hours worked by 
part-timers grew more in areas more affected by the NMW. When we consider the 
effect on full-time hours, it would appear that there are no significant effects. 
These two first chapters focused on the medium-run effects of the NMW in the UK, a 
period which covered years of positive growth. However, the effects of an up-grade in 
the MW may not be constant across the economic cycle. This was one of the reasons of 
the analysis in chapter 4 which focused on a panel of 33 OECD and European countries 
for the period 1971-2009. The purpose of the analysis was to produce new cross-country 
estimates of the employment effects of the MW. Using international data, cross-national 
variation in the level and timing of the MW uprating was exploited. The panel allowed 
us to take into account the institutional and other policy related differences that might 
had an impact on employment other than the MW. The long panel also allowed us to 
differentiate the effect of MWs on employment in periods of economic downturn as 
well as in periods of economic growth, exploiting the exact timing of the recessionary 
experiences in different countries. The study advanced in  many ways the earlier cross-
country study of the impact of the MW on employment (Neumark and Wascher, 2004). 
The first advance related to extending the dataset of Neumark and Wascher (2004), by 
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including more countries and by extending the time period under scrutiny. The second 
contribution of this study was to generalise the controlling environment to allow for the 
fact that countries are introducing new employment policies, or changing them very 
frequently. In the literature to date this has not been adequately modelled. Another area 
of advance related to one of the starting point and guiding motivation of this research 
which is to examine the effects of the interaction between the depth of the recession and 
the MW. Another contribution was to use different measures of the "bite" of the MW, 
checking the robustness of the results. As in Neumark and Wascher (2004) and in most 
of the MW literature, the Kaitz index defined as the ratio of the MW to an average wage 
was used. However, the percentile at which the MW "bites" the wage distribution and 
the MW relative to GDP per head were also looked at. The final area of our robustness 
investigation was that we attempt to explore the difficult problem of the possible 
endogeneity of the MW or Kaitz variable. The core problem with any MW regression, 
however formulated, is that arguably the measurement errors of the determination of 
employment are not independent of the "bite" of the MW. This is true to the extent that 
any country's government which invokes a MW (or has favourable policies relating to 
its up-rating in real terms) will also have unmeasured, unobserved attributes which 
separately affect the employment level. In this sense – one cannot reasonably assume 
that the variable which measures the MW is a valid exogenous variable to be included 
on the right hand side of such an equation. For this reason a ‘political complexion of the 
government’ instrumental variable (the Schmidt Index) was used.  
A number of interesting conclusions might be drawn from this analysis. First, that cross-
country regressions can be plagued by unobserved heterogeneity which gives rise to 
endogeneity problems. Secondly, that the Kaitz index in this context may well be an 
endogenous variable and that if ones take into account this endogeneity one gets 
reassuringly stable IV. Finally, it would appear that the conclusions regarding the 
employment effects of the MW are very different for adults and young people.  When 
the IV identification strategy is used, results show that there is a small negative 
employment effect of the MW for young people, but that this effect is no present for 
adults. It would appear that the most vulnerable groups in the labour market, whose 
wages are closer to the MW, are most affected by it. Also the negative effect for young 
people appears to be more pronounced during recessions. 
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Chapter 5 aimed at deepening the understanding of whether the NMW contributed to 
the decrease of lower tail wage inequality in the UK, looking at the period from the 
introduction of the policy in 1999 up to 2010.  
In order to estimate the effect of the NMW in the recent trend towards lower tail wage 
inequality in the UK, the methodology exploited by Lee (1999) for the US was used. 
We assumed that the level of wages would have been similar across areas (or would 
have changed similarly), if it were not for the effect of the NMW. Differences in 
average wage levels across areas, that were assumed to be exogenous, therefore induced 
useful variation in the real "bite" of the NMW across areas that allowed the 
identification of its effect net of other confounding forces. 
Three issues that appeared to bias Lee’s (1999) work were addressed, namely, the 
omitted variable bias due to the absence of area fixed effects (Autor et al, 2010), 
measurement error in the variables (Bosh and Manacorda, 2010) and simultaneity bias. 
We addressed the measurement error in the wage data by instrumenting our measure of 
the NMW computed with the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data with 
a new NMW measure computed using the Annual Population Survey (APS). To the 
extent that measurement error in the ASHE data is not correlated with measurement 
error in the APS data, this procedure will purge the estimates of potential correlation 
between the included regressors and the error term due to measurement error. We also 
attempted to solve the simultaneity bias problem in our data using alternative measures 
of wage inequality in our regression, such as the Atkinson index and the Generalised 
Gini.  
By looking at wage differentials of different percentiles q relative to the median wage 
(w
q
it – w
50
it), the results suggests an effect of the NMW on the wage distribution. Using 
2SLS estimation, the point estimates tend to become smaller at higher deciles and are 
statistically significant only up to the first decile, suggesting a negative impact of the 
NMW just on lower tail wage inequality, and also some small spillover effects further 
up the distribution. By testing also different measures of wage inequality, such as the 
Atkinson index and the Generalised Gini, we find again a significant contribution of the 
NMW in reducing wage inequality. 
  
In a period of positive growth in the UK (1999 to 2007), while the overall effect on the 
NMW on employment rate averaged over its existence was neutral, we found small 
positive employment effects from 2003 to 2007. Similarly, the association of the NMW 
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with unemployment was negative in those years. With the suspicion that the effects of 
an upgrade in the MW may not be constant across the economic cycle and across 
different age groups (adults and young) we undertook cross-country analysis to see 
whether the effect of the MW diverge with the aggregate economic conditions for the 
young and adult population. We find basically no significant detrimental effect of the 
MW on adult employment. We also find a small detrimental effect of the MW on the 
employment of young people, with this effect exacerbated in periods of economic 
downturn. Finally, we followed Lee (1999) to analyse whether the NMW in the UK 
contributed to reduce lower tail wage inequality from 1999 to 2010. We find 
confirmation that the NMW actually contributed to the trend towards lower wage 
inequality in the UK in the last 12 years. 
Different issues could be further analysed in future research. An important component 
of our analysis was to analyse whether the effect of the MW is different across the 
business cycle using cross-country data. Up-dating the analysis of the employment 
impact of the NMW in the UK using more years of analysis would help to further 
understand the issue of a possible detrimental effect of the NMW in periods of 
downturn. Also it would help, if possible, to investigate the possibility of including 
aggregate demand controls in the UK local area level analysis. 
 
Another important component of our analysis has been to raise the issue of the potential 
endogeneity of the MW variable in the standard approach to estimating an employment 
equation. Further research should be encouraged in finding appropriate IVs for the MW 
variable. 
Moreover, looking at the effects of the NMW on lower tail wage inequality, we pointed 
out a simultaneity bias problem which arises when applying Lee’s (1999) methodology. 
This is due to the presence of the median wage in both sides of the regression equation. 
Again further research should be encouraged in finding appropriate solutions to this 
issue. 
Finally, further work should focus on firm level datasets, which will allow investigation 
of other potential channels where the MW might have had an impact, such as 
productivity, profits, investments and probability of exit. 
This thesis aimed to empirically investigate the labour market impact of the MW, 
possibly one of the most contentious issues in labour economics. We hope to have  
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significantly contributed to the MW debate and also to have identified future areas of 
research in order to deepen the understanding of this interesting and controversial topic. 
 
 
 
 
 167 
 
Bibliography 
Addison, J. and Ozturk, O. D. (2010). "Minimum Wages, Labor Market 
Institutions and Female Employment and Unemployment: a Cross-Country Analysis", 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 5162. 
Addison, J. T., Teixeira, P. (2003). "The Economics of Employment Protection", 
Journal of Labor Research, 24(1): 85-129. 
Atkinson,  A. (1970). "On the Measurement of Inequality", Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2(3): 244-263. 
Autor, D. Katz, L. and Kearney, M. (2006). "Trends in US Wage Inequality: Re-
assessing the Revisionists", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 96(2): 
189-194. 
Autor, D. Manning, A. and Smith, C. (2010). "The Contribution of the Minimum 
Wage to US Wage Inequality over Three Decades: a Reassessment", NBER Working 
Paper, No. 16533. 
Baker, M Benjamin, D, and Stanger, S. (1999). "The Highs and Lows of the 
Minimum Wage Effect: A Time Series Cross-Section Study of the Canadian Law", 
Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2): 318-350.  
Bartel, L. (2010). "The Study of Electoral Behavior", in Leighley, J. ed.,  The 
Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, Oxford University 
Press, chapter 13. 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E, and Mullainathan, S. (2004). "How Much Should We 
Trust Difference-in-Differences Estimates?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 
249-275. 
Blanchard, O. and Wolfers, J. (2000). "The role of Shocks and Institutions in the 
Rise of European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence",  Economic Journal, 110: 1-
33. 
Boone, J. and Van Ours, J. (2009). "Bringing Unemployed Back to Work: 
Effective Labor Market Policies", De Economist, 157: 293-313. 
 
 168 
 
Bosh, M. and Manacorda, M. (2010). "Minimum Wages and Earnings Inequality in 
Urban Mexico", American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, 2(4): 128-149. 
Brown, C., Gilroy, C. and Kohen, A. (1982). "The Effect of the MW on 
Employment and Unemployment", Journal of Economic Literature, 20(2): 487-528. 
 
Burdett, K. and Mortensen, D. (1998). "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and 
Unemployment", International Economic Review, 39(2): 257-273. 
Butcher, T. Dickens, R. and Manning, A. (2009). "The Impact of the NMW on the 
Wage Distribution", Report for the Low Pay Commission. 
Card, D. (1992). "Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of the 
Federal Minimum Wage", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1): 22-37. 
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1994). "Minimum wages and employment: A case study 
of the fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania", American Economic Review, 
84(4): 772-793.  
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1995). "Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of 
the Minimum Wage", Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Connolly, S., and Gregory, M. (2002). "The National Minimum Wage and Hours of 
Work: Implications for Low Paid Women", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,  
64(Supplement): 607-631. 
Cowell, F. (2011). "Measuring Inequality", Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Di Nardo, J, Fortin, N. and Lemieux, T. (1996). "Labour Market institutions and 
the Distribution of Wages, 1963-1992", Econometrica, 64(5): 1001-1044. 
Dickens, R. and Draca, M. (2005). "The Employment Effects of the October 2003 
Increase in the National Minimum Wage", CEP Discussion Paper n.693. 
Dickens, R. and Manning, A. (2004a). "Has the National Minimum Wage reduced 
UK Wage Inequality?", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 167(4): 613-626. 
Dickens, R. and Manning, A. (2004b). "Spikes and Spill-overs: the Impact of the 
National Minimum Wage  on the Wage Distribution in a Low-Wage Sector", The 
 169 
 
Economic Journal, 114: C95-C101. 
Dickens, R. Machin, S. and Manning A. (1999). "The Effects of Minimum Wages 
on Employment: Theory and Evidence from Britain", Journal of Labor Economics, 
17(1): 1-23 
Dickens, R., Riley R. and Wilkinson, D. (2009). "The Employment and Hours of 
Work Effects of the Changing National Minimum Wage", Report for the Low Pay 
Commission: http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/research/pdf/NMW12.pdf 
Dolado, J., Kramarz F., Machin S., Manning A., Margolis D. and Teulings C.  
(1996). "The Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe",  Economic Policy,  
11(23): 319-70. 
Dolton, P. and Rosazza-Bondibene, C. (2012). "An Evaluation of the International 
Experience of Minimum Wages in an Economic Downturn", Economic Policy, 69: 99-
142. 
Dolton, P., Rosazza-Bondibene, C and Wadsworth, J. (2010). "The UK National 
Minimum Wage in Retrospect", Fiscal Studies, 31: 509-534. 
Dolton, P., Rosazza-Bondibene, C. and Wadsworth, J. (2012). "Employment, 
Inequallity and the UK National Minimum Wage over the Medium-Term", Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74(1): 78-106. 
Donald, S. and Lang, K. (2007). "Inference with Difference-in-Differences and 
other Panel Data", Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2): 221-233. 
Gautié, J. (2010). "France: Towards the end of an active Minimum Wage Policy",  
in Vaughan-Whitehead ed., The MW Revisited in the Enlarged EU, ILO, International 
Labour Office, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK, pp.153-183. 
Hamermesh, S. (1995). "Myth and Measurement: the New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage: Comment", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48: 830-834. 
Lambert, P. (2001). "The Distribution and Redistribution of Income", Manchester 
University Press, Manchester. 
 170 
 
Lee, D. (1999). "Wage Inequality In The United States During The 1980s: Rising 
Dispersion Or Falling Minimum Wage?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 977-
1023. 
Lester, R. (1946). "Wage Diversity and its Theoretical Implications", The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 28(3): 152-9. 
Lester, R. (1947). "Marginalism, Minimum Wages, and Labor Markets", The 
American Economic Review, 37(1): 135-148. 
Low Pay Commission (1998). "The National Minimum Wage. First Report of the 
Low Pay Commission", June, London:  http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file37987.pdf 
Low Pay Commission (2009). "National MW. Low Pay Commission Report 2009", 
March, London: http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/7997-BERR-
Low%20Pay%20Commission-WEB.pdf. 
Machin, S. and Manning, A. (1994). "The Effects of Minimum Wages on Wage 
Dispersion and Employment: Evidence from the U.K. Wage Councils", Industrial and 
labor Relations Review,  47(2): 319-329. 
Manning, A. (2003). "Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competion in Labour 
Markets", Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Manning, A. and Dickens, R. (2002). "The Impact of the National Minimum Wage 
on the Wage Distribution, Poverty and the Gender Pay Gap", Report for the Low Pay 
Commission: http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/pdfs/amrd.pdf 
Metcalf, D. (2008), "Why Has the British National Minimum Wage Had Little or No 
Impact on Employment? ", Journal of Industrial Relations , 50(3): 489-512. 
Montalvo, J. (2011). "Voting after Bombing: Can Terrorist Attacks Change the 
Outcome of Democratic Elections?", Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4): 1146-
1154. 
Nanos, P. (2008). "The Minimum Wage and the Distribution of Wages: Analysing 
the Spillover Effects of the National Minimum Wage in the UK", Preliminary Draft, 
Department of Economics, University of Oxford. 
 171 
 
Neumark D. and Wascher W. (2010). "Minimum Wages", The MIT Press, 
Cambridge (US). 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. (1992). "Employment Effects of Minimum and 
Subminimum wages: Panel Data on State Minimum Wage Laws", Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 46(1): 55-81. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. (2004). "Minimum Wages, Labor Market 
Institutions, and Youth Employment: A Cross-National Analysis", Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 57(2): 223-248. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher W. (2007). "Minimum Wages and Employment", 
Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 3(1-2): 1-182. 
Nickell, S. (1997). "Unemployment and Labour Market Rigidities: Europe versus 
North America", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3): 55-74. 
Nickell, S., Nunziata, L., and Ochel, W. (2005). "Unemployment in the OECD 
since the 1960s: What do We Know?", The Economic Journal, 115(1): 1-27. 
Nunziata, L. (2002). "Unemployment, Labour Market Institutions and Shocks", 
Nuffield College Working Papers in Economics 2002-W16. 
 
OECD (1998). "Making the most of the minimum: statutory MWs, employment and 
poverty", OECD Employment Outlook 1998, chapter 2, pp.31-79, June, Paris. 
OECD (2004). "OECD Employment Outlook", June, Paris. 
Stewart, M. (2002). "Estimating the Impact of the Minimum Wage Using 
Geographical Wage Variation", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
64(Supplement): 583-605. 
Stewart, M. (2004a). "The Impact of the Introduction of the UK Minimum Wage on 
the Employment Probabilities of Low Wage Workers", Journal of European Economic 
Association, 2: 67-97. 
Stewart, M. (2004b). "The Employment Effects of the National Minimum Wage", 
The Economic Journal, 114: C110-C116. 
 172 
 
Stewart, M. (2011a). "Quantile Estimates of Counterfactual Distribution Shifts and 
the Impact of Minimum Wage Increases on the Wage Distribution", Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series A, forthcoming. 
Stewart, M. (2011b). "Wage Inequality, Minimum Wage Effects and Spillover", 
Warwick Economic Research Paper, No 965. 
Stewart, M. and Swaffield, J. (2002). "Using the BHPS Wave 9 Additional 
Questions to Evaluate the Impact of the National Minimum Wage", Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 64(Supplement): 633-652. 
Stewart, M. and Swaffield, J. (2008). "The Other Margin: Do Minimum Wages 
Cause Working Hours Adjustments for Low-Wage Workers?", Economica, 75(297): 
148-167. 
 Stigler, G. (1946). "The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation", American 
Economic Review, 36(3): 358-365. 
Swaffield, J. (2008). "Estimating the Impact of the 7
th
 NMW Up-rating on the Wage 
Growth of Low-wage Workers in Britain", Report for the Low Pay Commission: 
http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/research/pdf/LPC_Research_for_the_2010_Report_
Estimating_the_impact_of_the_7th_NMW_wage_workers_November_2009.PDF 
Teulings, C. (2000). "Aggregation Bias in Elasticities of Substitution and the 
Minimum Wage Paradox",  International Economic Review, 41: 359-398.  
Wooldridge, J. (2002). "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data", 2
nd
 
edition, MIT Press, London, England. 
Wooldridge, J. (2007). "Differences-in-Differences Estimation", NBER Summer 
2007 Workshop on "What’s New in Econometrics?". 
Yitzhaki, S. (1983). "On an Extension of the Gini Inequality Index", International 
Economic Review, 24(3): 617-628 
 
 
 
 
